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Letter from the editor 
his sixth issue of Workers of the World – International Journal on Strikes 
and Social Conflicts is being published in June instead of the beginning of 
2015 mostly because of the difficulties its dossier, “Resisting War in the 
Twentieth Century”, has experienced. Themes as peacekeeping, ‘nation 
building’ or even post-war reconciliation can hardly be considered as ways 
of resisting war. Some of our invitations regarding resistance to war in 
Portugal and its former colonies, the former Jugoslavia or Israel could not 
be met, at least now, and finnaly some of the submitted articles were not 
considered fit to print, at least as they were when submitted. In the end only 
three articles have ‘survived’ the scrutiny of our evaluators. These are 
Fernando Mendiola’s article on war experience and antimilitarism during 
the Spanish Civil War, one by Carlos Ángel Ordás about conscientious 
objection and resistance to compulsory military service in France, Italy and 
Spain (a comparative analysis, from the First World War until the 1980s) 
and Lon Strauss’s «Fear of Infectious Dissent: First World War Military 
Intelligence, Labor, and the Conscientious Objection of Erling Lunde». 
Besisdes the dossier, we publish Christer Thörnqvist and Susanne 
Fransson’s article on unofficial women’s strikes in Sweden in the 1970s and 
1980s and a study by Gonzalo Pérez Álvarez on the formation of a fraction 
of the Argentinian working class in Northeast Chubut, Patagonia. 
For the first time we publish a forum discussing Bryan D. Palmer’s book 
Revolutionary Teamsters: The Minneapolis Truckers’ Strikes of 1934. The 
discussants are Sean Purdy, Sándor John, Marcelo Badaró Mattos and Bryan 
Palmer, who makes a final comment. 
 
Workers of the World is the journal of the International Association Strikes 
and Social Conflicts (http://www.iassc-mshdijon.fr/). This issue is being 
published when the III International Conference of the IASSC is being held 
in Barcelona, from 16 to 19 June. Good work! 
Articles for Workers of the World should be sent to the executive editor at 
workersoftheworld2012@yahoo.co.uk. 
 
António Simões do Paço  
Executive Editor
T 
  
Cogs in the military machine? War experience and 
antimilitarism during the Spanish Civil War
1
 
Fernando Mendiola 
 
 
ntroduction: the antimilitarist perspective(s) 
The civil war of 1936 marked the arrival of modern war in the Spanish state, 
the industrial war that had devastated Europe between 1914 and 1918. With 
its own nuances and characteristics, Spanish society was now also affected 
by the processes of social transformation that the continent had previously 
experienced. Not without controversy, these processes have in part been 
described in the historiography as “brutalization” and the spread of a “war 
culture”.2 Besides these processes, the Great War also shook European 
                                                 
1
 This paper was originally presented in 2014 at the International Conference entitled 
“Resisting War in the 20th Century” at the Universidade Nova de Lisboa and is the fruit of 
long discussions with several friends working in social movements, especially related to 
antimilitarism and historical memory. I also want to thank Robert Curwen for his help with 
the English version of the text. 
2
 The concept of brutalization was proposed years ago by the German historian Mosse to 
describe the changes that took place in German society as a consequence of the experience 
of World War I. MOSSE, G.L. Fallen Soldiers. Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars. 
New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp.159-181. Many years later, in 1938, 
the anarchist and anti-militarist thinker Emma Goldman, whose position we shall be 
analysing over the course of this article, also pointed to the pernicious ethical consequences 
derived from the experience of war, from which thousands of youths had returned 
brutalized and degraded. See PORTER, David, ed. Vision on Fire. Emma Goldman on the 
Spanish Revolution. Oakland/Edinburgh: AK Press, 2006, p.237. The spread of “war 
culture” in the frame of the “European civil war” has been widely explained by 
TRAVERSO, Enzo. A sangre y fuego. De la guerra civil europea. Valencia: PUV, 2009 and 
for contemporary Spain by GONZÁLEZ CALLEJA, E., “La cultura de guerra como 
propuesta historiográfica: una reflexión general desde el contemporaneísmo español”. 
I 
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conscience and politics in another direction, giving rise to the spread of an 
anti-war sentiment that had been uncommon until then. This was reflected 
in the birth of the War Resisters’ International (WRI)3 in 1921. 
In the Spanish case there is no doubt that it was the civil war that unleashed 
brutalization and the spread of a war culture, although it is possible to find 
certain precedents in social conflict and the policies of public order prior to 
the war as well as in the colonial experience. Only five years after including 
the renunciation of war in its constitution, in line with the resolution of the 
Brand-Kellogg Treaty,
4
 the country became immersed in a three-year war as 
a consequence of the attempted coup d’état of July 1936. 
In light of this situation, this article aims to analyse the reactions to the logic 
of war and militarization of those on the anti-fascist side who had 
previously defended a discourse clearly opposed to them. The article 
focuses on two traditions of thought, both of which saw the need for a 
specific social movement in opposition to the army and militarism: one 
                                                                                                                            
Historia Social, 61, 2008.  For his part, Ledesma provides an interesting reflection on the 
usefulness of the concept in the 1930s and the dangers of its uncritical use and makes an 
interesting historiographical critique of the supposed “escalation of violence” in Spain 
during the spring of 1936. See LEDESMA, José Luis. “Qué violencia para qué retaguardia, 
o la República en Guerra de 1936”. Ayer, 76, pp.92-93 and LEDESMA, José Luis. “La 
‘primavera trágica’ trágica de 1936 y la pendiente hacia la guerra civil”. In: SANCHEZ 
PÉREAZ, F.  (coord.) Los mitos del 18 de julio. Barcelona: Crítica, 2013. 
3
 For the birth of the WRI, which was initially named Paco (Peace in Esperanto), see the 
study by PRASAD, D. War is a crime against humanity: The Story of War Resisters’ 
International. London: War Resisters’ International, 2005, pp.87-100. A global survey of 
the rise of pacifism following World War I can be found in the works of Prasad, D. Ibid., 
pp.101-190 and CASTAÑAR, Jesús. Teoría e Historia de la Revolución Noviolenta. 
Barcelona: Virus, 2012, pp.119-214. Also interesting is the collection edited by Brock and 
Socknat with several studies on pacifism in the interwar period. BROCK, P. and 
SOCKNAT, T. (eds.) Challenge to Mars: Essays on Pacifism from 1918 to 1945. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1999. Zahn provides a survey of German pacifism and the 
repression it suffered under Nazism. ZAHN, Gordon C. “Pacifist during the Third Reich”. 
In: BERENBAUM, Michael, (ed.) A mosaic of victims. Non-Jews Persecuted and 
Murdered by the Nazis. New York and London: New York University Press, 1990. 
4
  While a large part of the legislative work of the II Republic can clearly be described as 
having a demilitarizing character, with article 6 of the constitution itself and the reforms of 
Azaña, there are authors who note continuity between the political and military policies of 
Republican Spain and the later unleashing of bellicose and repressive dynamics. 
GONZÁLEZ CALLEJA, E., “Experiencia en combate. Continuidad y cambios en la 
violencia represiva (1931 – 1939)”. Ayer, 76, 2009. The continuity between the colonial 
war and the tactics of the insurgent army has been analysed by NERÍN, G. La guerra que 
vino de África. Barcelona: Crítica, 2005. For a critical review of the treatment of violence 
in the history of the II Republic, see GONZÁLEZ CALLEJA, E. “La historiografía sobre la 
violencia política en la Segunda República española: una reconsideración”.  Hispania Nova, 
Revista de Historia Contemporánea, 11, 2013. 
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tradition was explicitly pacifist and non-violent while the other was 
explicitly anti-militarist, but considered the use of revolutionary violence.
5
 
On the one hand, we find initiatives that echo the positions of the WRI, such 
as the Orden del Olivo (Order of the Olive Branch), created in 1932 by 
some trade union adhesions to the WRI and the Spanish League of War 
Resisters that was created in 1936 and was affiliated to the WRI. The 
majority of the men and women who participated in it were close to the 
libertarian milieu, presided over by the libertarian doctor Amparo Poch.
6
 
From this milieu a critique emerged of the role of violence in revolutionary 
processes, such as the revolution of October 1934, for example, as well as of 
the limited interest shown by the revolutionary currents in defusing the pre-
war climate, which had been increasing since that year.
7
  
On the other hand, we find the majority of the anarcho-syndicalist 
movement, grouped around the Iberian Anarchist Federation (FAI – 
Federación Anarquista Ibérica) and the National Confederation of Labour 
(CNT – Confederación Nacional del Trabajo), which was much more 
concerned with the anti-militarist critique, without that meaning, as we shall 
see, a renunciation of violent means for political action.
8
 
                                                 
5
 This is an approach that is based on the political identity of the subjects themselves. I 
therefore rule out describing the pre-war republican regime as “anti-militarist”, as was done 
by the journalist and man of letters Chaves Nogales in his interesting chronicle La Defensa 
de Madrid of 1938. Sevilla: Espuela de Plata, 2011 [1938], p.25. 
6
 A. Rodrigo has written an interesting biography of this Spanish pacifist and also compiled 
her writings on feminism and naturism. Consult, respectively, RODRIGO, A. Una mujer 
libre. Amparo Poch y Gascón, médica y anarquista. Madrid: Flor del Viento, 2002 and 
Amparo Poch y Gascón, textos de una médica libertaria. Zaragoza: Alcaraván Ediciones, 
2002. 
7
 AGIRRE, Xabier. “Los insumisos del 36: El movimiento antimilitarista y la guerra civil 
española”. In:  Movimiento de Objeción de Conciencia. En legítima desobediencia. Tres 
décadas de objeción, insumisión y antimilitarismo. Madrid: Traficantes de Sueños, 2002, 
pp.28-31; RODRIGO. Una mujer libre. Op.Cit., p.78 and DE LIGT, Bartholomeus. The 
conquest of violence. An Essay on War and Revolution. London, Pluto Press, 1989 [1937], 
p.191.  
8
 A global view of anarchist politics during the II Republic and the Civil War is provided by 
CASANOVA, J. De la calle al frente: el anarcosindicalismo en España (1931-1939). 
Barcelona: Crítica, 1997. Ortega Pérez reviews the antimilitarist principles of anarcho-
syndicalism and its different currents, some of which argued that a strong antimilitarist 
position was compatible with the incorporation of armed practice in political action and 
even with the existence of structures close to military ones. ORTEGA PÉREZ, J., “Durruti 
y las tradiciones del antimilitarismo”. In: MORALES TORO, A. and ORTEGA PÉREZ, J. 
(eds.), El lenguaje de los hechos. Ocho ensayos en torno a Buenaventura Durruti. Madrid: 
La Catarata, 1996. Regarding this, Chris Ealham even writes about “militarized trade 
unions” during CNTs insurrectional strategy in the first half of the 1930s. See his La lucha 
por Barcelona. Clase, cultura y conflicto 1898 - 1937. Madrid: Alianza, 2005, pp.227-230. 
In fact, a large part of the arguments at the Zaragoza Congress in May 1936 and at the 
plenary of the FAI of June that year focused on the proposals of the Nosotros group to 
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In spite of their differences, both traditions were situated in the social orbit 
of anarchist or libertarian culture, and might have become closer had the 
war not begun, if we consider that in January the FAI began a discussion on 
the proposals of non-violent struggle made by Bartholomeus De Ligt, an 
activist of the WRI, and published the De Ligt Plan.
9
 Other examples of this 
proximity were the campaign of disobedience to military service
10
 and the 
meeting that the Libertarian Youth planned to hold in Barcelona on 18 July 
1936, cancelled following the coup d’etat, at which leaders of the WRI and 
the anarchist movement would have participated together.
11
 Perhaps, all this 
was a sign of a break with the earlier position of limited receptiveness to the 
spread of disobedience and non-violent struggle, in the framework of 
anarcho-syndicalism’s change of course in the first half of 1936.12 
We know that both traditions were devastated by the dynamics of war. 
However, their perspective is especially useful for understanding the 
dynamics of militarization that emerged not only at the battle front, but also 
                                                                                                                            
create the embryo of a revolutionary army based on the Defence Cadre of Barcelona, a 
proposal that was rejected by the majority. On this, see GUILLAMÓN, Agustín. Los 
Comités de Defensa de la CNT en Barcelona (1933 – 1938). Barcelona: Aldarull Edicions, 
2011, pp. 27-51. At the Zaragoza Congress, Cipriano Mera opposed the creation of armed 
militias, and even rebuked the defenders of this position: “Ascaso and García Oliver will 
tell us what colour they want for the braids and shoulder patches”. See OLAYA 
MORALES, Francisco. “Preámbulo”. In: MERA, Ciprino. Guerra, exilio y cárcel de un 
anarcosindicalista. Madrid: La Malatesta, 2011, p.17. At the same congress it was decided 
to implement a campaign “to foment aversion to bellicose action and a refusal to do 
military service”. Cited in RICHARDS, Vernon. Enseñanzas de la Revolución Española. 
Madrid: Campo Abierto Ediciones, 1977, p.134. For an evaluation of the rich 
historiography on anarcho-syndicalism in the 1930s, see MARTÍN NIETO, I. “De la clase 
obrera a la acción colectiva. La historiografía sobre el movimiento libertario durante la 
Segunda República y la Guerra Civil”, Historia Social, 73, 2012. 
9
 In the preface to the edition, the anarchist editor of Tierra y Libertad (Land and Freedom) 
underlines that De Ligt’s ideas were to be put in practice by the Spanish proletariat, and 
mainly by the CNT and the FAI, who were “the first ones to do it”. See DE LIGT, 
Bartholomeus. Movilización contra toda Guerra. Barcelona: Ediciones Tierra y Libertad, 
1936, pp.7-8. For more on the thought and career of this Dutch pacifist, see his own work, 
The conquest of violence. Op.Cit., and the study by NOORDEGRAAF, Herman. “The 
anarchopacifism of Bart de Ligt”. In: BROCK and SOCKNAT (eds.) Challenge to Mars. 
Op.Cit.  
10
 Shortly before the start of the war, the WRI’s publication, The War Resister, reported on 
the implementation of “an intense campaign of propaganda in favour of the principles and 
tactics of resistance to war, (…) with the most favourable reception being found amongst 
anarchist organizations and the CNT”. Cited in AGIRRE. “Los insumisos del 36…”. 
Op.Cit., p.31. 
11
 A. Rodrigo gives details on the program of the meeting, at which texts by De Ligt were to 
have been read. Una mujer libre. Op.Cit., pp. 105-106. 
12
 De Ligt was critical of Spanish anarchists for their limited receptiveness to the spread of 
nonviolent struggle in the years prior to the war. See DE LIGT. The conquest of violence. 
Op.Cit., pp. 198-199. The change of course in 1936 is explained by CASANOVA. De la 
calle al frente. Op.Cit., pp.132-152. 
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in the rearguard. In this respect it is worth noting the proposal of one of 
these antimilitarists, Simone Weil, who stated that:  
The very essence of the materialist method is that, in its examination of any 
human event whatever, it attaches much less importance to the ends pursued 
than to the consequences necessarily implied by the working out of the 
means employed. One can neither solve nor even state a problem relating to 
war without having first of all taken apart the mechanism of the military 
struggle, that is, without having analysed the social relations it implies under 
given technical, economic, and social conditions.
13
 
Thus, based on this antimilitarist perspective, or better put, these 
antimilitarist perspectives, namely the writings left to us by these men and 
women, I will now analyse how they experienced and adapted to a context 
that collided frontally with their ideals. My analysis is based above all on 
personal documents (letters and memoirs), in which the protagonists often 
clearly set out the contradictions they were experiencing. Starting from this 
documentation, which can be enriched by new research, I attempt to provide 
a global explanation – one going beyond the existing fragmented 
historiography in this respect – of the analyses and experiences of these 
people who identified themselves as antimilitarists. My analysis is arranged 
around four of the main aspects of the process of militarization that began 
after 18 July 1936: the acceptance of the need for war; the militarization of 
the armed resistance; the recruitment and disciplining of soldiers; and the 
repression of political dissidence.  
 
II. War and violence: necessary evils? 
The start of the Spanish Civil War brought about a de facto fracture in the 
international pacifist movement, divided between those who continued to 
reject violence as a method of opposition to fascism and those who, facing 
the gravity of the situation, decided to choose the armed option, supporting 
the republican side in different ways.
14
 Nonetheless, the nonviolent 
                                                 
13
 Article titled “Sobre la Guerra [Reflections on War]”, published in La Critique Sociale, nº 
10, November 1933, reproduced in WEIL, Simone. Formative Writings. New York: 
Routledge, 2010, p.174.  In the same article, and based on the analysis of different internal 
dynamics generated in the war process, she concluded that “revolutionary war is the tomb 
of the revolution” (p.166). 
14
 There was a strong discrepancy between those whose position changed to one of calling 
for armed support for the republican side (Einstein, Brockway…), and the position of those, 
like Bart de Ligt, who tried to uphold disobedience, passive resistance or boycott the main 
tools of opposition to fascism. See AGIRRE. “Los insumisos del 36…”. Op.Cit., pp. 31-33 
and CASTAÑAR. Teoría e Historia de la Revolución Noviolenta. Op.Cit., pp. 203-214. The 
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argument remained the official position of the WRI, although it supported 
the implementation of mechanisms of solidarity with republican Spain, on 
the line defended by De Ligt. This Dutch pacifist held that, “Considering the 
ideological traditions and the social, political and moral conditions (…) the 
Spanish anti-militarists could do nothing else than resort to arms before the 
military invaders”.15 De Ligt stressed that in his opinion the most coherent 
position would have been to organize a non-violent popular defence on a 
massive scale, with broad international solidarity, as well as trying to disarm 
the army and weaken militarist attitudes prior to the war.
16
  
A similar position was adopted by one of the most representative leaders of 
the Spanish pacifist movement at the time, Julio Brocca. In a letter to R. 
Brown, the honorary secretary of the WRI, Brocca declared that,  
In the circumstances in which the fascist insurgency has taken 
place, the people had no other alternative than to face violence 
with violence (…) From the first moment, I placed myself 
without reserve at the service of freedom, without renouncing, 
however, my principles of absolute resistance to war; that is, I 
have done, and continue to do, as much as I can by word and 
deed for the anti-fascist cause, but without participating in 
violent actions.
17
  
Another of these pacifist militants, Amparo Poch, acted in a similar way. 
This doctor and anarchist militant worked as a doctor in a libertarian 
battalion in the first months of the war; she later went on to manage 
children’s homes under the control of the Ministry of Health, directed at the 
time by the anarchist Federica Montseny.
18
 Following her dismissal in June 
                                                                                                                            
case of the American section of the WRI, the War Resisters’ League, has been studied in 
depth by BENNET, S. H.,  “Pacifismo socialista y revolución social no violenta: la War 
Resisters League y la Guerra Civil Española”. In: JULÍA, S. (ed.) La Guerra Civil española 
1936-1939. Actas del Congreso Internacional La Guerra Civil española 1936-39, 
celebrado en Madrid los días 27, 28 y 29 de noviembre de 2006. Madrid: Sociedad Estatal 
de Conmemoraciones, 2008. An account of the split in the Dutch movement can be found 
in NOORDEGRAAF. “The anarchopacifism of Bart de Ligt”. Op.Cit., pp. 97-98. Cyril 
Joad, another of the proponents of British pacifism, also underscores that facing bombings 
like that of Guernica and bearing in mind the impossibility of promoting revolutionary 
initiatives from the grass roots up, feeding the military escalation would take Europe over 
the edge of the precipice, and he thus preferred to opt for a policy of continental 
demilitarization and boycott of the German armaments industry.  JOAD, Cyril Edwin 
Mitchinson. Why War? Hardmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1939, p.35. 
15
 DE LIGT. The conquest of violence. Op.Cit., p. 198. 
16
 Ibid., pp. 198-200. 
17
 Cited in AGIRRE. “Los insumisos del 36…”. Op.Cit. pp. 31-33. 
18
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1937, she subsequently worked in Barcelona in the Casal de la Dona 
Treballadora [House of the Working Woman], belonging to the 
organization Mujeres Libres [Free Women], of which she was a co-
founder.
19
 Like Brocca, she managed to combine her social work and her 
support for the anti-fascist side with a critical position in regards to “this 
repugnant war that shames us”.20 
While we have documentary accounts of the experience of pacifist leaders, 
there were certainly many other unknown individuals who found themselves 
involved in the war in spite of their anti-war sentiment. One of them was 
Celestino García, a young man who, in the shadow of the chimneys and 
smoke of the Altos Hornos de Vizcaya [Biscay Blast Furnaces], was a 
naturalist and vegetarian. He associated with anarchist circles although he 
kept apart from politics and was more concerned with health and spiritual 
questions, above all with the work of the Hindu thinker Krishnamurti. 
García and a companion of his from the town of Sestao tried to avoid going 
to war so as not to have to bear arms; when recruitment became imminent, 
they spoke to friends from the CNT to enlist in the Bakunin battalion, where 
they obtained positions as adjutants and couriers, often exposed to enemy 
fire, but in which they did not have to carry weapons.
21
 
As noted above, the war produced a rupture in the pacifist movement at the 
international level, with many of its members going to Spain to take part in 
it. One of them was Simone Weil, who explained her decision as follows:  
I don’t like war; but I found the position of those outside the war 
far more horrifying than war itself. When I understood that, as 
much as I tried to believe otherwise, I couldn’t ethically refuse 
to participate in the war – that’s to say, I couldn’t wish every 
day, every hour, victory for some and defeat for others while 
doing nothing myself, I told myself that I must put Paris behind 
me and I caught a train to Barcelona with the intention of 
enlisting.
22
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While in the explicitly pacifist world the war caused a split in many 
collectives, the anarchist movement was in no doubt about the need for an 
armed response to the attempted coup d’état, a response that was in fact 
decisive for stopping the coup in many cities like Barcelona, Madrid or San 
Sebastián/Donostia. Once the war was underway, therefore, it is possible to 
find a whole series of writings and statements in the anarchist world that 
clearly express a rejection of more diplomatic options and, above all, the 
logic of non-intervention as an excuse for isolating the Republic. This can 
be appreciated in the following citation from an article by Camillo Berneri:  
Nobody hates war more than us, but we believe that the moment 
has come for verifying the formula that was spelt out on another 
occasion by Léon Blum himself: ‘It is necessary to accept the 
eventuality of war, in order to save peace’ (…) Pacifism follows 
a road paved, like the road to hell, with good intentions, but this 
road leads to the abysm.
23
  
Another militant who clearly expressed herself in this respect was Emma 
Goldman, who, facing the importance of the moment not only for Spain but 
for the world, declared that, “I consider, therefore, that I must set aside the 
inner aversion that the cruelty of war produces in me”.24 
Furthermore, in the letters that Goldman sent to several of her comrades 
from other countries, she clearly posed the insufficiency of the methods 
based on civil disobedience or passive resistance for confronting fascism. 
She also made a critique of Gandhi’s proposals and asserts that nonviolence 
could not achieve significant social transformations, something that was 
especially verifiable in the framework of a civil war: “Most important of all 
is that mechanized warfare and violence used by the state make non-
resistance utterly futile. What do you think non-resistance could do during 
bombardment from the air – a daily occurrence in Spanish cities and 
towns?”25 In another of her letters, moreover, she mentioned the posture of 
Dutch pacifism, in reference to De Ligt’s group, and stated that, “It is really 
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expecting too much to expect our gallant comrades to abide by the kind of 
pacifism entertained by comrades in Holland”.26 
 Now, in spite of these antimilitarists having no doubt about the need to take 
part in the war, in many of them we find an evident bitterness about its 
consequences. Weil, for example, expressed scepticism about the way in 
which the atmosphere of war smothered revolutionary sentiment. She had 
no doubt about the good faith of  
our anarchist comrades in Catalonia. Yet what do we see over 
there? Alas, there also we see forms of compulsion and 
instances of inhumanity that are directly contrary to the 
libertarian and humanitarian ideal of the anarchists. The 
necessities and the atmosphere of civil war are sweeping away 
the aspirations that we are seeking to defend by means of civil 
war.
27
 
These concerns were even shared by some who did not reject violence as a 
political tool, such as the case of Durruti, who stated at the War Committee: 
“If this situation [of war] is prolonged, it will put an end to the revolution, 
because the man who emerges from it will be more of a beast than a 
human”.28 
In a similar take, Emma Goldman also posed the problem of violence in her 
reflections in a complex and multifaceted way, transmitting her constant 
concern about its consequences while defending its need, both facing 
revolution and in the case of the war in Spain. She stated that, “The function 
of Anarchism in a revolutionary period is to minimize the violence of 
revolution and replace it by constructive efforts. This has been done in 
Spain”.29 
This statement was, however, accompanied by a certain disappointment in 
this period, the spring of 1938, concerning the consequences derived from 
involvement in the war and the use of violence:  
                                                 
26
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More and more I come to the conclusion that there can be no 
Anarchist revolution. By its very violent nature Revolution 
denies everything Anarchism stands for. (…) Whatever the 
reason it is certain, as Spain has again proven, that nothing 
remains of Anarchism when one is forced to make concessions 
that undermine the ideal one has struggled for all one’s life. You 
see, my dear, I do not feel very happy in my shoes.
30
 
 
III: Debates on militarization 
One of the main questions that surfaced on 18 July 1936 concerned the tools 
for confronting the coup d’état. The weak and slow government response 
was very quickly overtaken by rapid grass-roots action, principally by the 
trade union organizations UGT and CNT. This rapid process quickly 
resulted in the formation of armed structures in the framework of the 
political and trade union organizations: the militias.
31
 
Leaving aside the importance of having armed bodies of their own in order 
to obtain quotas of power in the rearguard, the organization of militias in the 
libertarian world made it possible to temporarily resolve a dilemma, that of 
creating large armed organizations with a logic different from that of the 
army. In this respect, there are numerous testimonies that describe the 
militias as having a form of internal organization with a very low level of 
militarization, as well as its characteristic war-like spirit. The latter was 
expressed at a meeting where the march of volunteers towards Zaragoza was 
organized in the early days of the war, “we want to be militiamen of 
freedom, not soldiers with a uniform”.32  
However, the rapid advance of the insurgent troops in the southwest directly 
drew attention to the problems of this type of militia units, which had been 
formed without any type of training or military instruction. Several voices 
were raised that criticized their efficacy using different arguments 
(dispersion of authority, degree of tactical preparation and women’s 
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participation in war, for instance).
33
 At the same time, and in the framework 
of that debate, the idea gradually took hold that a regular army was needed, 
within which the militias should be integrated and militarized; a series of 
steps were taken to this end, culminating in the creation of the Popular 
Army in October 1936.
34
 
This process was carried out with important debates, mainly in the 
libertarian milieu,
35
 since militarization ran directly counter to the latent 
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antimilitarist spirit, above all in the anarchist columns, where it was still 
thought that “the army is chains, the symbol of tyranny”.36 Another good 
example of this is the following article in the anarchist newspaper Nosotros:  
When this word [militarization] is pronounced – why not say it? 
–we feel uneasy, we get anxious, we shudder, because it brings 
to mind constant attacks on dignity and on the human 
personality. Up until yesterday to militarize meant – and there 
are still many who wish for the same thing today – to regiment 
men in such a way that their wills are annulled by breaking their 
personalities in the cogwheels of the barracks.
37
 
Another of the components of the debate was the possibility of organizing 
guerrilla groups, an option that was also initially proposed by some of those 
who were later to defend militarization, such as Cipriano Mera. This option 
was subsequently defended by another anarchist who shared military 
responsibilities with him, Abraham Guillén, who made a strong critique of 
republican military strategy, defending a guerrilla war in the Francoist 
rearguard. Guillén based his arguments on the contrast between the 
militarized model of war he attributed to the Communist Party (in which the 
conquest of territory would lead to control of the population) and a more 
demilitarized model, in which the power of the population, combining 
armed resistance with non-collaboration, would ensure a subsequent victory, 
even at the cost of losing territory at first.
38
 
Now, in spite of the reticence encountered, militarization was accepted 
largely on the basis of technical and pragmatic arguments about the need for 
having a well-organized army to win the war. In the end, in the case of the 
CNT, some authors speak of a “two-phase militarization”: first, maintaining 
a certain autonomy (in fact, the general-secretary of the CNT went as far as 
to say that, “this transformation does not imply a fundamental change, since 
command in the brigades will be exercised by the same men who exercised 
it in the columns”)39 and later, following the events of May 1937, becoming 
increasingly integrated in the brigades of the Popular Army. 
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In fact, the process was accepted by the principal leaders, including those 
who before the war had deeply disagreed on the formation of armed groups, 
like García Oliver or Cipriano Mera. The former declared in a speech of 
March 1937:  
Today, while still being a convinced antimilitarist, in face of the 
fascist oppression… (…) I affirm that the Spanish proletariat – 
anarchist, syndicalist, socialist or communist – will never be 
independent and free and will never be able to analyse any of its 
ideological positions, if it does not have (…) a suitable 
instrument for war, namely military technique and the army 
placed at the service of the revolution.
40
  
For his part, Cipriano Mera wrote that “We have to wage war as it is 
presented to us by a regular army, equipped with all the modern means of 
combat”.41 
Nonetheless, in many cases such acceptance was given in full awareness of 
the contradiction it involved for antimilitarist ideals and of the dangers 
implicit in the new method of organization, with the result that, insofar as 
they could, some individuals made small gestures of resistance, even 
symbolic ones. An example of this is Manuel Carabaño, an anarchist 
militiaman who described his experience as follows:  
In the end we accepted [militarization] with considerable 
enthusiasm. What we never accepted was the normal discipline 
of the army. I refused to wear a uniform, I took my officer’s 
insignia and sewed them onto a leather jacket I used for going 
hunting (…) We never gave military salutes.42  
A similar experience was that of Félix Padín, a young member of the CNT 
from Bilbao, who was named a sergeant in the Durruti Battalion, and who 
explained in his memoirs that although sometimes they had to ensure some 
                                                 
40
 Talk at the Coliseo of Barcelona in January 1937, organized by the Propaganda 
Commission of the Regional Committee of Catalonia.  GARCÍA OLIVER, Juan. El Eco de 
los Pasos. Barcelona: Ibérica de Ediciones y Publicaciones, 1978, p. 409. 
41
 Article in Solidaridad Obrera, 23 March 1937, reproduced in SEMPRUM-MAURA, 
Carlos. Revolución y contrarevolución en Cataluña. Op.Cit., p.214. In his prologue of the 
book by Guillén, Vadillo underlines that some antimilitarist union leaders, such as Mera, 
had surprisingly very good aptitudes as army officers. GUILLÉN. El error militar de la 
República. La pérdida de la guerra civil. Op.Cit., p.14. 
42
 Oral testimony in FRASER. Recuérdalo tú y recuérdalo a los otros. Historia oral de la 
Guerra Civil Española. Op.Cit. Vol.11, p.50. 
Fernando Mendiola 19 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 6, June 2015 
 
kind of discipline with the soldiers, he “did not like to wear military 
insignias”.43 
Emma Goldman provides another example of this contradictory experience. 
She showed understanding for her Spanish comrades and came to accept 
militarization as a necessary incoherence, but at the same time she was 
aware of what it signified. She made this clear in a very eloquent speech in 
Paris in mid-September 1937 at the conference of the IWMA (International 
Working Men’s Association), in which she recognized the contradiction that 
acceptance of war and militarization meant for Spanish anarchism, while at 
the same time expressing her confidence that: “For the present there is no 
danger that they will become cogs in the military wheel”.44 As we shall see 
in the next section, that confidence was not always confirmed in the 
experiences of her antimilitarist comrades. 
 
IV. Recruitment and discipline 
Parallel to the formation of a regular army was the need to have a multitude 
of soldiers available, willing and trained to form part of it. This leads us to 
consider the mechanism for recruiting and disciplining a large part of the 
young, male population of the zone under republican control, irrespective of 
the opinion they might have held about the war.
45
 
The imposition of conscription also resulted in an increase in desertion
46
 as 
a response. This could be in order to avoid enlistment, for which purpose 
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courses of action like flight to mountainous areas, self-mutilation or exile 
were chosen;
47
 or it could involve taking advantage of the situation on the 
front to change sides and continue fighting in accordance with one’s own 
ideology, which in its turn brought a growing concern by the authorities on 
both sides to repress such practices. 
Nonetheless, the repression of desertion also raised critical voices in the 
libertarian camp, such as those of Emma Goldman or Simone Weil, who 
stated:  
We loathe military constraint (…) Well, in Spain there is 
military constraint. In spite of the influx of volunteers, 
mobilization has been ordered. The defence council of the 
Generalitat, in which our FAI comrades hold some of the 
leading posts, has just decreed that the old military code is to be 
applied in the militias.
48
 
This controversy not only arose with the soldiers who were mobilized, but 
also with those volunteers who at a certain moment decided to withdraw 
from the front, with the argument that their enlistment had been completely 
voluntary. This was initially confronted by some anarchist leaders, like 
Durruti, using the power of persuasion and upholding the principle of each 
person’s freedom of action, as reflected in his testimony in the Madrid 
press: “Concerning the person who wants to go home claiming that he 
leaves voluntarily, since he came as a volunteer: after putting a few ideas to 
him, I send him home on foot. I’ve hardly ever reached that extreme”.49 In 
his memoirs, Cipriano Mera also referred to some of his men abandoning 
the front, in this case civil guardsmen.
50
 He reproached them for their 
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conduct and left them free to choose: “If you were not from the CNT, it 
could be said that it was revenge taken against former civil guardsmen; I 
should shoot all of you. Leave your weapons in a stack and get going to 
Madrid”. Although a little later Mera stated that, “the majority of the 
guardsmen reacted well and re-joined the battalion,” he also concluded 
those pages by including his own reflections on the need for greater 
discipline to avoid such situations: “so I started to realize that self-discipline 
was something very complicated and that, during war, the instinct of self-
preservation turns out to be stronger in men than fulfilling their duty”.51 
 In fact, the reality of war resulted in a gradual hardening of discipline in the 
army.
52
 A good example of this change of attitude is provided by the 
anarchist García Oliver. When in September 1936 the lieutenant A. Bayo 
suggested to him the need for greater discipline and even the use of the 
death penalty to improve the performance of his troops, who had just failed 
in their attempt to take Mallorca, García Oliver, at the time head of the War 
Committee of Barcelona, replied as follows:  
Don’t think of those methods of coercion and punishment. A 
comrade who slips up should be corrected affectionately, 
making him understand his mistake, but never depriving him of 
his life. The worker has actively entered into a revolutionary 
period where he is the boss and master instead of the slave. And 
he can no longer be treated as in earlier times and you military 
leaders must convince yourselves of that.
53
  
Months later, in March 1937, however, these are the words he used to 
address the students at one of the military schools: “Officers of the Popular 
Army, you must observe an iron discipline and impose it on your men, who, 
once they have joined the ranks, must cease to be your comrades and 
become cogs in our army’s military machine”54 in an expression that 
breached the trust that Goldman would express some months later. 
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Moreover, it closely resembled the type of soldier sought by other 
republican forces, like the “automaton soldier” referred to by the ERC 
(Republican Left of Catalonia) leader Pedro Puig Subinyá.
55
 
In this case we also find expressions criticizing this type of soldier, as in the 
article published by Solidaridad Obrera subsequent to the discourse of 
García Oliver cited above:  
In recent days we have witnessed events that have destroyed our 
soul and even made us a little pessimistic (…) When our chests 
are heaving with ideas of freedom, with libertarian conceptions 
and rebel thoughts in perfect consonance with our permanent 
activity, it is incomprehensible that comrade ministers should 
express themselves in such terms.
56
  
Beyond the question of whether or not these measures were necessary, the 
effect on some anarchist leaders of this strengthening of discipline can also 
be appreciated, such as the case of Peirats who stated in his memoirs that, 
“As militarization was imposed on the militias, disciplinary measures were 
stepped up and the nascent military caste really took its role to heart. Its 
members had quickly assimilated all the defects of the former soldiers and 
none of their virtues”.57 
In fact, from 1937 onwards, in the framework of militarization and 
following the rise of the communists, some voices were raised in the 
libertarian milieu that were more understanding of the practices of desertion, 
like that of one of the few anarchist military commissars, Ángel González 
Gil-Roldán. According to Peirats, who summarizes and also quotes from 
one of his reports, desertions were due to a combination of factors linked to 
the military situation, hardship and political tensions. He even notes that 
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many deserters were from the communist brigades, where they 
ran the risk of death because of their political ideas, or where 
life was made morally impossible. When dealing with affiliates 
and militants of the CNT, desertion often consisted in a 
clandestine reintegration in the confederal units.
58
  
 
V. Repression of political dissidence 
Finally, we must also consider how the pacifist and antimilitarist tradition fit 
in with the implementation of repressive dynamics against political and 
religious dissidence in the republican rearguard. While occurring on a lesser 
scale than on the insurgent side, repression was unleashed above all in the 
early months, and an important role was played in it by militants of 
antifascist political organizations, which, in the absence of a state apparatus, 
began to take justice into their own hands in different ways. The 
participation of anarchist groups, which were therefore immersed in the 
antimilitarist tradition, is confirmed in these events, in which they shared 
responsibility with other organizations.
59
 
Criticism of these events could also be found in all the antifascist political 
traditions,
60
 both at the time and a posteriori, so it makes no sense to 
mechanically equate denunciation of the repression with the existence of 
pacifist or antimilitarist postulates. For this reason, I will leave aside 
criticism proceeding from other political forces and concentrate on postures 
where criticism of the repression was made from a tradition that included 
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antimilitarism in its theoretical principles, namely anarchism. I will consider 
such criticism in relation to the capture of prisoners of war, repression in the 
rearguard or the repression set in motion following the events of May 1937, 
following which members of left-wing groups also began to suffer political 
persecution, basically those close to the POUM (The Workers’ Party of 
Marxist Unification) and also anarchists. Hence, what follows is an analysis 
of the critical voices that were raised from an openly antimilitarist stance, 
both on the military frontline and in the rear guard. 
One of these voices was that of Cipriano Mera, who openly opposed 
reprisals in the early months of the war, when the atmosphere was clearly 
favourable to them. In his memoirs, he recounted how on more than one 
occasion he opposed these reprisals, such as the case of Sigüenza, when he 
prevented the shooting of the town’s bishop: “with rifle in hand I told the 
comrades that we had come to Sigüenza to fight against those who had risen 
against the people, and not to commit crimes or take reprisals against the 
vanquished”.61 
Indeed, ideological repression was an important concern for many 
antimilitarists, such as Emma Goldman, who reflected that, “the idea that 
while an armed attack on the Revolution calls for an armed defence, it 
doesn’t also, to my mind, necessitate the shooting of people whose only 
crime is their difference of opinion”.62  
Surely, Simone Weil was one of those who posed this problem in a more 
dramatic mode, for example, in her letter to the French writer Georges 
Bernanos:  
In Barcelona, on average 50 men were killed every night in 
punishment expeditions (…) But maybe figures are not the 
essential on this matter. The essential is the attitude regarding 
killing someone. (…) Seemingly brave men told each other with 
a brotherly smile how they had killed priests or ‘fascists’.63 
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And in the rearguard, Joan Peiró was surely the person who most radically 
criticized this dynamic in a series of articles dating from the start of the 
war.
64
 Peiró thought that repression was needed for fighting fascism and for 
the triumph of the revolution, but he expressed his criticism against “the 
modern vampires, those irresponsible who shed blood for the very pleasure 
of shedding it, as if their only aim were dishonouring revolution”.65  
The concern was collective, and in fact in the first weeks of the war we find 
several calls, besides Peiró’s, in the anarchist press appealing for this 
dynamic to be stopped. A good example of this is the manifesto published 
by the FAI on 30 August, which stated that, “we are the enemies of all 
violence, every imposition. We are sickened by all blood that is not the 
blood spilt by the people in its great endeavours for justice”.66 
However, this stance did not only reflect the position of the elite, but was 
also found in many local committees and leaders of the republican 
rearguard. In the case of Catalonia, Izard provides an interesting collection 
based on monographic studies, many of them local ones, which collect 
numerous cases where these local authorities stopped repressive dynamics 
or hid right-wingers and churchmen to save their lives.
67
 We also find 
similar cases in the collectives of Aragón, where the local leaders put a stop 
to the repression unleashed by groups that were going from village to 
village or returning from the front, as in the case of Más de las Matas 
(Teruel), where the militiamen who had taken the village decided that there 
would be no reprisals. Ernesto Margeli, a militant of the CNT, explained 
that this was the stance of the local authorities, who had occasion to 
confront itinerant patrols that said they were also acting in the name of the 
anarchist trade union: “murder was a form of conduct that was absolutely 
anti-anarchist. Unfortunately, not all the comrades had enough education to 
understand it like that”.68 
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One of the main references when it came to stopping repression in the 
rearguard was Melchor Rodríguez, an anarchist from Seville, who from the 
outset played a prominent role in curbing the antifascist repression in 
Madrid. Following an initial four-day period in the post in November 1936, 
he was Delegate of Prisons for several months between 4 December 1936 
and March 1937. He was under the orders of the Minister of Justice, García 
Oliver, also from the CNT, with whom he had a tense relationship. During 
this period he implemented radical measures to guarantee the basic rights of 
prisoners, which saved the lives of hundreds of them and gave rise to 
numerous tensions with those in charge of public order on the Madrid 
Defence Board,
69
 close to the Communist Party. While in this case, 
moreover, propaganda gave a clear humanist colour to the work of Melchor 
Rodríguez, who was nicknamed “the Red Angel”, on more than one 
occasion the activist himself stressed that his conduct responded to a 
political conception of anarchism, where there was no room for the 
extermination of the political enemy. In his speech accepting a small gift 
from several prison functionaries when he had been relieved of his post, he 
insisted that his work involved putting into practice “the socialist-libertarian 
idea”.70 
This critical posture upheld by the anarchist tradition against violations of 
human rights became more evident from May 1937 onwards, when the 
repression in the rearguard also started to be directed against the left-wing 
opposition on the republican side, and especially against the POUM. In fact, 
the murder of the anarchists Berneri and Barbieri during the May Events, 
and the subsequent trial of the POUM, were accompanied by the creation of 
the Military Intelligence Service (SIM – Servicio de Inteligencia Militar), 
which largely drew on Stalinist practices imported by soviet agents; a 
number of voices from the libertarian world were raised against this 
situation.
71
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Paradoxically, however, the alternative put forward by those who in the 
final year of the war criticized the centralization of power and the growing 
weight of the communists in the Negrín government, amongst whom a large 
part of the anarchist forces was found, was to organize a coup d’état. This 
was Colonel Casado’s coup, in which the antimilitarist Mera played a key 
role, and with which the logic of militarism once again inundated the 
republican rearguard on the eve of defeat.
72
 
 
VI. By way of conclusion 
As we have been able to see in the course of these pages, the same thing 
happened to international pacifism and antimilitarism as occurred in Spain: 
the hurricane of war ended up carrying away a large part of the experiences 
promoted in earlier years, with the result that the majority of those opposed 
to the logics of war and militarism ended up accepting them, more or less 
willingly and with greater or less conviction. In fact, in Spain the war put an 
end to an incipient and potentially fruitful – we will never know – 
collaboration between the anarcho-syndicalist movement and the WRI. 
From then onwards, the option of arms was adopted by the great majority of 
antimilitarists, and was, in part, understood by those who rejected it, so the 
logic of war facilitated their militarization and integration in the modern 
disciplined army, in which dissidence and desertion were harshly punished. 
At the same time, the rearguard was also the setting of a cruel repression 
that was debated and discussed in antimilitarist terms. 
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The aim of these lines has not been to raise the question of who was more 
coherent or practical at that time, but to make a contribution that helps us to 
better understand the process of militarization on the republican side. This 
process was understood very lucidly, more often with bitterness and internal 
contradictions, by those who described themselves as pacifists or 
antimilitarists. It was in this scenario where, irrespective of the stance taken, 
these militants put into practice the challenge posed by Simone Weil, that is, 
analysing “the social relations implied in military struggle”. 
This approach enables us to observe how the logic of war and the new 
hierarchies favoured by the use of violence and its centralization overrode 
those who proposed different ways of resolving conflicts and social 
organization. These women and men in no sense questioned the need for a 
military victory over the insurgents, but they observed patterns of conduct 
based on militarism and authoritarianism, such as accepting the logic of war, 
militarization, conscription and ideological repression; at times they 
denounced these patterns of conduct, and at others they promoted them 
against their own principles. 
Returning to these questions today should help us not only to improve our 
analysis of the social dynamics developed in the framework of war, but also 
to enrich certain discourses on anti-Francoist, democratic memory that have 
focused above all – due to the weakness of institutional initiatives – on 
revealing the human and social consequences of the Francoist repression. 
However, we would be doing a disservice to the historical knowledge of the 
ideas of those repressed by Francoism if we were to close our eyes to certain 
processes of militarization that also strongly affected those who experienced 
and suffered from them. In fact, those who clearly defined themselves as 
being opposed to military logic and values tried, if only in part, to curb or 
mitigate them in the context of the war. 
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ntroduction 
In the twentieth century, armed defence of the nation was an unavoidable 
duty for citizens in France, Spain and Italy, as in many other countries. This 
duty, sometimes considered sacred, was not only compulsory during 
wartime, but also in peacetime in the form of compulsory military service 
(CMS). This service was present in most countries in the twentieth century, 
consisting of military training for young men for a determined period of 
time which varied according to the historical and national context. 
Over the course of the century, many men ended up in prison for refusing to 
carry out this task. This defiance first arose as an individual means of action 
stemming from moral, religious or political issues, but it did not take long to 
become a collective movement. The resistance to bear arms grew and 
matured continually throughout the century, becoming a widespread and 
heterogeneous social movement. Many people, ranging from the purest of 
pacifists to the most radical anti-militarists, discovered that CMS was a 
common enemy against which to fight and protest. Resistance to this service 
took on the shape of conscientious objection (CO) and draft-dodging, the 
expressions of which were both very valuable to the development of the 
anti-militarist and pacifist movement: they provided the structure for a 
continuous line of action, a tradition of protest and a meeting point for 
I 
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people who believed in a non-violent society or who simply opposed the 
militarism their countries promoted in different ways. 
The objective of this article is to compare resistance to armed service in 
France, Spain and Italy. The choice of these three countries stems mainly 
from their similarities as well as the need to limit the subject studied for 
reasons of space. 
 
The origin and basis of compulsory military service 
The political, social and economic changes which took place in the 
nineteenth century had a big impact on the way warfare was carried out and 
the configuration of armies. This meant that the twentieth century brought 
forth an attitude of individual and collective resistance towards military 
service, first, and the creation and spread of anti-militarist movements, later. 
The changes in warfare were impacted by the industrial revolution which 
gave rise to a new era in the history of armed conflict with a growing 
tendency toward “total war”. War became a mobilization and deterioration 
issue, and all of the warring country’s resources were allocated to the war 
effort to an unprecedented extent. The railway played an essential role in 
transporting troops and necessary material resources from the most remote 
areas of the country to the battle front. The reach and power of new artillery 
exceeded anything known until then. The end result of a war would be 
influenced as much, if not more, by industrial power as it was by the mass 
conscription which was essential to the conflict.
1
 
Mass conscription came with the change in armies. The French Revolution 
greatly influenced this process as it was the chapter of history that 
determined that the nation belonged to the people, giving rise to the concept 
of a “nation in arms” which implied the duty – in reality, the obligation − of 
defending the nation when it was under threat.
2
 The end result was the 
implementation of a new mass and “egalitarian” recruitment system. 
However, the possibilities of redemption via payment, soldier substitution, 
etc. were progressively implemented, meaning that the only people enlisted 
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were those who could not pay for their redemption or substitution.
3
 On the 
other hand, the “defensive” role of the army was simply a designation and 
not always the most important aspect, as demonstrated by Napoleonic 
expansionism. 
The lower classes started to display their resistance to military conscription 
when it was first implemented and would try all kinds of trickery to avoid 
being enlisted. But as time wore on, these lower classes began to attain 
“class consciousness”, providing them with the awareness that behind the 
wars there were interests which concerned not only the nation, but also the 
benefits for other “classes” who determined the contours of the hostilities, 
but who generally did not form part of the troops. Moreover, the army began 
to be regarded as the state’s weapon − not the nation’s − used to subdue a 
labour movement which was becoming more organized and militant. Those 
who resisted military service were considered deserters, imprisoned and 
sometimes executed.
4
 
Military service to the nation, meaning individuals’ duty to the state, 
became very common in Italy and Spain, no doubt favoured by fascism’s 
influence and its distinct militarist character. In both countries citizens were 
bombarded with patriotic rhetoric, glorifying the army.
5
 Moreover, in Spain 
as in Italy, militarism had the blessing of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, at least 
up to the time of the Second Vatican Council in the early 1960s.
6
 
 
The two world wars: the first resistance 
Although there were a series of organizations, mostly Marxists and 
anarchists, which had displayed their rejection towards war since the 
beginning of the twentieth century, war itself as a historical event was what 
most influenced the appearance of individuals resisting the use of weapons. 
That is how the first meaningful cases of public resistance to war arose in 
the context of the First World War. Figures like the Frenchman Louis 
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Lecoin or the Italian Luigi Lué di San Colombano are examples of this 
personal resistance. Both of them ended up in prison after refusing to bear 
arms during the conflict. Louis Lecoin’s reasons were libertarian and San 
Colombano’s responded to his inspiration in the life of Christ and Tolstoy’s 
pacifist works.
7
 Their cases were not exceptions as there were other men 
who were imprisoned because of their anti-belligerent beliefs, which tended 
to be of anarchist, Christian or socialist inspiration. These incentives arose 
in many other countries and inspired many important international pacifist 
and anti-militarist organisations such as the War Resisters International 
(WRI) or the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR). 
These types of organizations also appeared in the inter-war period in France: 
the Comité de Défense de l’Objection de Conscience was created in 1920, 
the Ligue pour la Reconnaissance Légale de l’Objection de Conscience in 
1924 and the Ligue Scolaire pour la Paix in 1932, which adhered to the 
WRI in 1939. The conscientious objectors who resisted doing CMS ended 
up being imprisoned. The number of them was quite low, ranging from 1 in 
1928 to 7 in 1949.
8
 Nevertheless, as in other countries, many men managed 
to avoid MS by going into exile, deserting or managing to be designated 
“invalid” for armed services, but it is difficult to know if this stemmed from 
their anti-belligerent beliefs, as this can only be known in the cases of those 
who expressed their motivations publicly, like Claudio Baglietto, a young 
Italian who went into exile in 1932 to avoid being recruited.
9
 
The Italian context proved to be more difficult for this cause due to the rise 
of fascism to power in 1922. No alternative could put conscience ahead of 
duty to the state; however, despite this difficult context, there were young 
men who left proof of their resistance to CMS and to violence. As well as 
Baglietto, Aldo Capitini, who had been excluded from CMS due to physical 
problems, published Elementi de un’esperienza religiosa, a book inspired in 
Gandhi’s ideas where he speaks about non-violence and refusal to 
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collaborate.
10
 Capitini was an inspiration and a backing for the resistance of 
individuals who arose later. 
The 1930s were difficult for international pacifism on the other side of the 
Alps as well as in Italy. Fighting fascism or defending peace at any price 
was a generalized debate within the international pacifist movement.
11
 The 
Spanish Civil War was an important episode in this conflict, where the 
emerging Spanish pacifist movement, established around professor José 
Brocca and the Orden del Olivo, was dissolved when the conflict ended.
12
 In 
fact, many pacifists from all over the world decided to put their anti-
belligerent beliefs to the side and defend the anti-fascist cause so that, once 
this objective had been attained, they could  finally abandon arms 
definitively. Others kept resisting the use of violence and when the Second 
World War was declared they hid, went into exile or ended up in prison. 
 
Against compulsory military service 
In the second half of the twentieth century resistance to war continued 
through opposition to CMS. This opposition had different timing and 
rhythms in France, Italy and Spain, but there were many similarities 
between the three countries. On the one hand, the reasons tended to be quite 
similar, mostly religious or political. In all three cases the resisting 
individuals had to face very punitive, and occasionally very militarist, laws 
in each of their countries. On the other hand, personal resistance to CMS 
provided the backbone for the development of a resistance movement with 
very similar stages and traits in all three countries, impregnated with a tough 
anti-militarist criticism. 
The reasons for those who resisted comprised religious, philosophical, 
libertarian and political issues in a broad sense and more specifically 
arguments against imperialism, militarism, the capitalist system, etc. They 
depended on the objector and on the context they developed in. For 
Catholics, the interpretation of the life of Christ, the Sermon on the Mount 
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through which he expressed love for the neighbour, the “Thou shalt not kill” 
commandment and the consideration of God’s law as above man’s law had 
great influence. However, the Catholic objection did not have a presence 
until the Second Vatican Council took place, wherewith the church changed 
its stance in regards to CO, especially with the Pacem in Terris encyclical 
and the Gaudium et Spes pastoral, where those who refused to bear arms for 
conscience-related reasons were attended to. Many Catholic objectors did 
not claim religious reasons up until that point: Prieto Pinna, for example, 
claimed philosophical reasons for his objection in Italy in 1948 in spite of 
his strong religious inspiration. This was the case for many Italian objectors, 
until Giuseppe Gozzini, a member of the Mouvement International de 
Réconciliation (MIR), appeared in 1962. His action brought forth an 
international debate within the Christian community where different 
positions on the subject surfaced, and ended up with Ernesto Baducci being 
imprisoned for supporting Gozzini.
13
 
In Spain, the first Catholic objector was José Luis Beunza, who had been 
very influenced by French Catholic objectors, especially by the members of 
the Communauté de l’Arche. What differentiated the Spanish case was that 
CO appeared in the 1970s, when the Vatican Council had long ended, 
legitimizing the more open sectors of the church. In Spain this appeared in 
some sectors of Catholicism deeply committed to individual rights and 
freedom, amongst which was the right to CO.
14
 It also seems logical to think 
that Catholic motivations were the only ones which could be displayed and 
beheld in certain consideration with Spain being under Franco’s regime, 
although it is true that CO was a way of understanding religion which 
opposed the dictatorship’s national Catholicism.15 
As well as the Catholic objectors, Jehovah’s Witnesses were also very 
present in the three countries, refusing to carry out armed service as this 
would oblige them to excessively neglect their evangelical labour. Despite 
the fact that their cause was neither a pacifist nor an anti-militarist one, it 
was important in countries such as Spain, because of how many of them 
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were imprisoned, jeopardizing Franco’s dictatorship and its intention of 
seeming tolerant towards religion in the international community.
16
 
On the other hand, for the anarchists the army was the antithesis of 
libertarian ideas. Denial of individuality, absolute obedience and forced 
discipline made CMS a difficult task for anarchists to carry out, and they 
also rejected the state’s authority to impose anything upon them. After 
Pinna’s case in Italy, many war-resister anarchists made their rejection of 
CMS public, such as Elvoine Santi, Pietro Ferrua, Mario Barbani or Angelo 
Nurra, all of whom, with the exception of Santi, belonged to the 
Federazione Anarchica Italiana. They carried out their resistance between 
1949 and 1951 as before that the libertarian option was to emigrate to 
Belgium or Switzerland, and less frequently, to England, France or the 
United States.
17
 Exile was an individual solution, which is why collective, 
official, open rejection started to be seriously considered in groups located 
mostly in the north of Italy, in San Remo, Turin, Milan, etc. In the case of 
Spain, the anarchists’ dangerous situation throughout the dictatorship meant 
that there was no public opposition to CMS until well into the 1960s. Up to 
that point the solution had been desertion or exile.
18
 
In France, the Catholic Church proclaimed obedience to the state when a 
citizen was called upon to fulfil his “national obligations”. However, from 
1948 onwards there were sectors within French Catholicism that supported 
the recognition of CO as had occurred in other Protestant countries. 
Regarding libertarian resistance, France had early models like Lecoin 
although most French anarchists who resisted opted to go into exile, only 
beginning to make their opposition public after the Second World War. 
As far as authors who served as inspiration for CMS resistance, Leo 
Tolstoy’s works must be mentioned, especially The Kingdom of God is 
within you. The Russian author was an influence for many of those resisting, 
including Christians and anarchists. With his radical Christianity serving 
him as a base, he defended turning one’s back on the state and acting as if it 
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did not exist, that way obeying and carrying out the rule of love on earth 
dictated by the Gospel. 
Other important examples were Henry David Thoreau, who defended 
disobedience to the state as a duty when it demanded the fulfilment of an 
unjust act and Jean-Maria Muller, who provided conscientious objection 
with the virtue of being an individual’s moral responsibility. Mohandas 
Gandhi was especially influential with his non-cooperation campaign, which 
brought forth a questioning of the social order in which the law developed. 
This point needs to be emphasized, as from the start resistance to CMS 
produced a deep political, social and economic questioning: “War is not an 
accident but the result of certain social and political conditions that need to 
be weighed to ensure peace. The challenge to the military in particular 
implies a questioning of industry, and the whole economic system depends 
in part on national defense”.19 
CMS objectors therefore criticized not only the army, but the whole 
capitalist social order. Lanza de Vasto, Gandhi’s Christian disciple, 
organiser of the Communauté de l’Arche and one of the main CO mentors in 
France and Spain stated that: 
It is useless, ultimately, to refuse military service if, on the other 
hand, one accepts to be an accomplice of injustice and unrest 
which, besides military service, are also due to wars. The desire 
to oppose violence by non- violent means cannot bring the 
conscientious objector to question the whole political and 
economic organization which almost always relies on violence 
and generates violence ( ... ) What should be objected above all 
are the root causes of evil that should be exposed and removed 
(...) the real conscientious objector  objects both in peace and in 
war the abuses, the excesses, the lies covered by the law, 
oppression and exploitation, the industrial and commercial 
system , politics, police and judiciary.
20
 
Resistance and repression 
Resisting CMS implied, for most of the twentieth century, strong repression 
from the state. Those who resisted were accused of disobedience, subject to 
a military penal code and judged by the military tribunal of their countries, 
resulting in a variable number of years in a military penal institution. But 
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this was not the end: when they served their sentence they were again 
summoned to the ranks as they had not yet fulfilled their duty to the nation. 
Refusing again meant going through the same process and this could be 
repeated until the maximum age of military service which ranged from 38 to 
55 years of age, depending on the country and the year.
21
 Usually this series 
of sentences did not go on until that age: after being sentenced a number of 
times to a variable number of years in prison, the young resister received a 
pardon. 
In France, for example, there were 82 objectors imprisoned in 1955; for 36 
of them this was their first sentence; for 31 it was the second; for 11 it was 
the third; for 3 it was the fourth; and there was one individual who had been 
imprisoned for eight years, having been sentenced five times. By 1970, over 
400 young men had been imprisoned in Italy since the end of the Second 
World War for refusing to carry out armed service, while in Spain there had 
been 268 people resisting CMS by 1973, out of which 264 were Jehovah’s 
Witnesses. 72 of them had been in prison for over five years and some of 
them since 1962.
22
 It was not unusual for these individuals to end up in 
psychiatry wards or even to be considered “invalid” when the case started to 
get too much public attention as happened with Pinna the second time he 
was summoned to conscript. 
 
From objection to the anti-militarist movement 
The path to recognising the right to CO followed very similar stages in the 
three countries during which there was a constant dialogue between the state 
and the people resisting CMS. In this dialogue the state was not prepared to 
completely satisfy the resisters’ demands and these resistance groups were 
not satisfied with what was proposed, prolonging and deepening the 
conflict. 
In the beginning it was the objectors and their sympathizers who demanded 
recognition of an alternative civil service (CS) for those who objected for 
religious, philosophical and moral reasons. They were willing to accept this 
even though it was more difficult: it was longer time-wise and as dangerous 
or more than CMS. After some years, countries ended up legalizing this 
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alternative, but accentuating its restrictiveness: it included a tribunal that 
judged who was an objector and who was not; it only recognised CO for 
religious reasons; it penalised propaganda that favoured CO, etc. This late 
recognition came when the objectors’ demands had become broader and 
asked for the same conditions as the rest of conscripted young men and 
recognition of political objection, as well as the demand to not have a jury to 
“judge the objectors’ conscience”. The last stage involved rejection of any 
kind of CMS or CS, emphasizing the negative repercussions CS had on 
unemployment, refusing the authority of state to impose any kind of 
compulsory service and radicalizing criticism towards a global anti-
militarist stance. 
The fact that governments always presented very limited and limiting 
proposals influenced this radicalization process. They did this only when the 
extent of the conflict did not leave them any other alternative than giving in 
to some concessions. The delay in this regard tended to coincide with the 
radicalization of the movements, making the demands that the government 
conceded already outdated in regards to the resistance organizations. 
It can be said that overall the three countries went through similar stages. 
Nevertheless, there was different timing of developments between them. 
France was the country that went through them quickest, especially 
throughout the upheaval of the Algerian war. Italy did not go through a 
similar episode; the process was more linear, although it was influenced by 
the French conflict, the international echo created by the Vietnam War and 
the flaring up of the Cold War. In Spain the dictatorship conditioned the 
appearance of resistance to CMS and it taking the form of a social 
movement, something that did not happen until the transition process began 
in the mid-1970s. Yet in the Spanish case the dictatorship’s strong 
militarism influenced the quick development of an anti-militarist movement 
that brought forth the quantitatively largest European resistance of the 
twentieth century. Spain’s entering NATO and the debate created around 
this issue was also an influence. 
In these three countries the CO issue started with the appearance of young 
men who refused to do CMS and managed to make their actions gain the 
attention of the public. In Italy it started with the aforementioned Prietto 
Pinna in 1948 who began his action having been influenced by one of Aldo 
Capitini’s conferences that same year. Pinna refused to put on the uniform 
and to obey, claiming philosophical convictions.
23
 He carried out his action 
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without any political support and without having looked for a support group 
previously. He and his lawyer, Bruno Segre, aimed to provoke public debate 
around the issue of CO as much as possible to generate recognition of the 
opposition to military service. This debate also appeared in France in 1948 
with the appearance of Jean-Bernard Moreau, a young objector who refused 
due to his Christianity and offered to carry out an alternative CS. His action 
got the attention of publications such as Figaro and Franc-Tireu,
24
 and 
other libertarian pacifist groups and human rights defence associations who 
began to demand recognition of CO. He also had the support of Abad Pierre, 
a member of parliament for the Christian Democrat party, Mouvement 
Républicain Populaire. In Spain resistance to CMS came out publicly in 
1971 with young Beunza’s CO. In the same way that Monreau did, Beunza 
claimed Christianity-related reasons and also offered to carry out an 
alternative CS that worked for the benefit of society. Before his action, 
Beunza had contacted different national and international groups, therefore 
gaining an important support group which came into action the moment he 
was imprisoned.
25
 
These young men’s actions hugely influenced the appearance of the first 
legislative proposals to tackle the issue, most of which were very restrictive: 
they did not recognise CO as a right; instead they simply offered the 
possibility of an alternative to CMS. They were only recognized it if it was 
for religious or sometimes ethical reasons. As well as the possibility of 
doing a CS the objector needed to be recognized as such by a tribunal which 
was totally or partially military. Finally, the CS tended to last a longer 
amount of time and the work was at least as hard as or harder than the one in 
CMS. 
That was the nature of the proposals presented in 1949 by Umberto Calosso 
(PSDI) and Igino Gioirdani (DC) in Italy and by the abbot Pierre and Paul 
Bonet with the support of other SFIO and MRP politicians in France.
26
 
More initiatives sprung up in the 1950s in both these countries, and although 
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they were quite restrictive, they faced political apathy in the best of cases 
and a strong political opposition in the majority of cases. In Spain, the 
resistance to the 1970 and 1971 initiatives was notorious: they were both 
very restrictive and had been presented by a large number of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses who had been carrying out sentence after sentence since 1958. 
Franco’s procurators called CO a “soviet manoeuvre” and tackled the 
concept as if it meant “a direct attack on the political and social system’s 
fundamental ideology”. They did not have any consideration for the 
objectors either, who were designated “psychopaths” and “traitors to the 
nation”.27 The only thing that was resolved was the regulation of the crime 
of refusing to do CMS in 1973 so as to end the frequent occurrence of 
having prisoners sentenced again and again. 
In the years following the appearance of these pioneers, resistance to CMS 
kept growing thanks to the number of objectors refusing to carry out armed 
service and ending up in prison, the spread of pacifist ideas and of non-
violence amongst the population, the development of groups starting to 
combine these theories and practices, and finally, the support of 
international organisations such as WRI, IFOR, MIR, etc. 
France’s case and the impact of the Algerian war proved to be very 
influential for the budding movement in Italy and Spain. The number of 
objectors and deserters between 1954 and 1962 came to around 500 young 
men. The French government stopped cycle-sentences, limiting the 
maximum number of years in prison for refusing to carry out CMS: it went 
from five years in 1958 to three years in 1962.
28
 Simultaneously, resistance 
groups inspired by pacifist and non-violence ideas and using the models of 
Gandhi, Luther King, Thoreau or Tolstoy, among others, arose. Action 
Civique Non-Violente appeared in 1958, founded by Roland Marin and 
Joseph Pyronnet; that same year Secours aux Objecteurs de Conscience 
appeared as one of Lecoin’s initiatives; in 1959 Jeune Résistance was 
founded, a group which was openly disobedient to the state. The war ended 
in 1962, but the groups’ activities did not nor did the growing tendency of 
resistance to CMS with a large number of people in exile or in prison for 
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this reason. The first legal initiative to recognise CO was settled in 1963;
29
 
the hostility felt by many politicians was reflected in the amount of 
modifications carried out to the original text, resulting in a distorted legal 
language where CO was recognized only to a very limited extent. 
Italy’s situation was not accelerated by a colonial war context, but CO and 
the pacifist and non-violence debate started to get more public attention 
from the 1960s onwards with the appearance of organizations based on non-
violence and against CMS. WRI and IFOR sections were created as well as 
the Centro per la Nonviolenza de Perugia, led by Capitini, which centred 
around non-violence and CO. Italian anti-militarism and resistance to CMS 
was supported by the Partito Radicale, founded in 1955 which had an 
important presence in the anti-militarist context from the 1960s onwards. In 
1963 the Gruppo di Azione Nonviolenta was created under Pinna’s 
initiative, spreading to various Italian cities and promoting civil 
disobedience and anti-militarist mobilizations for recognition of CO. In 
addition, in 1962 and with the help of the Gozzini case, Catholic CO started 
to become more and more frequent, impacting the creation of groups all 
over Italy who defended CO. In the end, in December 1972 the first law 
allowing an alternative CS was passed. Although it was as precarious as the 
first proposals presented in the 1950s, the government publicized it claiming 
it was a step forward for democracy and a civil conquest. The resistance 
groups attacked it directly with a campaign called legge-truffa [fraudulent 
law].
30
 
In Spain, the few objectors to appear after Beunza were supported by 
Christian pacifist groups like Justicia y Paz and Pax Christi, and received 
international solidarity from the WRI, IFOR and French and Belgian non-
violence and objectors groups. Collective objection started to develop with 
the launching of self-managed civil services that the objectors installed in 
areas suffering a strong lack of resources, such as the Can Cerra area in the 
L’Hospitalet del Llobregat in Barcelona and other places like Bilbao, 
Madrid, Málaga, Reus, Tarragona and Vic. These initiatives were launched 
between 1975 and 1976, as the political transition process was barely 
beginning. In January 1977, many of these objectors met in Madrid to 
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publicly and unitedly reject the December 1976 law for religious reasons. 
As a result of that meeting, they then formed the Movimiento de Objetores 
de Conciencia (MOC) which turned in to one of the most important 
resisters’ groups; they had an anti-militarist nature and a non-violent 
strategy. CMS resistance began to spread as a social movement. Non-
violence, pacifist and anti-militarist ideas had given rise to more groups 
with the same basis in many areas of the country. The case of Catalonia was 
notorious for the Casal de la Pau foundation (inspired by the Belgian 
Maison de la Paix), where different groups dedicated to pacifism and anti-
militarism came together. The way that the objection phenomenon was 
growing at a national and international scale no doubt influenced the half-
hearted recognition given to CO in the constitution in 1978 although its 
legislative regulation was not installed until 1984 under the Spanish 
Socialist Party (PSOE) government. The socialist legislative project, which 
was also very limited, recognized the possibility of an alternative social 
service for the objectors who were recognised as such.
31
 
None of the legal initiatives that were presented managed to solve the 
problem in any of the countries. The young resistance groups, who by this 
time were organized, made their demands public through a series of 
different types of actions. Resistance to CMS had taken on the shape of a 
social movement and had enlarged its base and its political models. The 
discourse comprised a strong anti-militarist stance and was more and more 
openly disobedient and defiant to the state. When the state tried to react to 
this, the young rebels were prepared to take another step and proposed 
disobedience to the law in spite of the fact that this would mean going back 
to prison. CS was considered free labour and therefore an attack on the 
working class. 
In France, CS was launched in 1964 and showed signs of complications 
from the very year of its launch. These complications became graver after 
May 1968 when many of the objectors ended up in prison for refusing to do 
a job they considered strike-breaking.
32
 In 1972, as a reaction to the 
repression, the Comités de Soutien aux Objecteurs (CSOC) were created in 
Lyon and rapidly spread across all of France. The objectors started to 
abandon their posts in the civil services and objection took on a strong 
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politicized dynamic with numerous groups in favour of draft-dodging 
springing up: the first Groupe d’Insoumission Totale was created in Lyon in 
1972; simultaneously, objectors in Rouen, Caen, Paris and Dreux created 
Groupes d’Insoumission Collective. The following year, many French 
groups were considering combined action and created the Comité de Lutte 
des Objecteurs which were federated independent committees against 
militarization, and whose members gradually became more radical and 
started to defend total insubordination more decisively. At an international 
level, there was a collective international draft-dodging campaign carried 
out by twelve rebels from Belgium, France, Holland and Sweden.
33
 
In Italy the Lega Obiettori di Conscienza (LOC) was founded in 1973 
against the legge-truffa. It started in Rome and in little time spread across all 
of Italy, organizing mobilizations against the law. In their first conference in 
1974, they determined to display disobedience towards CS, preparing to go 
to prison for it. The LOC was made up of people from the radical left, 
libertarians and Partito Radicale militants. From the 1960s on, arguments 
for CO became critical of the social system in general and militarism in 
particular, and this was made evident in the CO collective declarations 
signed by people resisting from all over Italy.
34
 On the other hand, the far 
left created an anti-militarist combat front based on struggle in the barracks, 
highlighting the fight against hierarchy and promoting insubordination. For 
this to be carried out, the Lotta Continua group was created and its 
publication, Proletari in Divisa.
35
 
In Spain, resistance to CMS was joined by the inertia of the movement 
against Spain entering NATO. Anti-militarist groups like the Grup 
Antimilitarista de Barcelona promoted the political debate around 
militarism. Other groups with a number of “revolutionary left” and 
libertarian militants also appeared: Mili KK (Kakitzat in the Basque 
Country) or the Colectivo Antimilitarista Pro Insumisión. It was not possible 
to apply the 1984 law until 1987, and by the time the government tried to 
launch it, all these groups, with the MCO, had a new strategy: draft-
dodging. This strategy was made public in February 1989 through a 
collective action when 57 draft-dodging objectors publicly surrendered 
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themselves to the military authorities to reassert their refusal to perform 
CMS and CS.
36
 
 
Conclusion 
At the end of the twentieth century, the state ended CMS. The wars of the 
past century definitively awoke youth’s resistance to participate in war. If 
armed conflict was the spark, the blaze of the conflict was maintained alive 
in times of peace through opposition to CMS. Personal resistance to 
participate in war or in training for it was the core concept of a social 
movement that spread throughout the second half of the twentieth century 
based on anti-militarist political content against war and its causes. The 
extent of this movement was so broad that in the last decade of the century 
the three countries studied decided to eliminate this obligation. Anti-
militarism developed by the young resister generation was extremely 
uncomfortable for the three states since governments were not prepared to 
give up conscription, because of the open disobedience towards the state 
which the resister groups defended and, finally, because the resistance 
movement questioned every aspect of the countries’ defence policies: 
weapon production, the belligerent episodes resulting from military 
alliances, the capitalism which accompanied war, etc. It ended up becoming 
easier for governments to professionalize the armed forces so as to put a 
stop to an unending source of conflict that dissuasive and repressive policies 
had not managed to terminate. 
Overall, objection and draft-dodging were mostly subdued, except in the 
case of Spain, where almost one million individuals were registered as 
objectors in the 1990s, out of an annual contingent of between 200,000 and 
250,000. To that one must add about 20,000 individuals resisting CMS and 
CS. However, in other countries there were rarely over a few hundred draft-
dodgers.
37
 However, since the armed forces were professionalized in all 
three countries the anti-militarist and pacifist movement has not had a 
similar level of public impact, except when there have been outbreaks of 
armed conflict. However, their main objective was not just to put a stop to 
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CMS, but also to oppose “war and its causes”, something they have not yet 
fully succeeded in. 
 
 Fear of Infectious Dissent: First World War Military 
Intelligence, Labor, and the Conscientious Objection of 
Erling Lunde  
Lon Strauss 
 
 
bout a month after the United States entered the First World War in April 
1917, Congress agreed that the nation would raise a large American army 
through conscription. For the first time in US history, the nation would 
utilize conscription without bounties or other ways for citizens to purchase 
their way out. There were also very few exemptions. In fact, the only clear 
exemption was for divinity students. The drafters of the Selective Service 
Act neglected to address what many peace activists at the turn of the century 
already knew, that individuals could genuinely abhor violence without the 
necessity of religious tenets supporting their belief.  
Erling Hjorthoj Lunde was one those Americans caught up in Selective 
Service, but conscientiously objected to war. Born in April 13, 1891, Lunde 
grew up in Chicago, Illinois. He earned a Bachelor’s of Philosophy from the 
University of Chicago in 1914. Lunde has a prominent legacy as an absolute 
conscientious objector because the National Civil Liberties Bureau 
published a pamphlet on his court-martial in October 1918 and he married a 
well-known activist – Laura Hughes. Yet, very little else about his case and 
the investigation into him prior to his court-martial is known. His case is not 
simply of interest to scholars of conscientious objection, pacifism, and 
dissent in America during the First World War, but also as an example of 
the role military intelligence played in such cases. Their investigation of 
him highlights Lunde’s conscientious objection, but also how there is 
another side to this narrative. Intelligence records hold a treasure trove of 
documentation into the investigations and intelligence agents’ perceptions, 
as well as documents they obtained through surveillance. Additionally, they 
offer insights into the case, such as how they uncovered Lunde’s willingness 
A 
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to work as a civilian in an industry important to the war effort – the railroads 
– contrary to his later arguments against supporting the war effort in any 
form.  
Though Lunde, like many others, struggled with what it meant to be an 
objector, military intelligence officers did not struggle with defining him as 
a dissenter. For these investigators, anyone who spoke out against the war or 
whom they perceived as impeding the war effort was a threat. They 
understood that words could have a powerful inspiration on people’s 
decisions. Erling Lunde’s investigation portrays the influences on 
intelligence officers’ decisions to target objectors like Lunde. Through their 
investigation they displayed political paranoid tendencies that were 
exemplary of the majority of the Military Intelligence Division’s wartime 
domestic surveillance. Intelligence officers were suspicious of Lunde’s 
sincerity as a conscientious objector, and, more importantly, they perceived 
his associations, especially his wife and father, with radical elements at odds 
with his stated beliefs and subversive to the war effort. Ultimately, 
intelligence officers influenced decision makers in the exemption process 
against him.
1
 
The First World War created “a world pacifist movement.” Though, 
Congress declared war on Germany in 1917, not all Americans had given up 
on the debate whether the US should join in the deadly combat in Europe. 
However, pacifist objection could vary immensely among different religious 
or sectarian pacifist groups. Americans altered the connotation of the term 
pacifism in the First World War. Prior to the war, it referred to someone 
working toward international peace. Pacifism was a noble endeavor. During 
the war, patriotic pressures altered its meaning, identifying pacifists with 
draft evaders, socialists, Bolsheviks, and radicals. In the aftermath of 
American participation in the Great War, the word encompassed much of its 
prewar meaning again, but for parts of society, it never lost its vile 
connotations. Thus, those who adhered to a strict definition of pacifism 
during the war, i.e. refused to participate under any circumstances, the word 
gained a new narrower definition. Some American pacifists “combined 
vigorous social action with absolute rejection of violence.” Whereas in the 
prewar years intellectuals led the pacifist—or peace—movement, during the 
war, “it acquired a socialist base.” Hence, it incorporated, and some 
government agents perceived it as embodying, a more radical element. The 
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movement stopped short of revolutionary support. Since patriotism and 
violence bombarded them from all sides, members of the peace movement 
associated physical aggression with an authoritarian state and social 
conformity. Thus, they opted to link their ideals for social equality with 
peace. The intellectual peace movement did not ponder conscientious 
objection prior to the war. They focused their energies more on the decision 
making process which led to war, emphasizing arbitration and rationality.
2
 
Additionally, between 1914 and 1917, the peace movement splintered. 
Many of the older peace societies, such as the American Peace Society, 
joined in the nationalistic aim of peace along American ideals. This also 
meant that they supported an American peace through force, since their 
rhetoric joined that of the war hawks by arguing that Prussianism prevented 
peace. Those left in the movement in 1917 were “a progressive coalition, to 
which antiwar Socialists were added.” They created organizations such as 
the People’s Council of America for Peace and Democracy, a group that 
military intelligence officers perceived as infested with socialists and whose 
aim was to stop conscription and the war effort at all costs.
3
 
Thus, the concept of individual conscience as a legitimate justification for 
an exemption from conscription was especially problematic for military 
planners. The US army had to rapidly expand. The military drastically 
needed enlisted men and officers, a task that called for nothing short of 
inducting as many eligible men as possible into the ranks. However, swift 
expansion was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, from the military’s 
perspective, the “dissenting rabble,” those socialists, anarchists, and others 
that the upper echelons of society viewed as harmful to the American way 
of life, would be caught up in the net of inductees. On the other hand, the 
Army’s need for manpower overrode any and all concerns. For officers of 
the Military Intelligence Division (MID), vigilance was of the utmost 
importance. However, MID grew slowly. Neither the men who joined the 
intelligence ranks nor the commanders of the training camps and infantry 
divisions understood what the primary aim of garnering domestic or 
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negative intelligence was. Plus, the MID leadership did not establish a 
coherent training program for their officers until near the war’s end.4 
In lieu of a comprehensive training program, intelligence officers were left 
relying on their own perceptions of what qualified as a threat and how to 
deal with it. Additionally, though intelligence officers were convinced that a 
nefarious German spy ring was working in America, but could not find 
evidence of it. They convinced themselves that anyone who did not support 
the war must be under German influence, or at the very least naively 
supporting them. The evidence never proved that a masterminded spy 
network existed. They, of course, could not be one-hundred percent certain 
of that. However, they were confident that pre-war undesirables, such as 
socialists, with prominent emigrated German and German-Americans, and 
now including pacifists whose dissent could infect other Americans were 
undermining the war effort due to German propaganda, at German direction, 
or because they were simply naïve. Intelligence officers portrayed political 
paranoid tendencies throughout their investigations. They applied “top-
down reasoning,” instead of listening to the evidence at hand. Even though 
many of their targets were sincere in their conscientious objection and 
pacifism, and did not want to intentionally interfere with the war effort but 
simply be left alone, the intelligence officers convinced themselves, as did 
many draft boards, that this was not the case. Thus, instead of following the 
evidence, the lack of evidence convinced them that their targets were simply 
that good at hiding the truth. Additionally, another aspect of political 
paranoia that intelligence officers exhibited was centrality. They believed 
without a doubt that disrupting the war effort, specifically the draft, was at 
the central goal of dissenters to the war. Intelligence officers were also 
certain that if dissention was allowed to ferment then the government, and 
especially the organizations working toward a successful war effort, would 
lose their autonomy. The Bolshevik Revolution began in early 1917, and 
there were large segments of the middle and upper class in the United States 
could face a similar threat. Lastly, intelligence officers projected these fears 
onto the individuals and groups they investigated, regardless of whether the 
evidence supported it.
5
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The Wilson administration and more powerful socio-economic groups took 
advantage of the war-induced anxieties to eliminate major socialist and 
radical groups, such as the Wobblies. Thus, without the political paranoia 
that was pervasive among American elites and the middle-class those 
extreme actions may not have been successful. As historian John Whiteclay 
Chambers wrote, repression “was entwined with the fabric of American 
society as well as with wartime nationalism and mobilization which 
encouraged it.” The class and status derived paranoia was so pervasive that 
it affected important sections of the government, including the federal 
courts, Congress, and the military. This is evident from Congress members’ 
overwhelming passage of the Espionage Act of 1917, along with the harsher 
provisions of the Sedition Act of 1918. Federal judges upheld the strictest 
interpretations of these Acts, as did the military intelligence agents 
conducting the investigations. They deemed any interpretation other than 
their own as disloyal and evidence of a “nefarious” plot.6 
Yet intelligence officers had to investigate everything brought to their 
attention--from the anonymous tip that one of the soldiers in “X” unit was a 
German spy to the auxiliary female chauffeurs who drove convalescing 
soldiers around the embarkation points. Ralph Van Deman, Chief of MID, 
and his staff organized both positive and negative intelligence sections. 
They defined positive intelligence as “the study of the military, political, 
economic, and social situation abroad.” Negative intelligence referred to 
enemy activities on the home front. They described the importance of 
negative intelligence as: 
The man or woman of foreign sympathy in the United States, 
who prevented the enlistment of one soldier, impaired his 
loyalty, prevented or delayed his arrival in France, hampered the 
supplies he required, or in any other of a thousand ways 
canceled that one man’s usefulness to this nation, did as much 
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for the Kaiser as the German soldier who killed an American in 
battle.
7
 
Intelligence officers worried about the “ruthlessness” of Germany and that 
nation’s mastery of espionage. Due to the diverse ethnic composition of 
American society and the nation’s geographic vastness, MID officers feared 
that the United States was an easy target for German subterfuge. In addition, 
they charged that German agents were sabotaging the American people long 
before the neutral nation entertained thoughts of war. These alleged covert 
agents tainted American opinion of preparedness. They instituted a 
propaganda campaign of peacefulness “to persuade the country to inaction.” 
Such accusations portray intelligence officers’ perceptions of pacifism. 
They saw German subterfuge in citizens’ opposition to conscription, in 
lenient exemption boards, and in pacifist or anti-war organizations. They 
thought that rumors and actions which affected productivity or morale at 
home had the same effect as a “defeat on the battlefield.” Thus, “the 
activities of many elements in the pacifist movements, the extremists among 
the socialists and the IWW, were as proper subjects for investigation and 
repression as mutinous soldiers, deserters or traitors in the ranks;” by 
extension, MID officers included conscientious objectors in this list. Similar 
to a large proportion of society, military officers viewed conscientious 
objectors as slackers, men who were purposefully avoiding their duty to the 
nation. In addition, objectors could negatively influence other soldiers.
8
 
Erling Lunde was one of those pacifists and draft dissenters. He sought an 
exemption from conscription based on his status as a married man and a 
conscientious objector. However, Lunde ran into problems. First, military 
authorities were already aware of him and his father, Theodore Lunde, who 
they thought of as “rabid” pacifists. Second, Erling Lunde’s wife was Laura 
Hughes, an outspoken Canadian pacifist. After Europe went to war, Hughes 
traveled around Canada speaking out against conscription laws. When the 
United States joined the war, she came south and did the same with 
organizations such as the American Liberty Defense League and People’s 
Peace Council—groups MID considered disloyal. Third, Lunde did not 
claim an exemption on religious grounds. He was not a member of one of 
the recognized pacifist religious denominations prior to passage of the 
Selective Service Act. Draft boards did not recognize other forms of 
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conscientious objection. Lastly, his marriage occurred in December 1917, 
six months after the Selective Service Act went into effect.
9
   
The Selective Service Act had several provisions regarding marriage as a 
justification for exemption. Legislators were clear that they did not intend 
the law to interfere with citizens’ right to marry. However, the law stated: 
Boards should scrutinize marriages since May 18, 1917, and 
especially those hastily effected since that time, to determine 
whether the marriage relation was entered into with a primary 
view of evading military service, and unless such is found not to 
be the case boards are hereby authorized to disregard the 
relationship so established as a condition of dependency 
requiring deferred classification under these regulations.
10
 
Lunde argued that his marriage was sincere and not an attempt to escape 
military obligation. He related how he met Laura Hughes in July, 1917. 
They got engaged in August, made a public announcement in September, 
and married on December 29, 1917. In February, 1918, the local draft board 
sent Lunde notice that they had placed him in Class 1, denying his claim for 
exemption as a conscientious objector. He appealed, providing three 
affidavits from friends familiar with his long-standing commitment to 
pacifism. The appeals board denied his reclassification.
11
 
He changed tack in late May. According to Lunde, the piano manufacturing 
company he worked for sent him to take classes in mechanical engineering 
due to a slump in business. During a class at the Armour Institute in 
Chicago, the professor asked for volunteers on behalf of H. B. MacFarland 
to become inspectors for the U.S. Railway Administration. Lunde 
immediately volunteered. That same day, he received his military notice to 
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entrain for a training camp between May 29 and June 2. Two days later, 
MacFarland offered Lunde a position as a material inspector of cars and 
locomotives. Lunde immediately contacted his local draft board to 
reconsider his case as an industrial exemption. McFarland wrote on Lunde’s 
behalf to the District Exemption board. He explained that the work involved 
required men with the proper technical training, which Lunde possessed. 
Such men were very hard to find. In addition, McFarland had learned at a 
meeting in Washington that men in this field would be exempt from the 
draft. Therefore, he argued that the board should reclassify Lunde. The 
exemption board and military authorities did not agree.
12
  
Lunde also attempted to convince the draft board that his wife was 
dependent upon him because she suffered from a nervous disorder. He 
explained that Hughes’s brother died in 1915 while serving the Canadian 
Army in France; consequently, she suffered a nervous breakdown. In 
addition, Hughes was pregnant. If the exemption board did not reclassify 
him, Lunde feared that Hughes’s mental health would fail and endanger 
their unborn child. As with his other attempts, however, this one also 
failed.
13 
 
Why Lunde’s renewed attempt for an exemption failed appears to lie with 
MID officers’ concerns about his and his wife’s loyalties. Though Hughes 
was not publicly speaking against the draft in 1918, she did so throughout 
the majority of 1917 as well as across Canada prior to that. During meetings 
of the American Liberty Defense League in 1917, undercover agents 
overheard her disparaging the military. According to Hughes, military men 
were brutes and war was obsolete. If fighting were the answer, then there 
was no need for the mass shedding of blood. “If we believed that we could 
settle all our civil wrongs by fighting we would take our prize fighters and 
put them in the ring to settle our disputes, but we have Judges on the bench 
for that.” She urged pacifists and conscientious objectors to continue 
resisting participation in the war. Eventually, she believed, the militaristic 
ideology would waiver and the higher ideal of peace would triumph. Such a 
struggle, however, would be long and hard. Many advocates of peace would 
die by militarists’ hands, but “it is better for you to die for your ideals than 
to submit.” Hughes was outspoken against what she termed the military 
machine and overtly supportive of pacifist resistance. For MID officers, she 
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posed a dire threat. They described her as “a radical pacifist and member of 
the People’s Peace Council.” They feared she would undermine American 
men’s fighting spirit while further corrupting and strengthening those who 
were unsupportive, i.e. disloyal. In this scenario, cultural ideas of coverture, 
that a husband and wife shared the same ideals, may have reinforced 
intelligence officers’ views of Lunde.14 
Hughes was not Erling Lunde’s only connection to overt pacifism. His 
father, Theodore Lunde, was a former treasurer of the People’s Peace 
Council. He resided in Chicago and was a purchasing agent or had some 
sort of business relation with the Norwegian government. In the middle of 
1918, the elder Lunde contacted MID regarding why they were blocking a 
passport for Helen Sheehy-Skeffington, an Irishwoman who was known to 
the authorities. Skeffington was the widow of Francis Sheehy-Skeffington, a 
participant in the Easter Rebellion in 1916. British authorities executed him. 
Helen Skeffington was a member of Sinn Fein, a movement that MID 
considered extremely radical and obviously anti-British. They deduced that 
Theodore Lunde’s interest in Mrs. Skeffington clearly indicated his political 
leanings.
15
 
In addition to the influence of his questionable relations, MID officers did 
not believe the younger Lunde was a sincere pacifist. “It is the opinion of 
this office,” one officer stated, “that neither son nor father are conscientious 
objectors at heart, and that it is merely a cloak, for Theodore Lunde has too 
often shown symptoms of belligerency.” They projected the father’s 
belligerence onto the son, disbelieving either man’s sincere commitment to 
pacifism. Captain Charles Daniel Frey, the National Director of the 
American Protective League, discovered the elder Lunde was out on 
$25,000 bail awaiting an appearance before a grand jury to answer charges 
under the Espionage Act. Needless to say, these reports did not endear 
Theodore or Erling Lunde to MID.
16
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In October 1917, Erling Lunde attended a meeting of the American Liberty 
Defense League chaired by a candidate for county judge in Chicago who 
was running on the Socialist ticket. Intelligence officers convinced 
themselves even before U.S. entry into the war that pacifists and socialists 
were in bed together and influenced by German subterfuge. Officers 
perceived meetings like this as proof of that connection. They determined 
that radicals and socialists were threats to the government’s autonomy. 
Interestingly, though, anarchists did not top this list of menaces. Military 
officers admitted that though anarchists were “theoretically the most radical 
element in our midst, and from a local police point of view the most 
dangerous, it has been of minor importance to Military Intelligence.” 
Apparently, MID officers concluded that anarchist propaganda had little to 
no influence on Americans; anarchists were a “very small group,” which 
was never pro-German nor a target for German influences. In addition, the 
movement’s leadership in the United States, specifically Emma Goldman 
and Alexander Berkman, went to prison in mid-June 1917. This left other 
“radicals,” especially what MID officers defined as “‘right wing,’” or 
“German socialism” as the top concern. The official, unpublished history of 
MID states that “in itself socialism is not subversive of the interests of the 
State and a political party endeavoring by ballot to bring it about may be 
just as loyal as any other political party either in or out of power.” Thus, 
intelligence officers begrudgingly acknowledged that even socialism, if it 
sought change through the ballot, was a legitimate political system. 
However, they feared that ethnic Germans dominated the Socialist Party in 
America. In addition, at its core, they feared the Socialist Party was not a 
political apparatus, but “rather a protest party which gathered unto itself all 
the discontented.” Lastly, American socialists professed to be international, 
and thus “anti-national” and against patriotism. Their anti-capitalist stance 
meant that socialists blamed individualistic Wall Street interests for pushing 
the United States to war. Therefore, intelligence officers argued that 
socialists disseminated propaganda against the war. By expressing their 
opinion, socialists bolstered the dissatisfied in the nation. “The baneful 
effect of this propaganda among persons inclined to be discontented, or 
averse for any reason to serve in the war, was soon apparent.” Regardless of 
how unlikely it would be to redeem people who were already reluctant to 
support the war in any way; MID officers saw this anti-capitalist line of 
reasoning as a threat. Intelligence records list anti-draft, registration 
propaganda, and violating the Espionage Act as the primary reasons for 
imprisonment in all of the important socialist cases.
 17
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Yet, intelligence officers displayed a discerning understanding of certain 
aspects of the socialist movement while simultaneously exhibiting political 
paranoid tendencies. On the one hand, they appeared to recognize the 
Socialist Party’s right to exist in America as another political entity as long 
as it worked within the prevailing political system. On the other hand, they 
condemned the socialists for “mustering the forces of discontent at the 
polls.” They feared evidence of a “slight increase” in votes for socialists in 
the ethnic German population; though, they admitted, “it was hardly enough 
to affect the war time elections.” MID officers even recognized that the 
infamous Industrial Workers of the World (IWW or Wobblies), failed on 
several occasions to create enough support for nation-wide strikes, even 
when utilizing popular appeals such as the trials of Eugene V. Debs and 
Thomas Mooney. Thus, there was no real threat that the Wobblies, or 
socialists, could succeed in halting the country’s day-to-day business on a 
local level, let alone a national one. However, this rationalization in no way 
appeared to have halted intelligence officers’ fears that socialists could 
influence Americans, especially draft-age men who were vital to the war 
effort.
18
 
To have a man like Erling Lunde in uniform, whom intelligence officers 
were extremely suspicious of, was hardly appealing. Intelligence officers 
did not trust his sincerity as a conscientious objector. More important, a man 
such as Lunde, active in organizations MID suspected of disloyalty, with a 
wife and father playing prominent roles in those organizations, might well 
prove a negative influence among other men in uniform. On June 1, 1918, 
Lunde wrote to the Secretary of War promising that he would not 
propagandize in the training camp if his appeals were denied. However, his 
father and wife continued to send him pamphlets, bulletins, newsletters, etc. 
from the suspected organizations. Other soldiers could easily happen upon 
this literature and thereby—MID argued—convert them to the pacifist 
cause. It would seem that the military should do its best to keep a man such 
as Lunde out of uniform; on the other hand, that would reward those who 
held un-American views. The Army inducted Lunde on June 2, 1918. He 
went to Jefferson Barracks in St. Louis, Missouri, where he refused to don a 
uniform or otherwise cooperate with authorities. He also declined to accept 
non-combatant service, claiming he did not want to do any work that aided 
the military. He maintained this position even while he sought an exemption 
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to work as an inspector on the railroads that would, by the nature of the 
work, support the war effort. Interrogated by an officer, Lunde explained he 
believed wars were unchristian, as was all killing. War did “not accomplish 
the ends that it was supposed to,” meaning that those who took part in wars 
sowed death and violence instead of peace. He thought international 
disputes should be settled diplomatically and without violence. Therefore, 
he would not help the military machine do its horrible work. Lunde stated 
that he did not belong to any church and based his objection to war upon his 
conscience alone. The officer asked the question authorities always posed to 
conscientious objectors: whether they would do anything if their loved one, 
specifically their female companion, was threatened. Lunde answered that 
he would adhere to his principles and do nothing. He subsequently answered 
the same question before the exemption board with his wife, Laura Hughes, 
standing beside him.
19
 
Theodore Lunde and H. B. MacFarland continued to try to get Lunde 
released from military service. The elder Lunde went to Washington, D.C. 
to speak with a War Department representative about his son’s situation. He 
also met with Congressman Niel Juul, the Representative from Erling 
Lunde’s district. Juul agreed to see what he could do and contacted the 
Adjutant General Henry Pinckney McCain. The Congressman told McCain 
that Lunde would benefit the government more as a rail equipment inspector 
than as a draftee. McCain replied that if General Director William McAdoo 
of the Railroad Administration asked to have Lunde indefinitely furloughed 
for work in that field, he would consider the request, but emphasized that it 
had to go through the proper bureaucratic channels. Privately however, 
McCain told one of his aides, Captain Daniel Frey, to discover whether 
McAdoo was contemplating granting Lunde’s request. Frey should convey 
what sort of man MID believed Lunde was; and to “convince him 
(McAdoo) that Lunde should not be transferred, and that he (The Adjutant 
General) would then refuse the transfer, but that he did not want to make 
any move that could conflict with the Railway Administration, without our 
first straightening the matter out.” McAdoo’s response was that he would 
first have to discuss the matter with MID.
20
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Meanwhile, H. B. MacFarland sent a request to William G. McAdoo to have 
Lunde furloughed. Although Erling Lunde had made it clear that he would 
not accept any work under military authority, he desperately sought a 
position as an inspector for the U.S. Railroad Administration, which was an 
extremely vital industry for prosecuting the war. Anything having to do with 
the rails in the U.S. was of interest to the military. In fact, in March 1918, 
President Wilson nationalized the railroads, establishing McAdoo as the 
Director General to unravel the enormous log-jam preventing materiel from 
being transported and unloaded rapidly for shipment to Europe. Over the 
winter of 1917- 1918, a national railroad crisis led to a paralysis of rail 
movement. A critical result was that coal went undelivered to the majority 
of Americans, leaving them shivering in their homes. Therefore, 
MacFarland argued that it was too difficult to find men who were qualified 
to do this type of work. He needed Lunde and the only way to get him was 
for McAdoo to approve the request.
 
Lunde stated that the work related to 
reliving the coal shortage during the winter was consistent with his pacifist 
beliefs. Yet, MacFarland’s plea had no effect. A letter from the office of the 
Adjutant General sent on July 3 stated: “Under no circumstances will an 
indefinite furlough be granted in the case of this soldier, for the purpose of 
engaging in industry essential to the prosecution of the war.”21 
Both the military establishment and patriotic citizens argued that every 
American should do their part to support the war. This obligation included 
conscientious objectors. In Lunde’s case, he did not start out as an absolute 
conscientious objector. He was willing to accept work with the U.S. 
Railroad Administration, though under civilian —rather than military—
leadership. High ranking officers, as well as the local draft board, rejected 
his appeals. Ironically, agencies such as MID were doing all they could to 
assign Lunde to some form of military service, despite worries that he could 
prove a negative influence upon other soldiers. Lunde was honest about his 
conscientious objection to war in general and to U.S. involvement in this 
conflict in particular, however, military officers ignored him.  
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Following a doctor’s examination that determined Lunde was mentally 
healthy, he was inducted into the Army. Three weeks later, the military sent 
him to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the place where--at the behest of the 
Adjutant General of the Army—they sent all conscientious objectors. At 
some point in July, military authorities transferred Lunde and the other 
objectors to Fort Riley, Kansas. In a letter to Hughes, Lunde explained that 
at first he was willing to do some kitchen duty and at least make a show of 
cooperating. Lunde and some others believed that if they did not overtly 
resist they would still get a square deal from the government. They were 
waiting to see what reforms the Wilson administration would enact. Lunde 
did the aforementioned work before arriving at Fort Riley, “merely as a 
good fellow to allow time for a definite policy to crystallize.” However, he 
acknowledged that his earlier assumptions were naïve and proved false. 
As this is military service, and since I have refused to all 
commitees (sic) that have quizzed me, to take any part in the 
military machine either non-combatant or combatant, I must 
now take my stand absolutely, and take the consequences. I 
harbor no ill feelings toward the officers or the government. 
They are merely going at this systematically to weed out men 
who claim to be C.O.’s, and can’t differentiate between military 
and civil service.
22
 
The officers called upon the conscientious objectors to dig latrines for 
themselves, do kitchen duty, clean up the camp grounds, and perform other 
demeaning tasks Lunde’s understanding of President Wilson’s policy was 
that they were responsible for keeping themselves and their quarters clean, 
as well as preparing their own food, and nothing more. He felt that he and 
the others were at the military camp involuntarily and the least the 
government could do was provide cooked food and basic sanitary 
conditions. He did not think poorly of the soldiers—mostly non-
commissioned officers—who watched over them. He felt he got along 
amicably with the military men with whom he came into contact. In fact, 
they were friendly to him because of his disposition and the fact that he had 
some influence among the other conscientious objectors. Intelligence 
officers perceived his influence and charisma as evidence that he posed a 
threat to the army and national security.
23
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The Adjutant General had decided that he would never authorize an 
indefinite furlough for Lunde. In late August, 1918, Lunde went on a twelve 
day hunger strike in protest. On October 15, a military tribunal court-
martialed him. Lunde explained that this situation came about when, on 
September 17, military authorities sent Colonel J. C. Waterman to order 
Lunde and the others to do “camp police” work, which was non-combatant 
in nature. As Lunde described it, he made explicit his position about any 
combatant or non-combatant work. After meeting with the Board of 
Inquiry—that interviewed objectors around the nation to review their cases 
and determine their sincerity—while at Fort Leavenworth, the board 
proclaimed Lunde to be a legitimate conscientious objector. Even so, the 
military did not discharge him. Lunde continued to refuse any non-
combatant work, even a job with the Corps of Engineers that was similar to 
the one he sought with the U.S. Railroad Administration.
24
  
Upon his arrival, Colonel Waterman offered Lunde and other “absolute” 
objectors various non-combatant positions. When they refused, he ordered 
them to do “camp police” work, which would have entailed cutting the grass 
around the camp and picking up trash. When Lunde refused, Waterman 
ordered him solitary confinement and fed only bread and water for three 
days. Soon after, he was court-martialed. Erling Lunde’s case provides an 
example of an absolute conscientious objector whose rejection of draftee 
status posed a threat to the military establishment and, because he was 
influential among his peers and had associated with “radical pacifists,” 
intelligence officers deemed him a national threat as a civilian, as well.
25
 
MID officers’ obsessive and contradictory attitudes led them to be deeply 
concerned about uniformed soldiers attending meetings with civilians who 
they considered to be less than loyal. In September 1918, Sergeant B. F. 
Hargrove infiltrated the Young People’s Socialist League in St. Louis. He 
became convinced that the League was “not one percent loyal” and that the 
Socialist Party platform represented a repudiation of true American values. 
“They have indorsed (sic) the Bolsheviki form of government, up-hold the 
IWW, oppose conscription, advocate a revolution and are otherwise anti-
war in their activities.” Hargrove listed at least seven soldiers and sailors he 
had discovered were members of the organization. In addition, he learned 
that one of these individuals “is actively engaged in spreading Socialist 
Propaganda in his respective camp and has been successful in interesting 
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about 25 fellow men. If his line of propaganda is similar to that preached at 
the meetings of the league, which is revolutionary in character,” he warned 
that, “it may have some influence on other soldiers.”26 
The military needed manpower and their chief source was obviously the 
working class. But the view persisted that many among the working class 
had a different agenda than loyally serving the United States. Their 
allegiance was in question. There had been several financial panics in the 
preceding decades that influenced hiring rates, wages, and cost of living. 
According to Carroll D. Wright, the United States Commissioner of Labor, 
1880 marked a significant shift in labor unrest from all previous years in 
American history. In that year, there were 618 strikes, whereas the largest 
number of strikes recorded prior to then was 51 in 1879. Between 1881 and 
1900, there were approximately 22,793 recorded strikes. Considering that 
1880 had witnessed the largest number of strikes up to that year, the 
explosion of strikes in the following decade clearly indicated massive labor 
unrest. In addition, there were major strike waves in 1910, 1912, and 1913, 
as well as an increase in labor disputes in 1916 and 1917. Unemployment 
peaked in 1900 at 1,420,000, then again in 1904 at 1,490,000. In 1906, the 
economy was more stable, with only 280,000 unemployed; just two years—
and another recession—later, those figures jumped to 2,960,000. Over the 
next five years, unemployment hovered around 2 million; then, in 1914, 
increased to 3,110,000 and jumped another 730,000 in 1915. During this 
volatile period for workers, membership in unions and the Socialist Party 
rose. Eugene Debs, running on the Socialist ticket, received 900,000 votes 
in the Presidential election of 1912. He gained six percent of the overall 
vote. In 1914, there were 1,200 socialist incumbents in municipal positions. 
Fourteen states elected thirty-three legislators from the Socialist Party. 
Some called it the “‘golden age of American socialism.’” In addition, the 
more radical Industrial Workers of the World had a membership of about 
100,000 by 1914 and probably gained another 50,000 before 1917.
27
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While the labor unrest and pro-labor organizations grew, the business 
community stigmatized strikers and unions as disloyal. Addressing a crowd 
in New York City on Columbus Day 1915, Theodore Roosevelt emphasized 
100 percent Americanism and that “labor troubles are not American.” He 
announced that even though the United States was neutral, German agents 
were stirring up labor discontent in munitions factories. Even worse, though, 
were “the labor troubles here not caused by foreign agents. These must 
cease if we were to have the true American spirit.” William C. Durant, 
President of General Motors, likened the labor unrest in the United States to 
a volcano. He told Colonel Edward House, President Wilson’s adviser, that 
America’s entrance into the Great War could “‘cause an eruption.’” 
Historian David Kennedy explains in Over Here that the Wilson 
administration feared the pacifistic appeal of the Socialist Party could derail 
the American war effort. Businessmen, he stated, reveled at the opportunity 
to legitimately brand all labor unrest as disloyal, something they did not shy 
away from doing before.
28
  
Military intelligence officers feared socialist or labor unrest would disrupt 
governmental authority in war time. They only had to look at recent history, 
such as the Lawrence, Massachusetts strike of 1912, to see how the IWW 
and socialists worked together toward a common goal—disrupting 
capitalism. Intelligence officers were watching men in uniform very closely 
for fear that some were themselves “seditious propagandists” and others 
were being overly influenced by them. Their political paranoid tendencies 
led them to block exemptions for men they considered subversive, like 
Erling Lunde. At the same time that they were making examples of 
“slackers,” they were also concerned about their dissident influences within 
the military. During Lunde’s defense in the court martial hearing, he 
explained that he had always had a history of pacifism, teaching universal 
respect and avoiding militarism. His father, Theodore, kept poor company 
as far as military intelligence officers were concerned. Laura Hughes, 
especially, was of concern. She was very outspoken in Canada prior to 
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American entrance in the war. During 1917, she was seditious in the US, as 
well, speaking at socialist, anti-war gatherings. Therefore, intelligence 
officers deemed Erling Lunde a clear threat and an insincere conscientious 
objector. The way they saw it, they had to do everything in their power to 
block not only his exemption from the draft, but also any possibility of him 
gaining access to vital national security-related work, such as with the 
railroads. The evidence against Lunde was scant, at best. The Board of 
Inquiry—established by the Secretary of War in 1918 to review objector 
cases—determined Lunde was sincere. Yet, military officers’ political 
paranoid tendencies influenced their decision to ignore such information and 
instead engineer grounds for a court martial. Erling Lunde’s case highlights 
larger societal, political paranoid tendencies toward socialism and pacifism, 
as well as the murky waters that American citizens had to navigate between 
expected obligations to the state and their conscience.
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 Women and Wildcats: Unofficial Women’s Strikes in Sweden 
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ntroduction 
For about two and a half decades, there has been a move towards 
tertiarization and feminization of industrial conflict in Western societies. 
While the strike propensity in manufacturing declined in the 1980s and 
1990s, it remained high, in fact even increased, in the tertiary sector 
(services, health care, education and so on).
1
 The growing portion of tertiary 
sector employment has further moved the focus from men to women, as the 
demographic transformation in work has promoted a feminization of 
strikes.
2
 But is a “feminization” of strikes just a move of strike activities 
from male-dominated occupations to female-dominated ones?  
It is clear that the dividing line goes between occupations and industries, not 
between men and women per se. Yet, occupational differences are 
themselves gendered. In the words of Linda Briskin, this is crucial for 
understanding women’s strikes: “As a system of social power, gender 
structures social organization, and produces and reproduces hierarchies and 
inequalities, and men’s privilege. Via institutions, policies, laws, ideologies 
and everyday practices, it structures work (as does class relations)”.3 
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Briskin’s primary concern was Canadian nurses’ strikes, but her view is 
both international and cross-sectoral. However, what if we go back in 
history, to when strikes and industrial conflict was still mainly men’s 
concern? Did women go on strike at all, and if so, how did their strikes 
differ from the overall pattern?  
Our aim is therefore to explore women’s strikes in Sweden in the 1970s and 
1980s. The 1970s was the decade of the “resurgence of class conflict” in 
Western societies, with an outstanding upsurge of strikes in many 
countries.
4
 There is an affluence of studies of both the 1970s strike waves 
and single strikes in this “rebellious” decade, but few of them make any 
distinctions between male- and female-dominated strikes. The strike was 
still in the 1970s and 1980s a “male” conflict weapon, employed by blue-
collar workers in manufacturing, mines, harbours and so on. In the early 
1990s, the Finnish scholars Raija Julkunen and Liisa Rantalaiho 
provokingly asked if there really were no women on strike, or if they were 
just “silenced” in labour history and sociology: “The tacit presumption that 
the history of the working class is the history of male workers has been 
preserved intact”, they claimed, and “a woman on strike is an anomaly, a 
silenced and deviant case”.5 
In the following article we shall therefore highlight those less known 
women’s strikes in the 1970s and 1980s. We limit the study to strikes in our 
home country, Sweden. Yet we believe that the results will be of general 
interest, as Sweden fits very well into the international strike wave pattern in 
the 1970s and 1980s.
6
 We will also relate the female-dominated strikes we 
discuss to the male-dominated ones in the same period. Swedish legislation 
makes a sharp distinction between official, legal strikes and unofficial 
“wildcat” strikes. The increase in the 1970s was solely due to the upswing 
of unofficial actions, and most female-dominated strikes were also wildcats. 
We therefore pay special attention to the treatment of women’s strikes in the 
Swedish Labour Court, following Briskin’s advice that “institutions, 
policies, laws, ideologies” are crucial to understand how the gender system 
affects gender differences in the labour market in general and industrial 
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conflict in particular. Consequently, besides material from labour market 
organizations, mass media and interviews, we draw heavily on the Swedish 
Labour Court as an important source. 
The next section gives an overview of the judicial framework. It is followed 
by a section dealing with the most prominent women’s strikes during the 
period, and thereafter a section dedicated to the treatment in the Labour 
Court. The final section summarizes the findings and presents our 
conclusions. 
 
The legal framework 
Up to the late 1920s, there was no legal right to strike in Sweden. On the 
other hand, no legislation forbade it either. Both the government and 
organized capital saw strikes as potential threats to society though, and 
strikers could be met by police or even military forces. There was also a law 
from 1899 forbidding workers to encourage other workers to strike or to try 
to prevent them from strikebreaking. Moreover, strike participants violated 
individual employment contracts and could therefore be fired, blacklisted or 
even evicted from their homes. 
In 1928, after protests from the labour movement, the right-wing 
government passed two new laws, the Collective Agreement Act and the 
Labour Court Act. Striking was now declared legal if a trade union had 
given due notice, but with the limitation that the previous collective 
agreement had expired; the conclusion of a collective agreement 
immediately led to a ban on strikes and lockouts. If this ban were broken, 
the new Labour Court could sentence the individual participant to pay 
damages up to 200 Swedish Kronor (SEK), a sum that was about equal to a 
month’s pay for a blue-collar worker at the time. There was also a 
considerable risk of getting fired.
7
 
The Collective Agreement Act was still in force when the first post-war 
strike-wave hit Sweden in 1969-70. New labour market legislation was 
introduced in the mid-1970s that was to a large extent a result of the strong 
grass-root uprising; the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and the 
social democratic government was more or less forced to introduce new 
laws. The outcome was, however ,not exactly what the grass roots had 
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expected. To strike was a democratic right guaranteed by the Governmental 
Act, one of the fundamental laws in Sweden. But, according to the new law, 
the 1976 Codetermination Act, it was not up to the individual to employ that 
right; a strike had to be launched by a trade union and only on the condition 
that it did not violate any collective agreement.
8
 Furthermore, the damages 
one could have to pay for taking part in unofficial strikes increased about 
ten times, although the main stress was on the trade union, not on the 
individual; trade unions were obliged to act to prevent or stop wildcat 
strikes.
9
 
The new legislation in the 1970s touched another sore spot in labour market 
regulation. Already in the so-called December Compromise of 1906, the LO 
had recognized the “freedom of work”, that is, the employers’ exclusive 
right to hire and fire, and to freely manage and distribute work. In return the 
Swedish Employers’ Confederation (SAF), formally recognized workers’ 
right to join unions and for unions to negotiate wages and working 
conditions on behalf of their members.
10
 In 1974, however, the social 
democratic government introduced the Employment Security Act, which 
stated that firing could be legally challenged. Firings could not be reversed, 
but if the Court found them unjustified, the employer had to pay expensive 
damages. Taking part in unofficial strikes was at the same time declared a 
reason for firing, but that was just a codification of an existing practice. The 
Codetermination Act slightly modified the right, but brought no radical 
change.
11
 The first precedent of the right to fire workers due to participation 
in a wildcat strike according to the new legislation was actually one of the 
women’s strikes we will discuss below. 
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Women on strike in the 1970s and 1980s 
Women’s share of the strike waves was only a small fraction of the total 
upsurge. An in-depth study of strikes in Sweden from 1975-79 shows that 
only 14 out of a total of more than 200 strikes, that is, 7 per cent, were 
organized by women. None of them were sanctioned by a trade union and 
thus were not protected by law.
12
 Most wildcats were reactions against poor 
outcomes of firm-level negotiations, but some were protests against 
insulting behaviour from management, bad work environments, or 
piecework systems.
13
 For a longer wildcat to be successful, financial support 
and media publicity were often crucial. As we will see, women’s wildcats 
had a problem with this.
14
 
The Cleaners’ strike, ASAB 1974-75 
The Swedish strike-wave took off with the large, three months long, 
unofficial and much publicized miners’ strike against the company LKAB 
in the very north of Sweden in December 1969. This certainly was a great 
upheaval that made a lasting impact on the Swedish labour market. Yet, 
miners were one of the most male-dominated occupational groups of all, 
and women were only noticed as miners’ wives, supporting their husbands 
and taking care of the households during the austerity the lack of income 
caused. The first strike with women protagonists came almost exactly five 
years after. In the early 1970s, the company ASAB had grown to be 
Sweden’s largest cleaning entrepreneur with some 8,000 employees. About 
7,000 of them were hired on part-time contracts, 80 per cent were women 
and 30 per cent had non-Swedish citizenship. Furthermore, it was a common 
opinion among the cleaners that ASAB’s take over lead to a higher work 
pace and lower pay.
15
 In the fall of 1974, ASAB introduced a new 
piecework system in all its operations. The new system increased the work 
pace without any pay compensation, and was thus the straw that broke the 
cleaning ladies’ back. The Real Estate Workers’ Union (Fastighets), had 
accepted the new pay system, but its members did not. Wildcat strikes broke 
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out in five different places. It started at the ironworks Domnarvet in 
Borlänge, mid-Sweden, and spread to the ore fields in north Sweden, to 
hotels and stores in Umeå, also in the north of Sweden, to Arlanda airport 
outside Stockholm and to a hotel, Billingen, in Skövde in western Sweden. 
Roughly 350 cleaners – all of them women – were on strike.16 
Domnarvet, Borlänge 
The uprising started at Domnarvet in Borlänge with a strike that lasted about 
one week. Although the strike violated the existing agreement, it led to a 
considerable wage increase.
17
 The cleaners had recently formed a local trade 
union branch and when the strike emerged, all union representatives 
withdrew from their positions of trust to be able to join the non-sanctioned 
action without risking serious reprisals. This was at the time a rather 
common way for trade union representatives to act during wildcat actions in 
order to show solidarity with the workers at their own workplace rather than 
with the trade union’s official policy.18 
The ore fields in northern Sweden 
Another struck company was LKAB, where the strike lasted about a month. 
“Cleaners are humans too”, a strikers’ slogan declared, with a clear 
reference to the great miners’ strike five years earlier in the same ore fields. 
The wages were gendered: former miners, who due to bad health or 
occupational injuries been transferred to cleaning, gained about twice the 
pay of female cleaners.
19
 The trade union, Fastighets, took a hostile stand 
towards the strike, stating that the claim to maintain the former wage-setting 
system was “beyond reason”. The strikers therefore elected a special strike 
committee to represent them. Besides the lack of support from their union, 
the cleaners had problems with strike breakers. According to the Work 
Environment Act, employers must always prevent health dangers and 
hazardous situations for people not taking part in a conflict. Hence, LKAB 
and ASAB could bring in personnel from other LKAB sites. The safety 
ombudsman took the side of the striking women and wanted to close parts 
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of the workplace, but he had no legal means to prevent other cleaners doing 
the strikers’ normal work tasks.20 
Most of the striking women were married to miners and got strong support 
from the people in the area. Money remaining from a strike fund from the 
miners’ strike in 1969-70 helped them financially. The outcome was that the 
strike did not stop the introduction of the new pay system, but the cleaners 
won a considerable wage raise as compensation. But also, the strike ended 
in the Labour Court and the participants were sentenced to pay damages for 
breaking the peace obligation. The damages were almost symbolic and 
nobody was fired, but the Labour Court made a clear ideological statement: 
one of the cleaners escaped the damages because she had wished to work, 
but was too afraid of harassment from the other workers to dare. Since she 
had notified the employer in writing before the strike, she was freed from all 
damages.
21
 
Hotell Billingen, Skövde 
The strikes at Domnarvet and LKAB were rather successful. In Skövde, 
though, the strike ended in a disaster – and in the Labour Court. When 
ASAB took over all cleaning business at Hotell Billingen in 1973, it 
shortened the average working day from eight to six-and-a-half hours, but 
instead extended the working week to six days and the limit for a 
performance bonus was raised.
22
 Of a total of 20 cleaners, eight were hired 
by demand, meaning that they had a formal employment contract, but no 
regulated working hours, and accordingly only got paid for hours worked. 
Such employment contracts were later found unacceptable by the Labour 
Court.
23
 There were further eight MTM managers following the 20 women, 
which they found highly provoking. Most of the women were members of 
Fastighets, but the protests against the new work organization got no union 
support. The cleaners therefore dissolved the local union branch and 
unanimously decided to go on a wildcat strike. Besides the claim to get back 
their former working contracts, the strike was a sympathetic strike for the 
conflicts in Borlänge and the mine-fields, and also to pressure a wage claim 
that had not been satisfied in the recent local negotiations. But already on 
the second day of the strike, two cleaners were fired as “strike leaders”; 
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thereafter the main demand was to revoke their dismissal.
24
 The remaining 
workers maintained the strike for 17 days, when, after a provisional decision 
by the Labour Court, they too got fired for “refusal to work”.25 
The Skövde wildcat was better organized than the strikes in Borlänge and 
the ore fields. It was also more militant: the strikers literally occupied the 
workplace to prevent strike breaking. Thus, Skövde was more dangerous 
than the other two strikes in the eyes of ASAB. Another difference, and a 
disadvantage to the cleaners, was that the hotel’s guests were in general 
hostile to the strike. On the other hand, the cleaners got strong support from 
people all over Sweden and local support groups in different communities 
together collected 200,000 SEK to help them, a very high sum at the time.
26
 
Arlanda airport and Umeå 
For sympathetic reasons, cleaners at Arlanda airport outside Stockholm 
carried out a four-day wildcat strike, demanding that the fired Skövde 
cleaners be re-hired and get “fair” treatment in the Labour Court. After 
promises from ASAB to treat the Skövde cleaners “fairly”, the strike was 
discontinued.
27
 The strike in Umeå, located on the north-east coast of 
Sweden, was also largely a sympathetic action. About 70 cleaners employed 
by ASAB and working at hotels, offices, and supermarkets, started a wildcat 
strike in support of their colleagues in Skövde, but also to press for wage 
increases. Some strikers returned to work after eight days, while others 
continued the strike for up to five weeks. Several of the strikers were 
sentenced to pay damages by the Labour Court.
28
 
The sewers’ strike at Brason, Gällivare 1975 
In February 1975, when the ASAB cases were in progress in the Labour 
Court, a new all-women’s strike broke out in Gällivare, a municipality in the 
north of Sweden, merged with the ore-field municipality Malmberget. 38 
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sewers at the garment company Brason lay down their work, primarily in 
protest against a new, performance-based piecework system, but also to 
demand a wage raise. The conflict was immediately deadlocked, as Brason 
refused to negotiate if the sewers did not first return to work. The sewers 
managed to hold out for two months, thanks to financial support from the 
LKAB miners’ strike fund. Finally, the company presented an ultimatum: if 
the strikers did not immediately return to work, it would be considered 
voluntary resignation. 16 sewers returned, while 22 continued the strike. 
They lost much power though, and gave in a few weeks later. Brason, 
however, stuck to its claim that the workers had voluntarily left their 
employment and refused to take them back. Since the strike had lasted for 
more than two months, the sewers were not allowed to try their case in the 
Labour Court; the ASAB strikes had just set a precedent, which we will 
return to below.
29
 
IMA Uthyrningsservice, Sundsvall, 1977 
In the autumn of 1977, the workers in the dry-cleaning firm IMA 
Uthyrningsservice in Sundsvall, a city in the mid-north of Sweden, went on 
a wildcat strike. The strike was started by men, but the majority of the 
participants were women. The primary purpose was to bring pressure to 
bear on the ongoing firm-level negotiations, but the strike was also a 
reaction against a bad work environment. All the firm’s 50 workers joined 
the strike, but after a day’s break to await a new negotiation offer from the 
employer, only 26 of them, mostly women, continued. The major reason 
why only half the workforce continued to strike was that they felt unfairly 
treated in the shop-floor negotiations. The wage increase seemed to be 
unequally distributed among the workers, and the 26 workers who continued 
the strike would gain less from the local agreement. Hence, the strike was in 
one way also a discontentment with the local trade union branch. The 
strikers organized a strike committee with only women spokespersons. The 
outcome of the strike was a new local agreement the workers were 
seemingly very happy with. According to the striking workers themselves, 
they would never have settled such a fortunate agreement without the strike. 
The local manager who negotiated on IVA’s behalf on the other hand 
declared that the raise was just due to a redistribution of the performance 
bonus among the workers; the employees who should have benefitted the 
most from the former agreement had voluntarily given up their wage 
increases in favour of a general rise for all workers, which was “a very nice 
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gesture”, in the words of the manager. Nor had the new agreement cost the 
company more than the first offer would have done.
30
 
But successful or not, the strike also ended up in court. The 
Codetermination Act came into effect on 1 January 1977. The IMA strike, 
occurring in September 1977, was therefore one of the first wildcats to be 
tried under the new law. As the maximum damage of 200 SEK for 
individuals violating the ban on strikes disappeared, SAF saw an 
opportunity for employers to claim higher damages, and to start a campaign 
against unofficial industrial action in general.
31
 Consequently, already after 
two days, IMA summoned the 26 workers who maintained the strike before 
the Labour Court. The court sentenced the strikers to pay damages, but, 
contrary to the employer’s claims, no higher than what was normal before 
the introduction of the new law.
32
 
Another complication was that IMA Uthyrningsservice was not an 
independent firm. It was a subcontractor to the larger dry-cleaning company 
Tvättmans, which in turn was affiliated to Electrolux, a multinational 
company with its main interests in producing vacuum cleaners and white 
goods, especially kitchen machines. IMA’s main customers were local 
industries that normally needed their laundry back promptly. Therefore the 
board of Tvättmans decided to send all laundry to Örebro, 437 kilometres 
south of Sundsvall. Many of the workers in Örebro refused to “handle the 
strike wash”, as they expressed it. Yet, the local trade union branches 
disagreed in Örebro as well as in Sundsvall. On the one hand, trade union 
representatives were obliged by the Codetermination Act to condemn 
wildcat strikes and urge the workers to go back to work; if they did not, the 
union risked high damages. On the other hand, the local representatives 
were not obliged to help the employer in any other ways, which they 
actually did in the IMA case. Trade union representatives from IMA in 
Sundsvall travelled all the way to Örebro to help with the laundry at the 
Tvättman plant there, and the local trade union branch prevented the 
workers in Örebro from maintaining contacts with the strikers in Sundsvall. 
The employees in Örebro were strictly forbidden to take any calls from 
Sundsvall and the switchboard at Tvättman refused to reveal their home 
numbers. The ban on calls from Sundsvall encompassed all calls; when a 
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local newspaper tried to contact Örebro workers for interviews, it got the 
message that neither the workers themselves nor their phone numbers were 
available as long as the strike in Sundsvall was still going on.
33
 
Two important women’s wildcats in the 1980s 
A wildcat strike with several similarities to the IMA conflict took place in 
Helsingborg in the south of Sweden in 1981. The firm-level negotiations at 
Viggo AB, a manufacturer of sterile surgical appliances, had ended in a 
stalemate. Against the trade union’s recommendations, the workers refused 
the employer’s bid and went on a wildcat strike. The strike was also a 
protest against rationalizations, poor working conditions and the threat of 
layoffs. Literally it was not just one strike, but a series of short sit-downs in 
the span of four days. The first sit-down counted on more than 100 
employees out of a total of 580 workers, while the following actions 
counted on roughly 50-60 people each. The strike was, however, poorly 
organized. A vast majority of the participants were young women without 
any experience of negotiations, trade union work or strikes. The claims were 
rather modest compared to many other wildcats in the same period, but to 
set an example, Viggo AB brought every participant in the sit-downs before 
the Labour Court, which sentenced them all to pay damages.
34
 
In 1985, Domnarvet in Borlänge was again struck by a wildcat cleaners’ 
strike; as in 1974 it was directed against ASAB. The strike lasted for four 
weeks and encompassed 26 women, which was about half the total number 
of cleaners. Some of the other cleaners went on sick-leave to avoid taking 
sides in the conflict. Much like in 1974, the strike was directed against 
rationalization: 15 cleaners risked being fired according to ASAB’s new 
organization plan. In a cynical way, the strike actually helped the company 
to downsize. ASAB fired 14 workers who had taken part in the strike, which 
meant that the company did not have to spend time or money on the normal 
procedures connected with firing. As in the 1974 strike, the cleaners had 
strong support from the male metal workers, who even threatened the firm 
with a legal sympathetic strike, which however only lead to a judicial 
confusion.
35
 The 14 fired workers did not just lose their jobs; together with 
their striking colleagues they were also sentenced by the Labour Court to 
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pay damages.
36
 A year and a half later, a thorough – but slow – inquiry by 
the Labour Court found that the firing was not in accordance with existing 
legislation and therefore illegal. The workers’ individual employment 
contracts had therefore neither been broken nor expired. The court argued 
that when threatened with firing, the workers had tried to go back to work 
several times, but had been refused entrance to the workplace by the 
company. Their claim for damages was denied, but ASAB had to pay for 
their economic losses, that is, more than one year’s salary for each of 
them.
37
 
Public sector wildcats, 1979-1989 
As in many industrialized countries, there are more women than men 
employed in the public sector in Sweden. In caring and nursing, it was 
already so in the 1970s. It is therefore not strange that some of the more 
noticeable women’s strikes occurred in public services. One of them was a 
1979 wildcat among the personnel at several children’s and youth custody 
centres in Stockholm. The employees had demonstrated against poor 
working conditions, but without any result. Hence, after a general meeting, 
they decided on a wildcat strike. The strike only lasted one week, but 
meanwhile five young persons under juvenile custody managed to escape. 
The strikers had given notice of their strike in order to give it a similar 
design as a legal action, although they were not backed up by their union. 
The outcome was however a defeat for the striking women, who were 
sentenced to pay damages by the Labour Court. The strike was 
extraordinary serious, the court argued, since former juvenile delinquents in 
urgent need of help risked a relapse into drug abuse, criminality or 
prostitution.
38
 
Three other wildcat strikes in child/youth care occurred in 1986 and 1987. 
In one of them, eleven day care centres in Stockholm were closed down for 
one day. The children’s parents had been warned of the action long before 
the outbreak; the personnel had explained to them that the strike was a 
reaction against a political decision to increase the number of children per 
centre beyond what the employees could handle. Many parents also joined 
the workers’ rallies against the decision. The one-day demonstration had no 
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union support, however, and was found illegal by the Labour Court which 
sentenced the participants to pay damages.
39
 
In another case, 350 recreational pedagogues, a vast majority of them 
women, took action against a political reform they claimed would worsen 
their working conditions. Eight of them, the elected strike committee, were 
charged for breaking the peace obligation by the employer, the city of 
Gothenburg, and got sentenced by the Labour Court to pay damages.
40
 Also 
in Gothenburg, a decision by the Gothenburg Local Council to reduce 
supplies for the child care system was met by a one day long wildcat strike 
from 541 child care workers, most of them women. Despite the fact that the 
strike was short, 89 of the participants were summoned to the labour court. 
As in the case with the recreational pedagogues, the city of Gothenburg 
decided not to charge all the strikers. Yet, in this case the employer more 
openly stated the principles for the selection. The summoned people all had 
either particularly great responsibility, such as superintendents and union 
representatives, or had acted “especially irresponsible”, which in practice 
meant that they had also taken part in a strike one year earlier. The trade 
union refused to represent the strikers in the court, which was most unusual. 
The standard court procedure for handling unofficial actions was that a 
representative of the charged workers’ union would agreed that the strike 
ban had been violated, but then would plead extenuating circumstances to 
minimize the damages. Instead the majority of the summoned workers were 
represented by a legal representative who was specialized in the law of 
procedure and with little skills in labour law. The representative even 
pleaded circumstances he thought were extenuatory, but in fact worsened 
the workers’ violation of the peace obligation in the eyes of the court. 
Accordingly, the court sentenced all 89 summoned employees to pay 
damages.
41
 
The vast majority of wildcat strikes in Sweden in the 1970s-80s were 
“spontaneous” shop-floor outbursts. The three public sector wildcats we just 
discussed were, on the contrary, planned manifestations and the participants 
gave notice in advance in order to limit the problems for the so-called third 
party. The best prepared and organized wildcat strike of all was, however, a 
day long mobilization in Gothenburg in November 1988, carried out by 436 
social welfare secretaries, all of them trained social workers and most of 
them women, in order to put pressure on the city in the ongoing local 
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bargaining with claims exceptionally high for local negotiations. The 
strikers had formed a special committee in advance, “Gothenburg social 
welfare secretaries for a decent salary”. The action was further backed up by 
other demonstrations: 300 employees rallied outside the bargaining hall in 
support of their negotiators; 200 of them registered as job applicants at the 
Gothenburg employment agency; and 67 people advertised in the local 
newspaper under the heading “Employers, look here!”. All but 15 of the 436 
participants were brought before the Labour Court, but only 27 of the 
summoned employees were represented by their union. The plea for 
extenuating circumstances differed from the preceding women wildcats in 
the public sector in one important manner. The strikers argued that the claim 
for higher salaries was not based on “market value”, but on “utility value” 
and “fairness”. They argued that their job was depreciated, considering the 
high qualifications needed and the mental strains of the job. Yet the Labour 
Court was not moved by this: all 421 charged employees were sentenced to 
pay damages.
42
 And for the sake of completeness, in 1989, about 180 
employees, mostly women, in child care in Stockholm carried out a wildcat 
strike very similar to the preceding ones. It was a protest against reductions 
of public expenditures; it was planned and lasted only for one day; and as in 
all other cases, the strikers were sentenced to pay damages by the Labour 
Court. 
To conclude, the public sector strikes described here have more in common 
than being solely carried out by female employees. They were all planned in 
advance and directed against cutbacks in public expenditures. With the 
exception of the social welfare secretaries’ strike, they differed from the 
simultaneous wildcat strikes in the private sector through their planning, in 
some cases even strike notices, the predetermined length of the action, and 
the political demands instead of, or in combination with, pay claims. 
Moreover, they never actually achieved anything: all strikes ended up in the 
Labour Court which sentenced a vast majority of the participants to pay 
damages. Yet there were no very sharp distinctions between the public-
sector strikes of women workers and the female-dominated strikes in the 
private sector, as many of them had legal consequences too. The next 
section thus looks deeper into how the Labour Court handled women’s 
wildcat strikes. 
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Women’s wildcat strikes in the Labour Court 
As wildcat strikes by definition violate the peace obligation, one might 
wonder why not all of them are brought before the Labour Court. The 
answer is that there is no public prosecutor in the field of labour legislation 
in Sweden; it is up to the labour market parties to take violations of 
collective agreements or labour law clauses to court, where they are 
represented; there are normally two representatives for employers’ 
associations and two for trade unions which together with three non-partisan 
solicitors appointed by the government constitute the Labour Court. 
Consequently, it is the struck firm that decides whether a strike action 
should be a matter for legal interference or not. In the aftermath of the great 
miners’ strike in 1969-1970, the SAF urged its affiliates to bring all 
unofficial actions before court. In the eyes of individual employers, 
however, it was usually better to keep good relations with the employees, 
and only 3 per cent of the wildcats were brought to court. The will to take a 
strike to court grew the longer the action was going on, but still only about 
50 per cent of the strikes that lasted for more than a week went all the way 
to the Labour Court.
43
 
In this light, the women-dominated strikes really stick out. As mentioned, 
only about 7 per cent of all unofficial strikes in Sweden 1975-79 were 
female-dominated. Yet, women’s wildcats constituted roughly 25 per cent 
of all strikes that ended in the Labour Court. Why? 
The public sector strikes we discussed in the previous section had a political 
target, which is likely one reason why they were brought before the court, 
even when they only lasted for a day. According to the Public Employment 
Act, which went into effect on 1 January 1977, industrial actions in the 
public sector may under no circumstances aim to “exert an influence on 
domestic political conditions”.44 An extra strong hostility from the 
employers was therefore not surprising. But the women’s private sector 
wildcats were also met differently than men’s. Most notably, three of the 
strikes presented above ended with firing. In Skövde 1974-75, ASAB fired 
two “strike leaders” directly, and later seven more cleaners; the sewers at 
Brason all lost their jobs in 1975; and so did the cleaners at Domnarvet ten 
years later. In the Domnarvet case the cleaners obtained redress from the 
Labour Court, but after a process so long that the redress was mostly 
symbolic. The Brason strike was never brought to court. The treatment of 
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the ASAB case is, however, worth looking deeper into, not the least from a 
gender perspective. 
Cleaning in court 
As mentioned above, two of the Skövde cleaners were fired for being strike 
leaders already on the second day of the strike. In its final ruling, the Labour 
Court, nonetheless, established that there was no legal ground for the 
dismissals; the two workers were protected by the Employment Security Act 
that just had been made effective. On the other hand, the court made no 
objections against ASAB’s firing of the remaining strikers at the end of the 
conflict. The seven fired women and their legal representatives claimed that 
the strike had been maintained only because the first two dismissals violated 
the Employment Security Act; consequently their action should be 
considered legal. The Labour Court thought otherwise, though. As the 
legitimacy of the first two dismissals could be tried in court, going on with 
the wildcat was instead found aggravating: the strikers had meddled in a 
dispute over rights. The distinction between disputes over rights and 
disputes over interests is very sharp in Swedish labour legislation. 
Interfering in disputes over rights has always been strictly forbidden and 
was thus an even stronger violation of the Collective Agreement Act than an 
“ordinary” wildcat strike.45 
It is further a standard part of the procedure for deciding the size of the 
damages that the strikes’ legal representative pleads for adjustment due to 
some extenuating circumstances. Although they are rare, there are cases 
when the court has adjusted the sum downwards.  When so it has been cases 
when the struck firm had violated or neglected its duty to negotiate, had 
behaved excessively provoking, had been hostile to trade union 
representatives or health and safety ombudsmen, or in other ways acted in a 
manner that could foment workplace dissatisfaction. In the Skövde case, a 
new, yet not successful, argument for adjustment was tried: the cleaners 
were low-paid, part-time employed, and accordingly a “weak” occupational 
group in general. The Labour Court has never, however, either before or 
after Skövde, taken any notice of general work standards. Yet, we have 
already seen one extenuatory circumstance in the ASAB conflict. In the ore 
fields, one of the cleaners notified the employer in writing before the strike 
that she did not dare to work because she was afraid to be harassed by the 
other workers. She therefore escaped all damages. On the other hand, 
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women on sick-leave or on leave during the same strike were sentenced to 
pay damages. They had not made clear that they were willing to work if 
they had not been absent for other reasons; hence the court saw their leave 
as a way to hit against ASAB, but dodge the responsibility for it.
46
 
It is worth noticing that when the Labour Court actually did find extenuating 
circumstances in some of the other women strikes we have analysed here, it 
was almost always related to the length of the strike. In the Domnarvet case 
of 1985-86, for example, some of the strikers were sentenced to pay twice 
the sum as the other participants, 300 SEK and 150 SEK respectively. The 
cleaners who got away the easiest were those who had returned to work 
before the strike was over.
47
 The Labour Court described the seven Skövde 
cleaners as “extraordinary stubborn”, since they maintained the strike for as 
long as 17 days, and had not obeyed a provisional decision by the court to 
return to work. Consequently, the court unanimously agreed that the 
dismissals did not violate the Employment Security Act. On the other hand, 
a majority of the court members stated that the firing of the two “strike 
leaders” on day two of the strike was illegal and they had therefore never 
got dismissed in the eyes of the law. The two representatives for the 
employers’ association in the court, however, registered reservations against 
this decision. The cleaners had been defective in loyalty and obedience, and 
since ASAB had lost its trust in them, the obvious consequence was to sack 
them.
48
 
“Loyalty” was also on the agenda ten years later when the Labour Court 
found the dismissals of the Domnarvet cleaners illegal. By trying to return 
to work after being given notice of firing, the women had shown good 
intentions and loyalty to the company, and should thus be protected by the 
Employment Security Act, the court argued.
49
 The fact that the Labour 
Court discussed “loyalty” at all in the Domnarvet verdict must be seen in the 
light of Skövde. The Skövde case had set a precedent: if a wildcat strike 
goes on without openings for several days, the firm has the right to fire the 
workers due to their lack of “loyalty”. Yet, although the 1974 Employment 
Security Act did not prevent companies from firing participants in wildcat 
strikes, all dismissals could now be tried in court. Before 1974 employers 
were in their sole right to “freely hire and fire”. That right did not disappear 
with the introduction of the Employment Security Act, but now they could 
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be urged to at least give arguments. For instance, when was a “long” wildcat 
strike so long that the struck firm could claim lack of loyalty? 
 
But what about gender? 
Drawing on the examples we saw in the previous section, we may conclude 
that participants in wildcat strikes had barely any chances at all to avoid 
legal punishment if the employer brought the strike to court. In most cases 
the punishment was just to pay damages of quite a symbolic magnitude, but 
– besides the stigma of being a “disloyal” person – strikers could actually 
lose their jobs if the strike went on for some time. Yet, justice is supposed to 
be blind: it should not make any difference between different kinds of 
strikers. Consequently justice should also be “gender-blind”. 
But is it? First of all, is it possible to regard men and women equally, but 
not talk about them in the same way? In the written judgement from the 
ruling against the dry cleaners at IMA in Sundsvall, the Labour Court 
introduces men with title and surname, for instance, the local union branch’s 
“Chairman Höglin” and the “Ombudsmen Larsson, Ståhl and Gunnarsson”, 
while women are only introduced with their first and family names, for 
example, “Tyra Åsén”.50 In the Skövde case, men got first names too 
besides their titles in the judgement, for example “Ombudsman Bo 
Svensson” and “District Superintendent Ingvar Eriksson”. Women were 
instead reduced to only first names in the description of the conflict. It was 
“Ragnhild and Britt-Marie” who got fired on the second day of the strike, 
and it was “Doris et alii” who continued the strike.51 In a preliminary 
inquiry to the trial, jointly undertaken by the employer’s and trade union’s 
representatives, the women were labelled as “the girls/lassies” (flickorna, in 
Swedish), as if they were disobedient schoolgirls. We have not found a 
single case where men have been called “the boys/lads” (pojkarna) in the 
Labour Court or preparatory inquires. Moreover, when pleading for 
adjustment of the damages, the women’s legal representatives appealed to 
the court members’ compassion, not to “fairness”: the cleaners were part-
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time employees with low salaries and so on, therefore their strike was 
excusable.
52
 
The picture of the ASAB women as weak and helpless was further 
multiplied by media, in Skövde as well as in Borlänge and the ore fields. 
Newspapers found it acceptable that single women, in particular single 
mothers, were on strike, but what about the married ones? Could and should 
women already “provided for” by a husband really gain anything from a 
strike?
53
 If we compare it with the overall strike pattern, wildcat strikes in 
male-dominated industries were by many accepted as a natural part of the 
so-called Swedish model in the two decades studied here. The central 
confederations, the SAF and the LO, both pointed out the wave of wildcats 
as a threat against the Swedish model. At the firm level, it was, nonetheless, 
usually more important to keep up good workplace relations; therefore 
wildcats were accepted as temporary outbursts that should be handled at the 
shop-floor level, not by the central associations or the Labour Court.
54
 In 
other words, employers in general were more patient with “male” strikes 
than with women on strike; the latter violated a “tradition”. We have also 
seen three women’s strikes that ended with dismissals. During the whole 
period 1970–1990, only two strikes performed by male workers ended in 
firing, one in vehicle services in 1978 and one in concrete works in 1980.
55
 
 
Concluding discussion 
So, finally, in what ways did women’s strikes differ from men’s during the 
1970s and 1980s strike waves? First, male strikes in manufacturing were 
normally “offensive”, aiming to profit from wage drift by bringing pressure 
to bear on local wage negotiations. About three out of four strikes in all of 
Sweden during our period started in that way.
56
 Yet, we barely find any 
women-dominated strikes of this kind. They were not totally absent, as we 
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have discussed elsewhere,
57
 but they only constituted a tiny minority. The 
only women’s wildcat in manufacturing that lasted longer than just a few 
hours was the Brason sewers’ strike, a primarily defensive strike with an 
extraordinary aftermath. Regarding length, strikes frequently have a better 
chance of success if they are short, if they hit hard from the outbreak and 
thus force the employer to make concessions before the strike gets 
“institutionalized”. The longer a strike goes on, the more it saps 
organizational strength, both financially and “mentally”.58 Several strikes 
we have seen here failed on this point; in most of them the opposing 
positions immediately were deadlocked and the strikes then moved on 
without any openings until they ended up in the Labour Court. Women’s 
strikes in the public sector, on the other hand, stuck out in the opposite 
direction; they were short, planned actions against political decisions to 
reduce public spending. Due to the political claims, however, they too ended 
up in the Labour Court. 
But what do these obvious gender differences depend on? Maybe the 
strategy used by the striking women in the public sector tells us more than 
meets the eye. If so, what “meets the eye” should be taken rather literally: it 
is a matter of being seen. Despite their obvious failures, the striking women 
managed to draw public attention to both bad working conditions and the 
importance of their work. The same goes for other women’s strikes 
discussed here, most notably the ASAB strikes, which shed public light on a 
low-valued job. As we hinted in the introduction, however, a pre-condition 
for any measures to make women’s work seen is that it is in some respect 
“silenced”. Men do not usually need to make their jobs visible. If men and 
women entered the labour market on equal terms, their conflict patterns 
would most likely not differ at all. 
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 The Workers of Northeast Chubut (Patagonia, Argentina): A 
Study of the Contextual Features that Shaped the Formation 
of a Working-Class Fraction  
Gonzalo Pérez Álvarez 
 
 
. Topic, Problems and Sources 
This article deals with the formation of one fraction of the Argentine 
working class in northeast Chubut (a province located in central Patagonia) 
during the 1970s and 1980s in the context of an industrialization project 
subsidized by the central government which aimed at peopling and 
developing Patagonia. In the Chubut region there are three cities: Trelew, 
Puerto Madryn and Rawson, which were formed as part of a model known 
as polos de desarrollo [development poles], a program promoted by the 
government for industries that settled south of the 42
nd
 parallel. Chubut had, 
until then, a non-existent industrial sector: the only important economic 
activities were trade, limited agricultural activity and extensive sheep 
farming for wool production in its hinterland. For this reason, the working 
class was small compared to the south of the province (400km away), where 
there was an important oil industry. 
Our starting hypothesis is that since the polos de desarrollo project was 
implemented, a new working class formed in the region as a result of the 
arrival of different groups of migrants coming from either other Argentine 
provinces, rural areas in Patagonia or neighboring countries. Following this 
hypothesis, we aim to understand how this class emerged and its main 
characteristics, paying special attention to the impact that this kind of 
subsided industrialization had on the characteristics of this class and on its 
forms of resistance and organization. 
The varied individuals that arrived at and settled in the region looking for a 
steady job started to form, through their organization and resistance, this 
I 
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new working class. Having become a class, this group of workers found 
themselves in the context of full employment resulting from the frequent 
opening of factories, and enjoyed the concrete possibility of improving their 
living conditions. 
Towards the mid-1980s, labour unions in the subsidized industrial projects 
were powerful organizations, capable of bargaining wages and intervening 
in the political life of these cities. However, these unions were not capable 
of categorically opposing the termination of benefits for the region, or the 
factory closings and layoffs that started towards the end of the 1980s and 
accelerated in the 1990s. 
I have previously studied the process this working class went through from 
the hegemonic imposition of neoliberalism in the 1990s until 2005 when the 
socio-economic structure collapsed.
1
 I observed that workers framed their 
struggle in the traditions and experiences gained during the period of growth 
in 1970s and 1980s.
2
 
This article analyses the formation of this working class in the context of a 
subsidized industrialization process. My intention is to understand how this 
working class was formed, the nature of its first actions, how it organized 
itself, and the state it was in throughout the changes that began in the 1980s 
and continued through the 1990s. I believe that the regions where the 
subsidized industrialization projects were implemented may be understood 
as “social laboratories” to analyze the workers’ organizational processes and 
the way in which these processes varied in different contexts. 
A key source of information for this project is a newspaper archive I have 
constructed through systematic recording of articles from the region for a 
30-year period. I have also consulted government archives such as the 
provincial historical archive, the historical archive of the provincial 
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legislature, and archives of the region’s town halls. Aside from these 
sources, oral testimonies have also been paramount in my research. Written 
sources, controlled by political powers, tend to hide central aspects of the 
conflicts. Working exclusively with written sources would have led me to 
visualize just one part of this process. Such written sources do not reveal 
much about many forms of – necessarily underground – resistance. Neither 
do they cover the development process of organizations nor the emergence 
of working-class activists, their transformations and debates. 
The emphasis on the deeds of individuals that built opposition to union 
leaderships and developed left-wing activism aims to recover the stories of 
those who are hidden by official history. This does not imply 
underestimating the role of the union leadership, such as its negotiating 
strategy,
3
 but understanding that the rank-and-file does not appear in 
conventional sources. For this reason, the process of recording oral sources 
focused on recovering missing information, balancing the contributions 
made by the different subjects involved in social relations. I particularly 
focus on recovering the contributions made by subordinate subjects, usually 
rendered invisible by traditional sources. 
 
2. Subsidized Industrialization and the “New” Working Class 
The polos de desarrollo policy was thought of as the creation of industrial 
centers that would radiate ‘progress’ towards nearby regions. In Argentina, 
Patagonia was the locus of this policy, and the Armed Forces, its main 
promoters. In the province of Chubut, industrial development programs 
were concentrated in the northeast where most of the job positions created 
by the provincial government were located.  
In 1971, an industrial park was created in Trelew and by 1973, the Chubut 
textile industry ranked second place at a national level in several branches 
of this sector. It is estimated that there were 29 working plants in 1970,
4
 and 
by 1974, 43 different textile companies employing 4,300 workers.
5
 
                                                 
3
  I believe it is possible to observe in social struggles as a whole, different goals, according 
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Moreover, in 1971 the ALUAR company (Aluminio Argentino SA) was 
granted the project of building a primary aluminum plant, which was 
installed in Puerto Madryn. In both cases, most of the investment was made 
by the state, leading to a significant transfer of public funds to private 
companies. 
ALUAR was an important company with concentrated capital and high 
technology, whereas the textile park was formed by small and medium-sized 
companies with low capital investment, little technology and highly 
dependent on intensive labor. For this reason, the development of ALUAR 
would have its peculiarities: it is the only industrial plant from the polos de 
desarrollo model that continues to grow up to the present. Its monopolistic 
nature in Argentina (and, at the global level, oligopolistic) as a primary 
aluminum producer gives it the power to control prices and enjoy a 
privileged relationship with the state.
6
 
Industrial development and job creation triggered the arrival of migrants to 
the region, which had a significant impact on the scarce urban population 
centres. Most of these migrants came from rural areas and were descendants 
of Patagonian indigenous peoples. Yet some people migrated from other 
Argentine provinces and neighboring countries as well. In the cities, rapid 
changes transformed social life in every aspect. For example, gender 
relations changed: the textile companies hired female workers, thus 
modifying the traditional role women had played in the province. 
The development of these subsidized industries created a pressing need to 
attract people to the region to work in the new factories and associated 
activities that began to emerge. I consider that this important immigration 
constituted a group of workers which gradually, through different actions, 
became a working class that did not have strong bonds with the experiences 
and traditions of the groups of workers that already lived in the region. This 
does not imply that until then there had not been a history of conflicts or of 
workers’ organizations;7 rather, it means that the emergent working class 
seemed to have forged no historical bonds with this older experience. 
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The formation of new workers’ groups triggered by new economic activities 
in a certain region has been the subject of study of several authors in 
different contexts which I will draw on. To study Patagonia, it is very 
important to analyze the literature on the development of the working class 
in southern Chubut at the beginning of the twentieth century related to the 
surge in the oil industry. In this context, there was a similar situation as in 
the 1970s: migrants from different backgrounds formed a heterogeneous 
working class with diverse experiences, which nevertheless, through the 
conflicts it underwent, was able to form a common class identity. 
Research by Susana Torres,
8
 Daniel Cabral Marques,
9
 Gabriel Carrizo
10
 and 
Edda Crespo
11
 has broadened our interpretations, forcing us to rethink some 
of our starting assumptions. Other authors who have either covered 
subsequent periods or worked on a long-term perspective and whose 
research has followed the same lines of analysis and interpretation have also 
contributed to my analysis such as Susana Vidoz, Gabriel Carrizo,
12
 Ester 
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Susana and CARRIZO, Gabriel. “El Yrigoyenismo y las identidades políticas territorianas 
en Chubut y Neuquen”. Actas Segundas Jornadas de Historia de la Patagonia, Universidad 
Nacional de la Patagonia, 2, 3 y 4 de Noviembre de 2006. 
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Ceballos,
13
 Susana Torres and Graciela Ciselli,
14
 Edda Crespo and Daniel 
Cabral Marques,
15
 among others. 
Without any intention to develop a thorough survey of the literature, I also 
mention other works that analyze the formation and transformation of the 
working class in other Patagonian regions, especially the province of 
Neuquén. The already well-known publications of Enrique Mases et al.
16
 
have shown, through a long-term study, how the Neuquén working class 
was formed, and how it was modified and transformed through different 
projects implemented by central or local governments. Several works by 
Fernando Aiziczon
17
are also relevant to my analysis. Finally, the research of 
Rodolfo Porrini Beracochea is also important. He has explored the 
formation of a new working class in Uruguay in the 1940s triggered by the 
development of an import substitution-oriented industrialization.
18
 
Regarding the relationship between migrant groups and the formation of a 
new working class, I also use other contributions that analyze, in different 
frameworks and with different starting hypotheses, the influence of 
migration in the formation of class identity. The works by Trpin
19
 and 
                                                 
13
 CEBALLOS, Ester. “El 1º de mayo en Comodoro Rivadavia durante el período 1901 – 
1945”. Actas X Jornadas Interescuelas de Historia, Rosario, 20 al 23 de Septiembre de 
2005. 
14
 TORRES, Susana and CISELLI, Graciela. “La Gobernación Militar de Comodoro 
Rivadavia 1944 – 1955. Problemáticas y fuentes”.  Actas VIII Jornadas Interescuelas de 
Historia. Universidad Nacional de Salta. 2001. 
15
 CABRAL MARQUES, Daniel and CRESPO, Edda. “Entre el petróleo y el carbón: 
Empresas estatales, trabajadores e identidades sociolaborales en la Patagonia Austral (1907-
1976)”. In: BANDIERI, Blanco y Varela (dir.), Hecho en Patagonia. La historia en 
perspectiva regional. Neuquén: Educo, 2006. 
16
 See MASÉS, Enrique et al. El Mundo del trabajo: Neuquen (1884-1930). Neuquén: 
Universidad Nacional del Comahue; 1994; MASÉS, Enrique y otros. El Mundo del Trabajo 
en Neuquén (1930-1970). Neuquén: Universidad Nacional del Comahue, 1998. MASÉS, 
Enrique and GALUCCI, Lisandro. (edit.) Historia de los trabajadores en la Patagonia. 
Neuquén: Educo, UNCo, 2007. 
17
 Particularly AIZICZON, Fernando. “Construyendo tradiciones en tiempos de transición: 
activistas en las luchas de los obreros de la construcción de Neuquén a fines de los años 
’80”. Actas del Primer Congreso Nacional Sobre Protesta Social, Acción Colectiva y 
Movimientos Sociales, Marzo de 2009 where he analyses the manner in which workers of 
different bakground formed traditions in common in Neuquén in the 1980s. 
18
 PORRINI BERACOCHEA, Rodolfo. “Experiencia e identidad de la nueva clase obrera 
uruguaya: la huelga frigorífica (montevideana) de enero de 1943”. História UNISINOS. Sao 
Leopoldo, n.6, julio-diciembre 2002, pp.63-96; PORRINI BERACOCHEA, Rodolfo. La 
nueva clase trabajadora uruguaya (1940-1950). Serie “Tesis de Maestría” de la Facultad 
de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, Montevideo, 2005. 
19
 TRPIN, Verónica. “Trabajadores migrantes: entre la clase y la etnicidad. Potencialidad de 
sus usos en la investigación socioantropólogica”. Actas ASET 7° Congreso Nacional de 
Estudios del Trabajo, Agosto 2005; TRPIN, Verónica. “Migrantes chilenos que trabajan en 
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Perren
20
 demonstrate how migration gradually modified the working class in 
Nuequén and Alto Valle del Río Negro. Mónica Gatica,
21
 on the other hand, 
shows the crucial influence of Chilean migration in the formation of a new 
working class in northeastern Chubut. 
 
3. An Emergent Working Class 
The development of subsidized industrialization triggered the arrival of 
workers to satisfy the increasing demand for labor power. The companies 
worked on promoting the arrival of these migrants. The most important 
factory in Patagonia, ALUAR, selected most of its initial personnel from 
rural workers. The company promised them housing, facilitated their move 
to Puerto Madryn and offered them well-paid jobs, thus ensuring the 
“fidelity” of these workers, who in general had no experience in unions or 
politics. 
This is explained by one of our interviewees, Fernando: 
ALUAR has always been characterized by hiring people from 
the countryside. At the beginning of the 1970s, when the 
company started, it didn’t recruit skilled workers from Buenos 
Aires; it recruited people from the provinces: La Pampa, 
Mendoza… people with no union experience.22 
Another interviewee, Héctor, noted: 
…the average laborer was from the country, most of them with 
no factory experience whatsoever, unlike those who had a 
special skill like an electrician or a mechanic, who did have 
experience from other factories. And to me, ALUAR —and this 
is something we always talk about—was looking for an 
inexperienced worker, so that they could mould them as they 
pleased. Those with a special skill, with some experience, were 
more reluctant, more prone to offer some resistance. Then we 
also gradually adapted to the circumstances and began to see 
                                                                                                                            
las chacras: la etnicidad ante una nueva ruralidad”. In: MASÉS, Enrique and GALUCCI, 
Lisandro. (edit.) Historia de los trabajadores en la Patagonia. Op.Cit.   
20
 PERREN, Joaquín. “Hacer la América en la Patagonia. Los migrantes bajo la lupa de la 
comparación (Neuquén: 1980-1991)”. In: Ibid. 
21
 GATICA, Mónica. “¿Exilio, migración, destierro? Los trabajadores chilenos que se 
asentaron en el NE de Chubut a partir de septiembre de 1973; Memorias, historias e 
implicancias”. Tesis doctoral. FHACE. UNLP, La Plata, 2011. 
22
 Fernando, interview, 2 May 2008. He is a technical union member who arrived in the 
mid-1980s from La Plata with no prior political experience. 
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how things really work. Here some very important internal 
committees of delegates were formed…23 
Here we can see a significant difference between the working-class 
component and the way it was formed by the company: the personnel 
needed for unskilled tasks were selected from workers with no factory 
experience and, in many cases, with no urban life experience. Broadly 
speaking, these subjects knew little about unions or politics compared to 
those hired for more technically-skilled jobs. The latter did bring with them 
forms of resistance and organization which would be the base for the first 
internal workers’ committees in the workplace.  
In the case of the textile park, there was no homogeneous behavior given the 
presence of different companies. A significant fraction of the working class 
was constituted by migrants that generally did not have factory or urban life 
experience, something more common among workers in low-technology 
enterprises, who were not required to have a significant prior knowledge of 
the tasks to be performed. This happened in the context of an emergent 
working class, characterized by its heterogeneity, as Daniel points out: 
“Broadly speaking we had this idea that in the industrial park most people 
came from smallholdings and therefore had no proletarian tradition. But 
actually, taking a closer look, there were people from everywhere”. 24 
The “idea” Daniel refers to represents the views of his political party, the 
MAS (Movimiento Al Socialismo), which had sent him to the region to work 
in the industrial park in order to promote political activity. But as he points 
out, the reality was much more heterogeneous. The group with the rural 
background was just one of part of the whole workers’ group. His own story 
is an example of this. He was from Buenos Aires and inexperienced in 
factory life since he had only worked in stores before: “I was 27 and had 
never worked in a factory. I was a political activist and came to work in 
whatever job I could get, but all my life I’d been a seller (…) I’d never 
worked in a factory so for me it was a whole new experience”. One of his 
anecdotes illustrates the complexity of this workers’ group: 
…the first gathering for an asado [typical Argentine food] was 
around December 20, before the holidays. I was sitting next to 
                                                 
23
 Héctor, interview, 9 May 2008. He was part of a list —the “Rafael Uribe”— that opposed 
the leadership in UOM (Unión Obrera Metalúrgica, metal workers’ union). He was a rural 
worker with no union experience and no political participation beyond the union. 
24
 Daniel, interview, 4 April 2012 at a university in Trelew. He was a MAS member, an 
important Trotskyist party in Argentina in the 1980s. He arrived at the region at the 
beginning of that decade and was involved in politics in the industrial park. 
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the factory watchman, who was an indigenous descendant. 
Then, after the third wine, the guy stood up and started to sing a 
lamento [sad indigenous song]. I was deeply touched… When 
he finished, I stood up and hugged him, and told him, ‘So we 
start getting to know each other, Ancamil, you should know: the 
Argentine historical figure I despise the most is General Roca.’ 
Then another worker jumped in, ‘if it wasn’t for Roca, you 
wouldn’t be eating an asado in Patagonia’. 
The contrast between the various stories and experiences is apparent. This 
heterogeneity was also visible in the different ideological positions. The 
matrix of the state project of occupying Patagonia was part of the process. 
This view, in our opinion held by most members of this young working 
class, was based on a supposed community of interests between workers and 
employers, whose aim was to assure the development of Patagonia. Such a 
view was strengthened by the idea that there was a need to maintain social 
peace, so as not to risk the industrial promotion program on which the 
emergent industrialization of the region depended. This view was very 
powerful because it was based on concrete elements. Subsidized 
industrialization depended on state funds, which the government began to 
cancel at the beginning of the 1980s. Workers were aware of this problem, 
and in many cases they developed their resistance strategy by allying with 
the bourgeoisie that had economic interests in the region and was in power. 
Such an alliance was aimed at “defending the region”, demanding to keep 
the benefits for the businessmen that invested in Patagonia. 
Such a position was mentioned in several interviews. Miguel tells us:  
“…somehow I think we were – one way or another – coaxed to defend the 
interests of the employers. Whenever we raised our voices to demand 
industrial promotion we were defending the employers and not us”. 25 Daniel 
remembers one of the few occasions where his proposal did not get enough 
votes in an assembly in the factory where he worked: 
…the management said that industrial promotion had been 
cancelled. Then there was an assembly, where we decided that a 
group of workmates should go fight by our employers’ side for 
industrial promotion (…) We always said that workers should 
never support the employers, but well, we lost. 
                                                 
25
 Miguel, interview, Touring Club cafè in Trelew, 6 June 2007. He was an important figure 
in the opposition slate in AOT (Asociación Obrera Textil, textile factory workers’ union) 
and a PI (Partido Intransigente, a moderate-left party) activist. 
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I consider that the characteristics of this process influenced the kind of 
confrontation and organization these workers developed. The identification 
of their interests with their employers, the alliances with these employers 
and the shared discourse on the need to stimulate Patagonian development 
were key elements of this history. I do not claim that these characteristics 
existed only in this region nor that there were no other regions with similar 
structural characteristics (such as in the province of Tierra del Fuego, the 
southernmost of Argentina
26
) where resistance processes with different 
dynamics occurred. However, I think that it has been demonstrated that one 
of the goals of the polos de desarrollo projects —i.e. forming workers’ 
groups with lower levels of conflict
27
 than the levels of conflict in 
traditional factories— was successfully reached, at least partially, in this 
region of study. Neither does this mean that there were no struggles and 
conflicts. However these events had particular characteristics, which we 
need to take into account to understand the dynamics of the emergent 
working class and the type of confrontation that arose in this subsidized 
industrialization context. 
 
4. First Years and the Dictatorship 
This workers’ group, structurally formed in the first half of the 1970s, began 
to make their first demands in a highly repressive context, forming as a 
class. These were not major conflicts: most of them were economic conflicts 
regarding working conditions and reducing daily working hours that the 
employers had imposed. I present here some features of the forms of 
resistance developed during the dictatorship. In these years, public 
demonstrations were obviously rare although if we analyze the situation 
against the grain we may find different forms of resistance. It is in this 
process of almost invisible resistance that we may observe some events that 
question the dominant discourse of social peace and the idea that the 
workers always followed their employers’ lead. 
The most evident of these initiatives was the refusal to work overtime. This 
behavior was expressed by the textile workers and those at ALUAR. The 
demand for better working conditions was made through this mechanism, 
                                                 
26
 See GRIGERA, Juan. “Promoción industrial en Argentina: el caso de Tierra del Fuego 
(1970-2007)”. Actas XIII Jornadas Interescuelas de Historia, Catamarca, 2011. 
27
 Particularly compared to what happened in the industrial centers in the country. See 
SCHVARZER. Promoción industrial en Argentina. Características, evolución y 
resultados. Bs. As.: CISEA, 1986. His hypothesis is that these projects aimed to obstruct 
industrial development in traditional industrial areas in order to alleviate existing frictions. 
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which made workers feel safe since it was not against the legislation in 
force. However, it was a demand that went against the “customs” of the 
region where, in the context of a developing industrialization, it was 
necessary to make intensive use of the still-scarce labor force available. 
Gerardo related this ALUAR policy and the way the company dealt with the 
demand: 
…in 1979, during the dictatorship, we had a conflict because we 
refused to work extra hours and demanded more personnel. So 
we were forced to go on strike. It wasn’t actually a strike, we 
just refused to work overtime, but the company legally 
demanded us to go back to our routine. Then one of the senior 
managers —a former Fate28manager—came down, and in that 
meeting he subtly told us, ‘Don’t you know this company is run 
by the Armed Forces?’ 29 
Héctor also remembered similar situations: 
In a strike attempt, they came with guns looking for some 
workers from specific sectors, and they were taken away, this 
was during the dictatorship. We were at a demonstration in front 
of the aluminum plant – I remember it rained or drizzled – and 
two or three workmates were arrested, things like that 
happened… Times were tough.30 
The refusal to work extra hours was also the form of resistance in the textile 
park of Trelew during the dictatorship. As René explained: 
…I started working in one of the most important factories in the 
park, and we worked many extra hours. This was at the 
beginning of 1977, we were already under the dictatorship and 
we weren’t getting any pay raises. So, how could we handle 
this? The company was so used to us working overtime, ‘cause 
we were in such great need (…) Our workmates had to be 
convinced that this wasn’t a strike —‘cause it wasn’t actually 
(…) and there was always the unconfirmed, terrifying rumor, 
you know? There was a rumor that some guy and his entire 
                                                 
28
 Most of the share capital of ALUAR was the property of the Madaness family, also 
owners of FATE, the most important tire factory in the country. 
29
 Gerardo, interview, 2 May 2008. He moved to Puerto Madryn in 1977 and had some 
knowledge of union activities since he had been a representative in Buenos Aires. 
30
 In these testimonies, it is clear that the Armed Forces played a key role in ALUAR, a 
strategically important company in this industry. 
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family had been kicked out of the factory, left in the frontier, 
and beaten by the pacos.
31
 
Furthermore, it was a demand related to these workers’ possibility to enjoy 
life. As Miguel pointed out: 
You were forced to work 12 hours. I got there in July… Imagine 
July in Trelew! You entered at 6 in the morning, and got out at 6 
in the evening; you could do nothing else, you couldn’t even see 
the sun.
32
 We even worked on Saturdays. My first confrontation 
with the company – without being a union representative, or 
anything – was because of the 8 hours thing. 
Because of the repression, union actions were always within legal 
boundaries. However, it is evident that the region’s young working class did 
put into practice several forms of protest during the dictatorship. When we 
make these forms visible, we can analyze the class characteristics and 
process of class formation in more depth. We consider it an open debate 
whether or not the working class was defeated during the dictatorship.
33
 
There is evidence to argue that it was not. In the region, there was no 
working-class tradition that the dictatorship may have aimed at destroying. 
However, the relationship between this  young, local working class and the 
national working class forces us to reflect more in depth on, for example, 
how the ideas of terror and persecution helped contain and repress working-
class protests as is demonstrated in the workers’ testimonies. 
 
5. 1983-1985: Before the Storm 
During the dictatorship, workers began to acquire a collective experience. 
These workers arrived at the region in the context of subsidized 
industrialization, forming internal committees in some textile factories and 
at ALUAR. These experiences of self-organization generated an 
accumulation of power that first became manifest after the return to 
constitutional government. These workers had already acquired a common 
experience, constituted by their shared interests which, at least in part, 
                                                 
31
 René Pérez, interview, Elvio Ángel Bel athenaeum in Trelew, 4 July 2009. René is 
Chilean like many workers of the region. The term ‘pacos’ refers to Chilean militarized 
police. 
32
 In the region under study, the sun sets at 6 pm in the winter. 
33
 To reflect on this, I recommend GHIGLIANI, Pablo. “La noción de derrota en la historia 
reciente del movimiento obrero argentino”. V Jornadas de Sociología de la UNLP. La 
Plata. 2008. 
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clashed with other subjects’ interests. Yet this new working-class 
experience was strongly influenced by the production relations in which 
they were immersed, relations that pushed them into a collaboration policy 
with the employers in order to maintain the program of state-subsidized 
industrialization. 
However, influence did not imply capitulation. Although there was a 
tendency towards collaboration, there was also an intention to forge some 
independent working-class politics. Both strategies were in opposition after 
the return to democracy, a time when this group of workers was already 
constituted as a class, with an ambivalent awareness.
34
  
The end of the dictatorship opened up new possibilities for this emergent 
class; restrictions were removed and they dared to set and advance new 
objectives. Fear began to dissipate. This is mentioned in Daniel’s testimony 
about an assembly at the beginning of 1984, when the factory internal 
committee was formed: 
…we were at the door when the foreman, the factory engineer 
and the manager came out to intimidate us, to prevent the 
assembly from happening. I said we must hold the assembly, 
workmates, we mustn’t be afraid, we live in a democracy, blah-
blah-blah. We gathered and held the assembly (…) and there we 
formed the internal committee... 
                                                 
34 I follow Gramsci’s ideas in Note sul Machiavelli sulla politica e sullo stato moderno. 
He holds that social group awareness is the result of the degree of homogeneity, self-
awareness and organization achieved through the process of struggle and in the context of 
the relationship between objective forces. Gramsci considers that collective political 
awareness can reach different levels: the first and most elemental is the economic-
corporative, the second is the awareness of the interest solidarity in the entire social group, 
but still at a merely economic level, and the third is when the group can see beyond 
corporative interests and develop political awareness. This ambivalence oscillates between 
the first and the second level; that is, between the defense of the small group (their interests 
being equal to their respective employers) and the defense of the larger social group, 
awareness that demands an independent strategy in the class, although not necessarily 
revolutionary. In fact, the third awareness level —political awareness— was not observed 
in my research. When this type of awareness is reached, the existing objective forces 
relations are deeply transformed. I also make use of Cabral Marques’s analysis of the oil 
region in southern Chubut: "Frequently, this conception involved a low level of conflict in 
industrial relations, expressed in the graphic expression of the common people the "big 
family". Within the system of relationships that this notion expressed, the individual 
appeared to be contained by strong networks of sociability that tended to relativize the 
fringes of rupture between different groups and within labor hierarchies, strengthening the 
bonds of belonging. Nevertheless, at the root of this supposed harmony, fault lines still 
existed and resistance was expressed in various forms, but in fact it did not jeopardize the 
basic conditions for the reproduction of the model." See CABRAL MARQUES, Daniel. 
“Hacia una relectura de las identidades y las configuraciones sociales en la historia 
petrolera de la ciudad de Comodoro Rivadavia y de la Cuenca del Golfo San Jorge Op. Cit. 
2011, p. 15. 
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This situation is mentioned in Rene’s testimony as well: 
…we had gathered, but still didn’t go out to the streets, or make 
ourselves noticeable. There was a lot of fear, there was no 
democracy (…) so we read the constitution to our workmates, 
we read them the “14 bis” Article of the Constitution, the right 
to strike, so that they had the knowledge to justify their actions. 
That evening at 6, the factory was occupied. 
The key role of the activists with more political knowledge was evident 
here. They explained to the rest the new possibilities opened up by the 
constitutional government. In these activists we can see the connections 
with the experiences and traditions acquired at a national level, which still in 
general were not absorbed by the workers of the region. 
In both the AOT and UOM unions, regional voting lists to replace the union 
leaders were postulated. In AOT, the aim was to confront the leadership of 
the days of the dictatorship, and in UOM a list was postulated as an 
alternative to the leadership represented by Lorenzo Miguel
35
 at a national 
level. These two union electoral histories were very similar: in the 1985 
election the pluralist candidates with a platform of resistance won, but were 
replaced by the previous leadership in the next election. In AOT, the textile 
factory group 1° de Mayo (May 1) was formed, winning the 1985 election. 
In this group different political sectors converged: Peronist groups (which 
headed the list) together with militants from left-wing parties such as PI, 
PC, MAS and PO.
36
 A similar process took place in UOM. Sectors from 
Peronist currents together with left-wing groups (especially from the PC and 
the PSA
37
) defeated the traditional leaders. 
These were processes of important social mobilization, but ultimately there 
were no profound changes in the unions’ characteristics. Although during 
the first years there were changes towards greater internal democracy and 
more presence in the streets, the new leaderships gradually moved away 
from that path.  
In AOT, the new regional leaders gradually adapted to the national 
leadership, leaving aside the search for an alternative union model. The 
resistance strategy – which seemed to have won them the elections – was 
replaced by a negotiating attitude when it came to concrete union actions. 
                                                 
35
 An historic figure of Argentine unionism and a Peronist party member with a classical 
negotiating approach. 
36
 Partido Obrero [Workers’ Party], of Trotskyist orientation. 
37
 Partido Socialista Auténtico, a moderate left party. 
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During the interviews the workers emphasized the importance of the 
pressure from the union national structure, through the cutting of funding, 
for example, when the regional union adopted a formal position against the 
policy of restricting grievances to the institutional level. 
These changes meant, for textile workers, the dissolution of the 1° de Mayo 
group, forming other groups affiliated with the different parties with some 
political weight in the textile park factories. One of the most dynamic 
groups was Celeste y Blanca run by the internal committee of the Modecraft 
factory.
38
 
Wining the regional elections in UOM did not entail becoming an 
alternative union project either. The regional leadership could not develop a 
working-class strategy different from that of the national union structure. 
The centralized structure impeded economic autonomy because the regional 
organization could not manage its own funds, and initiatives to seek 
autonomy were unsuccessful. 
In the following union elections this group also dissolved, thus making it 
possible for the group aligned with the national leadership to win. In our 
opinion – regardless of organizational or formal issues –  the greatest 
limitation they encountered in the attempts to build an alternative unionism 
was the level of awareness shown by rank-and-file members, of whom the 
leaderships (even the most combative ones) were an expression. They could 
not override the limitations of the corporate perspective of the demands for 
state industrialization subsidies which made it impossible to carry out an 
alternative project that supported and gave long-term perspectives to other 
kind of strategies. 
 
6. 1987-1988: the Storm broke 
When the elections that modified the union leaderships took place, labour 
unrest increased in the region because the national government had begun to 
reduce tax cuts for the factories in Patagonia. This had a strong impact on 
the industrial park in Trelew where factory closures and layoffs began to be 
more frequent. 
                                                 
38
 PÉREZ ÁLVAREZ. “Lucha y memoria obrera en el noreste del Chubut. Una 
aproximación desde la fábrica Modecraft 1990-1991”. Historia Antropología y Fuentes 
Orales. N.41, Barcelona, 2009, pp. 25-48. 
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At the beginning of 1987, the textile factory Gebco filed for bankruptcy, 
resulting in the occupation of the factory by the workers. This process ended 
in defeat that would be remembered in the conflicts of the 1990s. Juan 
recalls: “The first important factory occupation was that of Gebco. My dad 
worked there. They occupied the factory, but the managers were already 
gone and had taken all the money with them…”39 After an occupation of 
more than 40 days, the union leadership announced that they “had gotten 
80% of the compensation from the employers” and expressed their 
disagreement with “those who want to use this political struggle for 
sectarian, divisive goals”.40 In spite of the tone of the announcement, it is 
clear that the factory closures could not be prevented, and the total payment 
of the compensations required by law was never obtained. Moreover, union 
leaders attacked those who proposed an alternative strategy to organize the 
struggle. Greater friction did not necessarily mean greater awareness or 
greater progress for those who proposed an independent strategy. 
During these years some conflicts with teachers and provincial employees 
gained relevance. Both ATE
41
 and Atech
42
 went on strike for several months 
in 1986 and 1987. The provincial government of Atilio Viglione
43
 suffered a 
deep crisis. At the national level, some measures were taken, such as the 
reduction of oil royalties
44
 or the cancellation of industrial subsidies to set 
up new projects, which defunded Chubut’s budget, aggravating the 
recession. 
The workers of the region found themselves in a new social context. They 
were dealing with unprecedented forces and it seemed difficult to confront 
them with the old tools their experience had given them. Their history of 
struggles consisted of demands for better working conditions and salary 
increases, but they lacked the tools to figure out how to act in a situation 
where the companies did not need their work force. It was not about fighting 
                                                 
39
 Juan, interview, 6 June 2007. He was a Peronist Party member and a textile worker. 
Presently he is an activist in the unemployed workers organization, Aníbal Verón. 
40
 Diario Jornada, 29 April 1987, Trelew, Chubut, p.8. The leadership was responding to 
left-wing union groups, which had questioned the lack of reaction. 
41
 Asociación de Trabajadores del Estado, an association of provincial state workers in 
public administration, health, education, etc. 
42
 Asociación de Trabajadores de la Educación de Chubut, representing provincial public 
school teachers. 
43
 A UCR (Unión Cívica Radical) party politician who won the 1983 provincial elections 
and was at the end of his term of office. 
44
 Chubut has one of the most important oil fields in Argentina and a significant part of its 
budget depended on oil royalties paid by the central government to extract this resource. 
When the province stopped receiving this money, it did not have enough funds to pay the 
state workers’ salaries. 
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for improvements in the project of the ruling-class sectors of power; they 
needed to confront the new project imposed on them. 
An alternative to the project from above was necessary, and for that, a 
corporate perspective was insufficient. The strategy of most workers 
restricted the struggle to demands within small circles of workers in which 
the collapse of the polos de desarrollo model seemed to match their 
interests with that of their employers. The only possibility to keep their jobs 
seemed to be supporting the owners of “their” factories to make profits. The 
solution seemed clear: there was no alternative but to defend their 
employers’ interests so as to keep their employment. 
Furthermore, they found themselves in a situation where they could no 
longer trust their historical tools of organization and struggle. The biggest 
failure of the many unsuccessful attempts at building a new type of union 
was not being able to modify the political role those organizations played. In 
the region, the unions were incapable of creating bonds between different 
fractions of the working class. This became clear with the lack of reaction to 
the factory closures and massive layoffs. Almost all unions restricted their 
demands to asking for compensation, that is, for the factory owners to 
observe the law. 
The situation of the state workers was somewhat different. During the 1987 
conflicts, unions were growing stronger in the dispute with the weakened 
government. In 1988 there was an important change: when Peronists took 
office in the provincial government, some Atech union leaders were offered 
executive positions in the provincial government (the same would happen in 
1989 in ATE).  
 
7. 1989 to 1990: the shipwreck 
The end of the 1980s was a historic turning point with 1989 in particular a 
breakpoint at a national level. Hyperinflation, riots and looting,
45
 the fall of 
Alfonsin’s government and Menem taking office generated the conditions 
for the hegemonic period of neoliberalism.
46
 In the region, the decline of the 
polos de desarrollo project accelerated: there were massive layoffs in the 
textile sector and in other activities. It was evident that there was a crisis in 
the industrial park and in the rest of the small and medium-sized companies. 
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 See IÑIGO CARRERA, Nicolás y otros. “La revuelta. Argentina 1989/90”. PIMSA DT 
Nº 4, Bs. As, 1995. 
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 See BONNET, Alberto. La hegemonía menemista. Bs. As.: Prometeo, 2008. 
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In the construction industry, the collapse was steeper due to the decrease in 
investment and development of new projects. 
The increase in extreme poverty revealed changes in the social situation. 
The Social Services Secretary of Trelew reported that in 1989 two thousand 
families were living in extreme poverty.
47
 These were the families of many 
of the workers fired in previous years. 
This year was also a turning point for unions. The power several left-wing 
groups had gained in the first conflicts of 1989 became evident: they won 
several AOT assemblies defeating the union leaders that tried to avoid 
confrontations, and positing again two opposing strategies. However, these 
were circumstantial victories that could not go beyond the short-lived 
instances of collective participation. Then the attack from the management 
and the union leadership intensified. At the same time, it became evident 
that the opposition groups were having difficulties in building a union 
political project as an alternative to the project of the leadership of the main 
private workers’ unions of the region. 
The defeat of the strategy for building an independent organization of the 
working class – a defeat that was suffered gradually over a few years – now 
seemed final. Juan pondered the growing “individualism”: 
The struggles decreased in those years, because of fear… Many 
people had lost their jobs. So the other tried to protect theirs, 
they could see how the people who had been fired were doing, 
those from closed factories, it was pretty tough. People became 
individualistic, ‘I protect my job, I have children, have to bring 
food to the table’. 
Miguel, among others, was fired despite being a factory delegate, something 
that was illegal until then and would have been stopped by the unions. This 
attack against the unions, and the mild reaction to it, made defeat more 
important:  “When this happened many union activists, the emerging ones, 
were through. The worst part started when all the intermediate union 
members were swept out of many of the factories”. 
For state workers the situation was not that different anymore. The 
integration of some of their leaders into the Peronist provincial government 
in 1988 had weakened them, changing the unions’ profile and producing 
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per family, this meant more than 10% of the population of Trelew which in 1991 had 
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deep internal fissures which for many years would not be overcome. In 1989 
an event took place that, in my opinion, was very important for this model 
of union transformation: the Atech congress expelled the Alternativa 
Docente (Alternative Teachers) group, which was aligned with MAS, for 
having criticized the agreements that the union leadership had signed with 
the government. This was a key moment, for it was prior to similar events 
that happened years later in the private workers’ unions (in 1991 in the 
textile sector
48
 and in 1994 in UOM
49
). 
At the end of 1989, the state workers’ confrontation level increased and it 
was manifested in the streets; they protested against the economic 
adjustments in the province. At the end of the year, there was a strike 
announcement from the state workers for wage arrears and against threats of 
future layoffs. This laid the groundwork for the conflict that erupted in 
1990, the lengthy state workers’ strikes, known as the Chubutazo, that 
ended with the governor’s resignation.50 
 
8. Final comments 
In this article, I have aimed to deepen our understanding of what has been 
characterized as the formation of a working class in the context of a 
subsidized industrialization project. Workers of different backgrounds 
migrated to the Patagonia region in northeast Chubut, attracted by growing 
employment opportunities, stable jobs, and the possibility of owning a 
house. In this context, a new working class was formed, in part by the small 
groups of workers from the region. I also attempted to analyze how the new 
working class created bonds with previous working-class experiences and 
traditions.  
This group of workers gradually formed a class through a subterranean 
process of struggle and organization in the 1970s. During the dictatorship, 
this group of workers took several actions to fight as a class against their 
respective employers in order to improve their living conditions. After the 
end of the dictatorship, this class did not seem to have emerged from a 
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crashing defeat, maybe because the attack against workers was gradual and 
of a different intensity around the country in relation to the workers’ 
traditions the dictatorship wanted to destroy. In the transition to a 
constitutional government, this young working class called for new actions 
and showed an organizational level thus far invisible, discussing new 
models of union organization. It was clear that there were two opposing 
strategies, which were the expression of two levels of awareness with 
different potential possibilities of development. 
It was then, in my opinion, that this class was formed regardless of its 
internal heterogeneity.  However, it was also then that its development 
started to be undermined by the characteristics of the subsidized 
industrialization project in which these workers were immersed. During the 
1980s, the ruling class began a systematic attack against the polos de 
desarrollo project for the region; as a consequence there was a crisis in 
regional industrialization. In this context, workers saw that their jobs 
depended on the maintenance of state-directed industrial strategies. Most 
union leaderships – and most of the class – pursued a politics of “social 
peace”, building alliances with the employers in order to maintain the 
subsidies. The workers had once demanded the improvement of their living 
conditions to their employers; now they demanded the maintenance of 
subsidies for the benefit of their employers. Indeed, this social alliance was 
captained by the factory owners. 
This change, in my opinion, would be decisive, both structurally and 
ideologically. It helps to understand the development of this working class 
and the difficulties they went through to maintain and project alternative 
models of organization – different from the dominant models of traditional 
unions – or to oppose more decisively the factory closures and the 
cancellation of the subsidized industrialization project. This hypothesis 
seems to be reflected in the history of northeast Chubut. However, I cannot 
claim that this applies to every case of subsidized industrialization. In fact, 
in Tierra del Fuego there were important conflicts when the first factories 
were closed.
51
 Following E.P. Thompson: 
If the experience appears as determined, class-consciousness 
does not. We can see a logic in the responses of similar 
occupational groups undergoing similar experiences, but we 
cannot predicate any law. Consciousness of class arises in the 
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same way in different times and places, but never in just the 
same way.
52
 
A fundamental characteristic was the different levels of confrontation in the 
private and state sectors. The state workers’ actions were long-term 
although in general their claims were not met. On the other hand, private 
workers did not take general measures; they pursued short-term strategies 
aimed at the specific factory to which the complaint was made. The key 
point, however, is the evident lack of connections between the two groups. 
In previous publications, I stressed that this division may be explained by 
the role the state played as the promoter of capitalist development in the 
region by means of the subsidized industrialization model. As the crisis 
deepened, private workers demanded that the state maintain industrial 
promotion schemes. At the same time, state workers demanded that the 
same funds be used to raise their salaries. I have traced the different 
moments of changes in chronological order, and analyzed the period around 
1989 when structural transformation was most significant. Although what I 
consider a defeat of the working class was a gradual process, it was between 
1989 and 1990 that it was achieved, in a highly unfavorable national and 
international context for workers as a whole. 
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 Revolutionary Teamsters and Socialist Struggles Today: a 
forum 
 
 
on 
Bryan D. Palmer, Revolutionary Teamsters: The Minneapolis Truckers’ 
Strikes of 1934. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2013 (Hardcover) 
and Historical Materialism Book Series. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 
2014 (Paperback). 
 
 
Workers of the World has invited three academics to review Bryan Palmer’s 
recent book on the revolutionary teamsters of Minneapolis in the mid-1930s. 
Sean Purdy, S. Sándor John and Marcelo Badaró Mattos reviewed the book. 
Bryan Palmer commented. 
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SEAN PURDY 
S. SÁNDOR JOHN 
MARCELO BADARÓ MATTOS 
BRYAN PALMER 
 
In many respects Bryan Palmer’s masterful study of revolutionary 
Teamsters in the great Minneapolis strikes of 1934 is a continuation of his 
almost 40-year exploration of working-class studies in North America and 
Marxist historiography. The supremely rigorous research, poignant analyses 
and theoretical sophistication of the research into one of the most important 
strikes of the 1930s in North America recalls his first forays into Canadian 
labor history in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
1
 Like the work of the E.P. 
Thompson he has so thoroughly studied,
2
 this is a historian’s history: 
exhaustive archival research in diverse locales in the United States, 
thorough analysis of secondary sources on the strikes and the 1930s labour 
and socialist movement and a vibrant narrative of events, people and places 
that delves into the political and social history of the period.
3
 While not 
directly engaging with wider historiographical debates on Marxism and 
history, the Teamsters study is unapologetically materialist and informed by 
Palmer’s long engagement with Marxist theory.4 Perhaps most importantly, 
this study of Trotskyists in the trucking sector in Minneapolis is eminently 
political and explicitly intended to provide lessons for today’s working-class 
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Hamilton, Ontario, 1860-1914. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1979; 
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2015. A highly committed supervisor, Palmer has also supervised dozens of graduate theses 
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Studies since 2001. 
4
 PALMER, Bryan D. Descent into Discourse: The Reification of Language and the 
Writing of Social History. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990. 
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struggles, a concern long expressed in Palmer’s prolific historical and 
political writings.
5
 
Revolutionary Teamsters originated as a chapter in Palmer’s second volume 
of his biography of American Trotskyist James P. Cannon. It includes three 
introductory chapters on the historiography of the strikes, the 1930s U.S. 
labor movement, the concept of the mass strike and the political economy of 
Minneapolis; 18 short, lucid chapters chronicling the ups and downs of the 
struggle, the key players and events and analyzing the progress of the 
strikes; a conclusion on the lessons to be learned today; and a useful 
appendix on Trotskyism in the United States in the 1930s. The 300-page 
book is richly illustrated with a total of 28 striking images including 
photographs, paintings, leaflets, newspapers and paintings.  
Downplayed by many historians who focus solely on the Communist Party 
(CP) or bureaucratic trade unionism, Palmer emphasizes the centrality of the 
Minneapolis strikes (as well as similar socialist-led strikes in San Francisco 
and Toledo) as critical moments in the class struggle of the 1930s which 
played a crucial role in the revival of the workers’ movement after several 
years of depression-era misery, demoralization and defeat. What was new in 
the 1934 strikes was the existence of a solid cadre of revolutionary workers 
in the trucking sector in Minneapolis belonging to the Communist League of 
America (CLA), the first U.S. Trotskyist organization formed in 1928 by 
sympathizers of the international dissident component of the international 
communist movement led by Leon Trotsky. Expelled from the established 
and much-larger CP, a small group of CLA militants worked tirelessly in the 
first bleak years of the Depression to provide a pole of ideological 
opposition to both the Stalinists in the CP and the conservative labor 
bureaucrats of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) to organize workers 
(drivers and coal-heavers) in the largely non-union trucking sector in the 
city. Led by the Dunne brothers – Ray, Miles and Grant – Carl Skoglund 
and the non-Trotskyist ally Bill Brown, workers in the trucking sector 
organized a resilient rank and file union and through a series of strikes that 
faced brutal state repression consolidated their unions and effectively ended 
the open-shop regime in the city. It was one of the first salvos in the great 
working-class upheaval of the 1930s that witnessed the formation of the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and important advances in 
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wages, working conditions and union protections for millions of American 
workers. 
What is also new in Palmer’s analysis is his focus on the key role of CLA in 
the leadership of the strike. Along with the established militants and new 
recruits on the ground, the CLA sent its leading organizers such as James 
Cannon, Max Shachtman and Albert Goldman to Minneapolis to aid in 
strike organization and mobilization. Stressing the necessity of a democratic 
and rank-and-file based strike, they organized regular mass meetings, a 
daily strike paper and a Women’s Auxiliary. All in all, he highlights the 
cohesive nucleus of Trotskyist leadership that remained free from the 
conservatism of the Democratic Party and the reformists of the Farmer-
Labor government, developed a winning strategy and mobilized workers to 
confront the hostile and repressive forces of capital and the state. Palmer is 
not uncritical of the CLA and the strikes’ leadership, highlighting their 
sometimes sketchy assessment of the reformist state government during the 
strike and relations with other trade unions in the years after the strikes that 
have been overlooked in the wake of the decisive victory in 1934. 
If Palmer deftly outlines the “skeleton” of the 1934 strikes - organization, 
ideology, negotiation and conflict – he also provides the human “flesh” of 
the movement with a narrative punctuated by many mini-biographies, 
colorful story-telling and sensitive analysis. The three Dunne brothers who 
were central Trotskyist militants in the strike are portrayed in detail and 
labelled “Propagandistic Old Moles” for their persistent propaganda and 
incipient agitation in the first years of the Depression and contrasted with 
their older brother Bill who remained with the CP even writing a 
scurrilously sectarian pamphlet against his younger brothers’ Trotskyist 
activities. The contradictory gender relations involving the important 
Women’s Auxiliary in the strike is handled with the necessary nuance as is 
the reformism of the moderate Farmer-Labour state government in 
Minnesota. Palmer’s use of various primary sources such as the strike 
newspaper, leaflets, posters, personal and internal party correspondence and 
the memoirs of militants provide fascinating detail on the day-to-day 
progress of the strikes. Palmer’s exploration of the often conflictual personal 
and political styles of the Trotskyists’ strike committee and various other 
key players deftly rounds out his overall analysis. 
Palmer is concerned throughout the book with drawing the lessons of the 
1934 strikes and the importance of revolutionary socialist ideas and 
leadership in today’s struggles. As he states in the introduction: 
“Minneapolis in 1934 matters because, in 2013, it has things to tell us, ways 
of showing that the tides of history, even in times that seem to flow against 
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change, can be put on a different course.” (p.7) This is an utterly principled 
intention that cuts against much recent historical scholarship that feigns 
objectivity or disinterest in the fight for a better world in the present. It is an 
optimistic assessment for socialist and social movement militants today that 
recalls Gramsci’s famous dictum on the necessity of “pessimism of the 
intellect, optimism of the will”. In the present context of global economic 
crisis, war, environmental devastation and oppression, highlighting 
historical examples where committed minorities of socialists helped to 
mobilize and lead masses of workers to decisive victories is an essential 
intellectual and political task.  
If the determination, shrewd strategy and innovative tactics of the 1934 
Minneapolis strikers and the Trotskyist militants give us an inspiring 
historical inspiration, it is clear that the strategies, tactics and forms of 
today’s struggles would be decidedly different. Class composition and 
relations have shifted, employers and the state command massive resources 
of repression, technology and communications aid and complicate today’s 
struggles, multiple oppressions cut against class solidarity, most trade 
unions have ossified bureaucratic structures and practices, established left 
parties have adopted neoliberal politics and the revolutionary left fights 
against the current to establish embryonic footholds in the diverse struggles 
that we confront on a daily basis. Surely the keys to success today in any 
struggle would require an intelligent remapping and rethinking of the 
political lay of the land and innovative strategies and tactics appropriate to 
twenty-first capitalism. Yet thanks to Bryan Palmer’s inspiring history of 
Teamsters and Trotskyists in the 1930s we have a great place to begin this 
renewed project of socialist struggle. 
  
110  
 
 
SEAN PURDY 
S. SÁNDOR JOHN 
MARCELO BADARÓ MATTOS 
BRYAN PALMER 
 
To start with conclusions: Bryan D. Palmer’s Revolutionary Teamsters is a 
book for today. This account of class battles in Minneapolis during 1934 is 
must reading for those intent, in 2015, on changing the world we live in. 
Vivid, in fact thrilling, is its account of how workers ground down by 
economic depression and union-busting rose up in victorious struggle. 
Gainsaying those from both right and “left” all too smugly certain that it 
couldn’t be done, they paved the way for mass union organizing drives that 
followed on a national scale.  
Minneapolis was but one of an infinity of places where it needed to be done, 
and far from the only opportunity for successful class struggle at the time.
6
 
What made the difference, as Palmer convincingly shows, was the 
determined nucleus of revolutionary Marxists – Trotskyists – at the heart of 
his story. Up-front about his sympathies, Palmer is equally so when it comes 
to his intentions. To those who would cast yesteryear’s revolutionary 
Teamsters as voices from a long-dead past, Palmer provides explicit 
rejoinders, emphasizing that despite significant contrasts, there are 
important social and political parallels between what working people faced 
then and the situation today.  
I would argue that the key conclusion to be drawn from his account is this:  
Revolutionary Teamsters shows what even a small revolutionary nucleus 
can do, even in a difficult situation, if it is serious – in deeds as well as 
words – about bringing revolutionary politics into the class struggle. As 
Palmer writes, “the coming together of teamsters and Trotskyists in 
Minneapolis in 1934 provides a concrete case of just what can be 
accomplished by workers guided by those who have a revolutionary 
perspective” (p. 4), even if the immediate objective is as basic as 
establishing real union representation.
7
 That is a living lesson for today. 
                                                 
6
 From this standpoint, pace Palmer, “uneven and combined development” provides little 
guidance to understanding class-struggle victories there.  
7
 On p. 220, Palmer quotes Cannon’s statement that in the combination of revolutionary 
leadership and workers’ organized militancy, “one can see the power that will conquer the 
world.” 
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Some may concede that hard class struggle informed by revolutionary 
politics was necessary in 1934, even that it might be desirable in 2015. Few 
seem to believe that it is possible, let alone act accordingly, today. 
revolutionary Teamsters brings welcome lessons, and inspiration, for those 
willing to show not only that it should, but that it must and can be done in 
the here and now. He describes the labor officialdom of 1934 as “far more 
reticent than it was radical” (p. 275). You can say that again when it comes 
to their descendants of 2015. How to meet today’s burning need to organize 
the unorganized, with or without immigration papers, and carry out the 
urgent revitalization of the labor movement? Today’s version of the 
hidebound labor bureaucrats who stood in the way of victory in 1934 can’t 
and won’t. Only the kind of revolutionary outlook and program advanced by 
those who led the struggle to victory in Depression-ravaged Minneapolis 
can make this possible.  
It is commonplace for activists to bemoan the sorry state of labor today, 
with a “leadership” good only for bringing one defeat after another. What 
brought it about? Perhaps the biggest factor of all was the purge of reds who 
built mass unions in the first place. Revolutionary Teamsters is a 
contribution to reviving the historical memory of what they did and how 
they did it. Yet Palmer’s book is not an uncritical account of this heroic 
chapter in labor and revolutionary history. Nor is it a hagiography of 
Trotskyist leader James P. Cannon or his comrades among the strike leaders 
of 1934. Critical analysis is front and center.  
So too – and this is one of the pleasures of the book – is the human story. 
Who made up this handful of hard-bitten reds that, facing daunting odds and 
obstacles, dug deep into the Minneapolis coal yards? Why were men and 
women newly awakened by class struggle “oddly jubilant” (p. 83) on the 
eve of big battles? When the cops busted heads and shot unarmed workers 
in the back, how did the militants of Teamsters Local 574 organize care for 
the victims and regroup to win? How did they manage to put out a daily 
strike paper, The Organizer, that thousands of workers made the vibrant 
voice of their own aspirations? Above all, how did this small group of 
revolutionaries successfully organize workers battered by economic crisis, 
facing relentless employer hostility, after seemingly endless retreats “led” 
by worse-than-useless labor bureaucrats beholden to the parties and 
politicians of the capitalist status quo?  
Because of, not despite, their politics. The allegedly esoteric doctrine 
espoused by Cannon’s then-isolated cohort was no esoteric footnote, as 
mainstream historians would have it, in this rollicking story of rough and 
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ready Teamster rebels. Nor was it a sidelight to the “nitty-gritty” of 
organizing. Instead, as Palmer makes clear, it made the story possible: it was 
the nitty-gritty of how they built a powerful union – which wound up 
rocking the Northwest and beyond – from hard-pressed truck drivers 
together with the coal-shovelers, crate-heavers, “chicken-pluckers,” and 
others despised and excluded by the hidebound craft-unionists who lorded it 
over the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.  
“Going with the flow” is no way to win. As part of the Trotskyist nucleus 
then called the Communist League of America – itself scorned and derided 
by currents that fancied themselves the big-league players of leftist politics  
– they had assimilated the lesson that preparing real victories means 
swimming against the stream. This too is vitally relevant today, when what 
Cannon, Trotsky and their comrades called opportunism is deeply ingrained 
amongst all too many on the labor left. (To cite one example, organizing 
rallies for low-wage workers are repeatedly turned into photo ops for 
Democratic politicians. For another, see most left reactions to the recent 
Greek elections.) 
“Jugar con reglas del patrón, es segura perdición.” Roughly translated, this 
means “if you play by the bosses’ rules, you lose,” a slogan eagerly picked 
up from revolutionaries by immigrant workers at New York’s Hot and 
Crusty restaurant who waged a difficult, successful union organizing drive – 
and won a union hiring hall – in 2012.8 In an oft-quoted retrospective of the 
Minneapolis strikes, Cannon insisted: “Our people didn’t believe in 
anybody or anything but the policy of the class struggle and the ability of 
the workers to prevail by their mass strength and solidarity.”9 This is 
crucially pertinent to events in the U.S. today, as the labor officialdom 
preaches submission to the bosses’ anti-labor laws, endlessly subjugating 
the labor movement to the same Democratic Party that leads the charge 
against education workers, wages endless wars abroad, and ramps up police-
state measures “at home.” To unchain workers’ power today, it really is 
essential to build an opposition guided by the lessons of class struggle; that 
is, by revolutionary politics. 
Palmer’s book sheds light as well on the very current topic of police 
violence against the oppressed. Mass protests from Ferguson, Missouri to 
New York City have brought claims from “official” (Democrat-aligned) 
leaders that it’s a question of a “few bad apples,” and that racist police 
                                                 
8
 See “Hot and Crusty Workers Win With Groundbreaking Contract,” The Internationalist 
(November 2012), http://www.internationalist.org/hotandcrustyworkerswin1211.html. 
9
 James P. Cannon, “The Great Minneapolis Strikes,” Fourth International, May1944. 
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violence can be reformed away. More radical forces insist the problem is 
systemic; young Marxists have sought to popularize the chant that “Only 
revolution can bring justice.”  
The Trotskyist-led Teamster insurgents of 1934 stressed that repression is 
the function of the “special bodies of armed men” at the core of the 
capitalist state. When police bullets wounded at least 67 unarmed strikers on 
“Bloody Friday” (20 July 1934), The Organizer drove home the lesson that 
police are “the Uniformed Protectors of Profits.”  Guiding the strikes to 
victory in the face of this organized state violence required an understanding 
of this basic class insight plus a sophisticated sense of strategy and tactics 
informed by the lessons of previous class struggles, not only in the United 
States but internationally. Union militancy was necessary but not sufficient; 
again, revolutionary leadership was required.  
Capitalist or working-class politics?  As co-thinkers of Leon Trotsky, 
Minneapolis Teamster leaders knew that for unionists to defeat powerful 
employers backed by capitalism’s politicians and state power, they had to 
go beyond trade-unionism “pure and simple” and enter the terrain of 
politics.  
Revolutionary Teamsters is an antidote to the conventional wisdom snake-
oil tale that Roosevelt’s National Labor Relations Act, Labor Board and 
federal mediators embodied victories for the working class. As savvy 
veterans of battles going back to Wobbly days, Minneapolis Trotskyists 
showed their ability to outmaneuver local politicos, and sent some of those 
mediators scurrying out of town with their tails between their legs. The felt 
need to maneuver in the face of “Farmer-Labor” governor Floyd Olson’s 
support in the labor movement is understandable – but the book details 
important weaknesses in their approach regarding this capitalist politician. 
Trotsky was, moreover (as Palmer notes), quite critical of what he saw as 
his U.S. comrades’ tendency towards conciliation of “Rooseveltian” trade-
unionists. From the standpoint of the exiled Red Army organizer, principled 
intransigence in the fight for the political independence of the working class 
forms the basis for smart tactics in difficult situations. 
If that was a lesson of Bolshevism, so too was Lenin’s insistence that 
labor’s power must be brought into the fight against all forms of oppression 
if labor, and all those downtrodden by capitalist society, are to win. Key to 
the Minneapolis struggle was the fighting alliance Local 574 forged with the 
unemployed and with farmers facing ruin in the capitalist crisis. Palmer 
highlights the importance of the union’s Women’s Auxiliary, refuting 
historians who have put it down as an expression of submission rather than 
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what it was: one of the most vital weapons in for defeating local rulers 
ruthlessly determined to keep the women and men of 574 in their “place.” 
So no, the past is no “foreign country” for those intent on learning how to 
organize a different future. Today, some of the less deluded mouthpieces of 
capitalism admit to a sneaking suspicion that the working class will not 
forever take a beating without striking back. Glimpses and flashes have 
emerged, in immigrant workers’ revival of International Workers’ Day; in 
the May Day 2008 longshore union action against the Iraq and Afghanistan 
wars that shut down all 29 ports on the West Coast; in work stoppages there 
and in Brazil for the freedom of radical black journalist Mumia Abu-Jamal; 
in the increasingly open discontent of low-wage workers throughout the 
U.S., the determination of strikers standing up to the robber oil barons and a 
number of organizing campaigns. Of course we cannot pinpoint when 
broader struggles will erupt. What we can clearly affirm is that for a 
successful counteroffensive to be waged, organizing now on the basis of a 
program to win the class struggle is of the greatest importance. 
Through the many and varied sources Palmer brings to bear, we hear the 
voices of those who built on that basis in the years leading up to the 
victories of ’34. Among them are legendary militants such as the Dunne 
brothers and “illegal” immigrant revolutionary Carl “Skogie” Skoglund; 
less-known but pivotal activists like Jack Maloney, Carlos Hudson and the 
Dakota Sioux Trotskyist Ray Rainbolt, commander of the Union Defense 
Guard;
10
 picket-line defenders and Women’s Auxiliary organizers like Clara 
Dunne, Marvel Scholl and the indomitable “Mrs. Carle”; together with 
Cannon and other Trotskyist leaders who helped beat a path to victory in 
Minneapolis. Readers looking towards revolutionary future for the world 
workers movement will get the satisfying sensation of being in conversation 
with some of “our people” from the past, who have much to pass down to us 
today. 
 
  
                                                 
10
 Rainbolt was one of several Sioux and Ojibwe (Chippewa) revolutionary Teamsters who 
issued a humorous rejoinder  to claims that the union was “un-American” (p. 264n). 
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In this second decade of the twenty-first century, any analysis of current 
social conflicts would recognize that we are witnessing social struggles of 
great proportions in diverse places around the planet. Mass protests have 
multiplied with some reaching the proportions of true political revolutions 
(even if many times they are incomplete) and almost all have questioned the 
current bases of capitalist accumulation (if not capitalism itself). Surely they 
were impelled in great part (but not exclusively) by the crisis detonated in 
2008 and the “austerity” packages used by governments to combat it: from 
the “Arab Spring” (2010-2011) to the protests against the deaths of the 
Mexican students (2014) passing through the diverse “Occupy” movements 
in North America (and other places), by the Spanish 15M or the “June 
Days” of 2013 in Brazil, among many others. Analyses of these movements 
have highlighted among their principal characteristics, the profile of the 
protestors – more heterogeneous, young and educated -, the “horizontal” 
organizational forms and the rejection of traditional leaderships and 
organizational instruments typical of the struggles of the working class since 
the nineteenth century such as parties and unions. 
There are good reasons for such a rejection including: the exclusionary 
character that dominates the workers’ movement with representation almost 
always restricted to the formal sector of the working class in which 
precariousness, informality and elevated unemployment rates are widely 
evident (in the North as much as the South of the planet despite different 
dimensions); the bureaucratic practices of union leaders more interested in 
maintaining their relative privileges than effectively representing class 
interests; and the clear commitment to the ruling order by the leaderships of 
the immense majority of parties born through workers’ movements that still 
possess parliamentary/electoral weight. Yet the recent movements also face 
flagrant difficulties in relation to their capacity to guarantee that their 
explicit or implicit demands in mass mobilizations result in positive 
outcomes on the political level or even to take advantage of the moments of 
greater mobilization to create more permanent spaces of organization and 
struggle. Is this situation inevitable? Would it not be possible to (re)connect 
the recent mass mobilizations and their participants to the more traditional 
organizations of the working class, potentializing the former and revitalizing 
the latter? Can the history of the struggles of the working class in the 
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twentieth century, without pretension to give scholastic “lessons” to current 
generations, raise discussions about past experiences and processes that 
could be useful in the search for solutions to the impasses of the present? 
It is exactly in this sense that Bryan Palmer’s book, Revolutionary 
Teamsters, may be read as very rich contribution to analyses of the workers’ 
movement in North America in the context of the capitalist crisis that 
emerged in 1929, but also as a stimulus to debate alternatives in the present  
situation of social struggles. After all, the subject of the book – the truckers’ 
strikes in Minneapolis in 1934 – brings together a group of events that were 
central turning points in relation to questions of mobilization and 
organization in the decade. A context of capitalist crisis prevailed with the 
whole range of consequences for the working class that we all know so well 
today: a brutal rise in unemployment, the reduction of real wages of those 
who have work, the absolute and relative pauperization of the majority of 
the population as well as the anti-union politics of the bosses (combined 
with the passivity/complicity of the union bureaucracies encrusted in the 
craft unions dominant in the American Federation of Labor/AFL) and the 
combination of strongly repressive measures and mechanisms of social 
assistance (and at the most anti-cyclical interventions) of the state. 
In 1934, after various years of the evident decline of the capacity of 
intervention of the workers’ movement, a few mass strikes initiated a 
significant shift in the situation of American unionism. This was the case of 
the San Francisco general strike led by the stevedores of the city’s port that 
paralyzed around 125,000 workers at its peak. Similarly, the Toledo strikes, 
initiated in auto-parts factories, had a great impact that counted on the 
strong support of the unemployed sector of the working class. Treated in the 
second chapter of Palmer’s book, these strikes were characterized by the 
strong union and political presence of the left who organized the strike 
movements and together with the Minneapolis strikes of the same year 
provided a decisive impulse to the reorganization of American unionism 
that in the following years would result in the rise of the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (CIO). 
The truckers’ strikes in Minneapolis and the movements with which they 
connected – in a city with a little more than 450,000 inhabitants (the 
fifteenth largest city in the United States at the time) there were 30,000 
unemployed and around 120,000 depending on some form of public 
assistance in the first years of the 1930s – are highlighted as one of the great 
events of the time and have been evaluated by other studies, all of which are 
addressed by Palmer in the first chapter of the book. Even so, Revolutionary 
Teamsters is distinguished by a strong dose of originality for diverse 
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reasons. First, by the emphasis he gives to the importance of a left-wing 
leadership distinct from the vanguard organized in Toledo by the American 
Workers’ Party (an organization with a proletarian base and a fluid reformist 
program spurred on by the radical events of 1934) and the leaders of the San 
Francisco strikes linked to the Stalinist Communist party in its most 
sectarian phase at the beginning of the 1930s. Minneapolis witnessed the 
surprising encounter between a small (really small with only a half dozen 
militants at the beginning of the process), but decided groups of militants 
from the communist left opposition – Trotskyists organized in the 
Communist League of America – and the largely unorganized workers in 
the trucking sector.  
Palmer’s analysis demonstrates that such leadership had a decisive role in 
the grass roots organization of the trucking sector, widening the professional 
category and the mobilized base beyond the drivers and their helpers to 
involve all workers involved in the loading and unloading of goods. 
Studying this grass-roots organization in the 1930s, especially in Chapter 4 
– accomplished through the patience of the revolutionary “old mole” 
referred to by Marx – Palmer reminds us that it was not done in detriment to 
the occupation and renovation of the existing space of the established union 
(Local 574 of the General Drivers’ Union of the AFL).  Establishing 
anterior relations with the sector most disposed to mobilize for union 
recognition, the left vanguard was able in 1934 to transform the union into a 
more combative organization with a wider industrial logic of representation. 
The result was evident with the increase in the number of workers organized 
in the sector from between 75 and 175 in 1933 (p.37) to some thousands (2-
3 thousand in April and close to 7 thousand in the middle of the year) who 
fought for union recognition during the strikes of 1934 (p.60). 
The emphasis on the importance of the organizational work of the Trotskyist 
leadership leads the author to highlight the role of James P. Cannon, one of 
the principal leaders of the Left Opposition in the period and the subject of 
an important biography already published by Palmer.
11 
Cannon did not 
accompany the actions in Minneapolis from a distance but involved himself 
directly on the ground, especially from the final days of the second strike in 
May 1934 when he brought to the city his experience of decades as an 
organizer of movements to strengthen the Strike Committee constructed to 
sustain the struggle (see chapter 10). Cannon also represented a point of 
                                                 
11
PALMER, Bryan. James P. Cannon and the origins of the American Revolutionary Left, 
1890-1928. Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 2007. 
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convergence between the local mobilizations in Minneapolis and the wider 
conjuncture of the class struggle on the national level. As a way to 
understand the role of Trotskyists in the wider movement, Palmer includes 
an appendix to the book with a synthetic recuperation of the trajectory of 
Trotskyist militants and their organizations in the United States in the years 
before the 1934 strikes. 
All the emphasis the analysis places on the role of leadership should not 
lead us to a rash judgment that it was the only element responsible for the 
dimensions of the movements in Minneapolis in 1934. On the contrary, 
Palmer’s chief interest is in registering the specific form of the virtuous 
“dialectic of leaders and led” that occurred in this process. Such a dialectic 
is visible to the reader because the author presents a detailed narrative – 
supported by memoirs, testimonies, official documents and, especially,  
extensive research in periodicals of the period – of the events of the strikes 
in February, May and July/August. The narrative is certainly designed to 
highlight important particularities of the movement such as the degree of the 
extremely detailed preparation of all the activities undertaken by the 
militants, their preoccupation with mobilizing the unemployed (Chapter 6), 
the involvement of families (with emphasis on the role of women, dealt with 
in Chapter 7) and the disposition to confront harsh repression. The latter 
may be observed as much in the conflicts between strikers/picketers and the 
police and hired militias, such as in the “Battle of Deputies Run” that 
occurred in the May strike (see Chapter 9) as in the clashes of July/August 
when the National Guard was called up and martial law decreed against the 
strikers by the supposedly “progressive” governor of the Farmer-Labour 
Party. This latter battle was an even more violent confrontation, especially 
“Bloody Friday” on July 20 when dozens of strikers were arrested, many 
were wounded by bullets and one man was killed as a result of his wounds 
(see Chapters 14 and 15).  
The descriptive richness of the narrative of these events is strongly 
integrated with a theoretical-analytical approach that is the principal source 
of the originality of Palmer in relation to those who preceded him. In a 
creative form, he employs the theory of uneven and combined development 
to explain the process. In Chapter 3, Palmer recuperates the history of the 
workers’ movement in Minneapolis, demonstrating that significant advances 
in struggles at the end of the 1910s were followed by a series of defeats for 
workers in the 1920s and the rise of a reactionary and anti-union sector, 
organized around the Citizens’ Alliance, that pushed left-wing unionism to 
the margins and even relegated the class collaborationist mediation of 
conflicts by the AFL, highly relevant  in other areas of the country, to a 
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secondary role. However, in the midst of the powder keg of contradictions 
generated by the economic crisis after 1929, the relative “backwardness” of 
the local workers’ movement became the principal reason for the privileged 
position of the city as a platform for the workers’ movement to “leapfrog” 
towards the most important manifestation of class struggle at that time in the 
United States. In Palmer’s words: “labor’s very failures meant that there 
were spaces for radicalism to breath, for it could not be suffocated by 
mainstream counterparts almost entirely lacking in strength” (pp. 33-34). 
This same explanatory approach allows the author to explain how the ruling 
class exacted revenge in the first years of the 1940s against the leaders and 
conquests of the strikes such as the small economic victories of the February 
strike, the recognition of the union after the May strike and to a certain point 
the surprising victory of the July/August strike that resulted in wage 
increases, improvements in working conditions and a significant impulse for 
union reorganization not only locally, but in many other cities (see Chapter 
21). 
 Yet the importance of Palmer’s book goes well beyond the history of the 
strikes themselves that he tells. The central point is that Minneapolis in 1934 
“matters because [today] it has things to tell us” (p.7). Which things? 
Among the “lessons” of this process, Palmer stresses: “a sense of both the 
necessity and possibility of rebuilding the kind of revolutionary 
organization that can simultaneously nurture a creative leadership and 
encourage and develop the militant combativity of the working class. 
Struggles that secure gains in new causes have to be fought through, 
planned, and mobilized in order to be won”. Without doubt, this book 
rescues this “important chapter in the history of the possibility of class 
struggle” (p.268). 
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My thanks to Workers of the World for providing a forum for the discussion 
of my Revolutionary Teamsters: The Minneapolis Truckers’ Strikes of 1934.  
The commentaries by Sean Purdy, Marcelo Badaró Mattos, and S. Sándor 
John are laudatory and generous.  It is gratifying to read reviews that value 
history, not as some kind of precious artifact, but as a living process, with 
relevance in the here and now.  I wrote the book to make the elementary 
point, too often lost in the swirl of playful postmodernisms or detailed 
accounts of cultural minutiae, that history matters.  To be sure, as Sean 
Purdy points out, we cannot recreate the past in current political struggles, 
and just how much has changed and what that means for how we approach 
the project of socio-economic transformation in our times are critically 
important questions, with which we must engage rigorously. That said, it is 
important not to lose sight of continuities, of principles that do not die.  Too 
much is perhaps often made of how everything today is so relentlessly 
different than anything we may have known in the past.  This kind of 
positioning has a way of obfuscating the obvious, obliterating the outlines of 
the knowable in a charade of endless consideration, however sophisticated, 
that manages to immobilize active resistance rather than guide it in fruitful 
ways. 
What is most striking in the response to Revolutionary Teamsters is that, as 
what Sándor John calls “a book for today,” it elicits reactions that come out 
of today as well.  Purdy, John, and Badaró Mattos rightly read my account 
of arguably one of the most important strikes of the 20
th
 century with an eye 
to what can be learned about how we might struggle today. They express 
differences of nuance and subtlety, but they all agree that the crucial 
importance of a revolutionary Trotskyist left in Minneapolis in 1934 
mattered decisively. This registers with them in terms of appreciating the 
importance of the lack of such a presence, for the most part, in the class 
struggles of the current period.   
How different this is from what we might label the standard academic 
review, an early example of which is Richard Oestreicher’s short assessment 
in the British journal, Social History. Oestreicher praises Revolutionary 
Teamsters’ “energetic narrative,” delivered with what he describes as “skill 
and verve,” building on “laborious delving in primary sources.”  He 
acknowledges that the leadership of the strike was well-served by its 
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revolutionary commitments, in as much as this dedication to a cause steeled 
the determination of the Minneapolis trade union leadership.  But for 
Oestreicher the victory in Minneapolis somehow happened “in spite of their 
Trotskyist politics, not because of them.”  Managing to virtually ignore the 
book’s narrative, Oestreicher bypasses how the Minneapolis revolutionaries 
functioned as architects of a momentous labour mobilization in a non-
revolutionary situation. As an academic reviewer Oestreicher finds it 
perplexing how anyone could actually believe in the possibility of 
revolutionary politics, and his review ends with a dismissal of all such fine 
sentiments, calling for an “effective analysis of contemporary world 
politics” and an “appropriate strategy for the Left in the current moment.”  
What that might be, however, and how it might draw on the history of the 
teamsters’ strikes of 1934 is never addressed.  Ironically enough, the 
academic historian, seemingly guided by the need for an objective account, 
is able to ignore what happened in the past if it does not suit his sensibilities 
about what should be happening today.
12
 
Left critics of Revolutionary Teamsters,
13
 such as Teamsters for a 
Democratic Union founding figure, member of Solidarity, and New Politics 
co-editor Dan La Botz can fall into the same trap. La Botz, in what is 
arguably the most critical assessment of my treatment of the 1934 teamsters’ 
strikes, takes umbrage at any criticisms of the strike leadership, both during 
the confrontation in 1934 and for years afterwards. He blurs nuances, 
misrepresents positions, and argumentatively asserts that there are problems 
where others find strengths. Thus, Sándor John describes the reconstruction 
of class struggle in Revolutionary Teamsters as “vivid, in fact thrilling,” and 
another Solidarity reviewer, Barry Eidlin calls the book “the most vivid, in-
depth, meticulously documented account” of the 1934 events, “written with 
a novelist’s attention to narrative tension and plot development.”  La Botz, 
in contrast, bemoans an “all-too-dense narrative,” likening Revolutionary 
Teamsters to “a political tract from another era.”  Whereas Badaró Mattos 
rightly sees my book’s attention to the dialectic of leaders and led as 
unfolding in the “descriptive richness of the narrative of events,” 
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 Richard Oestreicher, “Review of Revolutionary Teamsters,” Social History, 40 (February 
2015), 123-125. 
13
 In what follows I will often allude to three reviews that have been collected digitally: 
Dan La Botz, “Trotskyist Teamsters of the 1930s – An Attempt to Draw the Lessons,” first 
published in New Politics; Barry Eidlin, “Minneapolis 1934 Strike Revisited,” first 
published in Against the Current; and Alan Wald, “‘A Seemingly Incongruous Alliance’: 
Trotskyists and Teamsters in 1934,” first published in Labour/Le Travail, all in “The Year 
1934: Three Reviews of Bryan Palmer’s Revolutionary Teamsters,”  http:www.solidarity-
us.org/site/node/4213, accessed 20 March 2015. 
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highlighting how the Left Opposition of the Communist League of America 
was able to advance the cause of trade unionism in Minneapolis, La Botz 
complains, yet again, of the “limited degree” to which “the Trotskyist 
leadership’s functioning in Local 574” is revealed.14   Sean Purdy sees the 
                                                 
14
 La Botz wonders whether the Trotskyist leadership made decisions first in their cell, 
fraction, or branch, or if those decisions were arrived at through dialogue with workers’ 
leaders and activists.  I can only question whether La Botz has read the book. There is 
abundant discussion of how the Trotskyist leadership, which rallied to it virtually all of the 
militant class fighters within the ranks, had existed within the trucking sector for some 
time. It clearly connected with workers, listened to them, and incorporated their tactical and 
strategic suggestions. Then, through their Communist League of America (CLA) 
discussions, these Trotskyists arrived at strategic orientations.  Once they were in positions 
of strike leadership, these CLAers conveyed to the Teamster membership suggestions about 
strike developments and how to advance the struggle in open, democratic union meetings, 
where union decisions were taken.  From the establishment of the Trotskyist-led volunteer 
organizing committee that orchestrated the first February 1934 strike through to the 
development of the Strike Committee of 100, the relations of Trotskyist leaders and the 
rank-and-file led are part of the “dense narrative” that La Botz finds unsatisfying. Had he 
been more open to reading it carefully, he would have answers to some of the questions he 
poses. The issue of party fractions and their role in situations like Minneapolis has been 
elaborated on in E. Tanner, “Revolutionary Teamsters: The Minneapolis Truckers’ Strikes 
of 1934 – A Review and Commentary,” Parts I & II, Workers Vanguard, 1052/1053 (19 
September/3 October 2015), http:www.icl-fi.org/English/wv/1052/palmer.html, accessed 
20 March 2015.  Tanner claims that Revolutionary Teamsters fails to address the work of 
the “Teamster fraction of the Minneapolis CLA branch.” This is overstated and it 
misunderstands precisely how Minneapolis in 1934 differed from Trotskyist trade union 
work in the 1933 New York hotel strike or among the Progressive Miners of America in 
Illinois. In both cases the struggle to build and sustain disciplined fractions of CLA cadre 
was essential but also flawed and incomplete, revealing both strengths and weaknesses 
within the Left Opposition’s trade union work. In both cases, albeit to differing degrees, the 
CLA fractions were struggling to achieve influence within established unions, integrate 
headstrong fraction members incompletely assimilated to the program of revolutionary 
trade union work, and overcome marginalization by entrenched, conservative labour 
leaderships. The CLA presence as a fraction thus had to be, as Trotsky advised his 
American Left Opposition comrades in 1933, disciplined but far from open in its 
operations. Among the Minneapolis teamsters, however, the CLA fraction was the CLA 
itself, largely because of the size of the local and the importance of the work among the 
teamsters to the branch. To talk of the fraction as somehow different than the CLA branch 
or, indeed, the local CLA strengthened by those Left Opposition leaders brought in from 
New York City like Max Shachtman and James Cannon, is to miss the main point. After 
breaking through various barriers with its orchestration of the February strike, this CLA 
leadership was the de facto leadership of the truckers’ insurgency, effectively displacing the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters-American Federation of Labor-affiliated 
officialdom. In this situation the fraction could function openly and effectively as the 
‘party’, and it did so adroitly, not with the purpose of establishing a revolutionary Soviet 
Minneapolis (which it was alleged was happening by a viciously red-baiting mainstream 
press), but with the intention of building militant class struggle unionism. Trotsky, 
recognizing that such situations would be rare for the revolutionary Left Opposition, 
nonetheless anticipated the possibility of these kinds of circumstances, and wrote: “The 
more the influence of the Communist fraction grows in the union, the more boldly and 
openly will it fling out the banner of its party.” See Leon Trotsky, “Trade Union Problems 
in America,” 23 September 1933, in dog Days: James P. Cannon vs. Max Shachtman in the 
Communist League of America, 1931-1933 (New York: Prometheus Research Library, 
2002), 591-593. For a discussion of how the International Communist League/Spartacist 
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human “flesh” that Revolutionary Teamsters puts on the skeleton of 
working-class leadership as illuminating; he enjoys the “mini-biographies, 
colorful story-telling and sensitive analysis” that is used to portray figures at 
the center of the strike, like the three Dunne brothers. La Botz, in contrast, 
following a position first articulated by Alan Wald, dismisses “one-
dimensional … portraits of Teamster leaders that border on caricature.”  
This is not so much a matter of there being ‘no accounting for tastes’, as it is 
a clear indication of how much preference is determined by politics. 
La Botz (and Wald as well) wants more on women and the support 
Auxiliary that they organized, while other reviewers (such as Eidlin) 
comment on the book’s attempt to “highlight and assess the central role that 
women played in the strike.” What is at stake in this discussion, however, is 
highlighted in Sándor John’s decisive judgment that Revolutionary 
Teamsters refutes “historians who have put [the Women’s Auxiliary] down 
as an expression of submission rather than what it was: one of the most vital 
weapons for defeating the political rulers ruthlessly determined to keep the 
women and men of 574 in their ‘place’.”  Radical feminists such as 
Elizabeth Faue have represented the Women’s Auxiliary as part of the 
gendered construction of working-class Minneapolis,
15
 and while I do not 
deny the importance of this in the making of class relations in the 1930s, I 
stake out an entirely different appreciation of what was involved in how 
women mobilized to support the teamsters’ strikes.  Wald, in particular, 
argues that talking to surviving relatives of those involved in the 1934 
conflicts will give us a fuller picture. 
Could more be done in the way of oral histories of the strike and its 
participants?
16
  Absolutely.  Might the search for other sources reveal a 
cache of fresh documentation?  Certainly that is possible.  For women, 
ethnic groups, and the particular case of native Americans, of whom I have 
identified six strike supporters, and about whom La Botz insists more 
should be told, useful information may well surface that will expand our 
                                                                                                                            
League critique of Revolutionary Teamsters around the issue of fractions and class struggle 
caucuses relates to perspectives of contemporary trade union work see “Spartacists 
Repudiate Class-Struggle Caucuses: Belated rationalization for abandonment of trade-union 
work,” http:www.bolshevik.org/statements/ibt_20141231_spartacists_caucuses.html, 
accessed 20 March 2015. 
15
 See Elizabeth Faue, Community of Suffering & Struggle: Women, Men, and the Labor 
Movement in Minneapolis, 1915-1945 (Chapel Hill and London: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1991). 
16
 There already are many oral history sources relating to the 1934 strikes, including the 
material presented in Philip A. Korth, The Minneapolis Teamsters Strike of 1934 (East 
Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1995). 
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understandings of the 1934 events in Minneapolis greatly.  No such 
evidence came to my attention and none is cited by La Botz.  Still, 
discoveries happen; those seeking may well find.  There remains much to be 
done, for instance, even on the ground of politics, with a fuller exploration 
of the importance of the Farmer-Labor Party, which governed the state of 
Minnesota, of undoubted importance.
17
  A good history of the reactionary 
Citizens Alliance exists, but there remains much to explore in terms of the 
local civic officialdom and its administration of the city amidst an intense 
period of class struggle.
18
 The context of Minneapolis’s “privilege of 
backwardness,” which I adopt from Trotsky’s discussion of uneven and 
combined development, is unconvincing to Sándor John but suggestive to 
Badaró Mattos, and I am more than willing to concede that the full story of 
Minneapolis’s political economy and how this material context relates to the 
workers’ mobilization of the Great Depression needs fuller elaboration.19  
Revolutionary Teamsters claims no definitiveness.  This said, however 
much more we may come to know about the 1934 strikes and the 
circumstances in which they developed, their meaning and significance in 
the history of American class struggle is unlikely to be so altered that we 
can ever discount the importance of the Trotskyist leadership that guided 
Minneapolis’s teamsters to victory. 
History matters. Not because it is interesting, and lively, and full of human 
richness, diversity, and complexity, although all of this is true enough, and 
quite important. History matters because, while it can neither predict the 
future nor assure us of the outcomes we want, it is all that we as historical 
materialists have to go on in our attempt to see the present as the raw 
material of social transformation. La Botz wants to restrict our vision to 
victories for industrial unionism, suggesting that my claims about 
revolutionary Trotskyism miscue.  But as much as 1934 was about 
consolidating a union, as long as that consolidation was the victory of 
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 Unpublished MA and PhD theses are suggestive, although their interpretations demand 
challenging interrogation. See, for instance, George Dimitri Tselos, “The Minneapolis 
Labor Movement in the 1930s,” PhD dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1971; 
Kristoffer O. Smemo, “The Politics of Labor Militancy in Minneapolis, 1934-1938,” MA 
thesis, University of Massachusetts-Amherst, 2011; and for the later 1930s, Smemo, “A 
‘New Dealized’ Grand Old Party: Labor and the Emergence of Liberal Republicanism,” 
Labor: Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas, 11 (Summer 2014), 35-60. 
18
 William Millikan, A Union Against Unions: The Minneapolis Citizens Alliance and its 
Fight Against Organized Labor (St. Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical Society, 2001). 
19
 The issue is not so much that Minneapolis was a locale of combined and uneven 
development per se (in the orthodox Marxist sense of the term), but that the presence of 
Trotskyists along with the relative backwardness of the labor movement, allowed a 
vanguard element, for a time, to leapfrog over backwardness, advancing the class struggle 
and necessitating a marshalling of antagonists against its leadership.  
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revolutionaries, there existed the ever-present twinned danger of 
compromising the independence of the Trotskyist left or of having it 
succumb to repression.  Almost all of La Botz’s critical commentary on my 
moderate criticisms of the Minneapolis leaders relates to post-1934 
developments, where I suggest that the leadership of the 1934 strikes 
followed a post-1936 course in their relations with trade union officialdoms 
in other cities and states that deprived them of a base of support in the ranks 
that could only result in their being targeted in future times of conflict and 
retrenchment.  The issue is not, as La Botz would have it, whether the 
Trotskyists could realistically have undertaken the arduous task of building 
party fractions throughout the Midwest and developing left-wing caucuses 
inside the International Brotherhood of Teamsters locals.  I am well aware 
of how difficult this would have been, perhaps even impossible. But in the 
absence of this kind of active development of a revolutionary presence in 
the wider union and, tellingly, in the apparent failure of the Minneapolis 
Trotskyist teamster leadership to use its important regional voice, The 
Northwest Organizer, to differentiate itself from “the pro-Rooseveltian trade 
unionists” lay the seeds of an accommodation that would bear the bitter fruit 
of repression.  Trotsky warned of this, writing of the “terrible danger” that 
confronted the Minneapolis victory and those who made it.  In June of 1940 
Trotsky discussed all of this with Farrell Dobbs, James Cannon, and other 
leading Socialist Workers Party (SWP) figures.  He was adamant that, for 
all its strong points, The Northwest Organizer was “a photograph of our 
adaptation to the Rooseveltians.”  He noted that the Dobbs-edited paper, 
proposed “a trade union policy, not a Bolshevik policy.  … You are afraid to 
become compromised in the eyes of the Rooseveltian unionists. … If you 
are afraid, you lose your independence and become half Rooseveltian.  In 
peacetime this is not catastrophic. In wartime … they can smash us.”20   
Roughly two weeks later, on 29 June 1940, Roosevelt signed what would 
become known as the Smith Act into law, criminalizing those who so much 
as advocated overthrowing the government.  A year later, 27 June 1941, the 
Minneapolis SWP offices were raided; 23 Trotskyists and Minneapolis 
teamster leaders were eventually brought to trial on a variety of charges, 
with 18 convicted of Smith Act-inspired counts in December 1941.  What 
Trotsky had predicated had come to pass. To address this and to relate it to 
the policies of the Minneapolis Trotskyist leadership in the aftermath of 
1934’s advances, is not, as La Botz and Eidlin suggest, allowing “sectarian 
                                                 
20
 Leon Trotsky, “Discussions with Trotsky, June 12-15 1940,” Writings of Leon Trotsky 
[1939-40] (New York: Pathfinder, 1969), 271-273. 
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tendencies to show through.” It is grappling with the actual history of the 
revolutionary left, addressing its victories and defeats with suggestions of 
what could have been done differently.  Not to do this is to abdicate our 
responsibilities as both historians of labour and the left, and leftists attentive 
to history.   
This history matters because the 1934 Minneapolis strikes, led by Trotskyist 
revolutionaries, remind us that revolutionaries can indeed win, even in the 
most inauspicious of circumstances. But in order to win, revolutionaries 
must be true to their principles, living by them through the thick and thin of 
protracted class struggle.  Those principles are not a loose and elastic 
container into which anything can be poured, just as they are not 
dogmatically rigid and incapable of adapting to complex realities.  Against 
my insistence that the victories achieved in 1934 in Minneapolis were more 
thorough-going than those achieved elsewhere – and can one really argue 
with this when the San Francisco waterfront strike or the Toledo auto parts 
battle and their outcomes are scrutinized? – La Botz claims that it was not 
the historic Left Opposition that won so much for workers, but “far left 
leadership of any sort.”  This echoes, in some ways, the view that the 
Trotskyist leadership led so effectively in Minneapolis in 1934 not so much 
because of its politics but in spite of them. 
This, in my view, is not the lesson that should be drawn from an 
examination of the class struggles of 1934.  Rather, the significance of the 
class struggle leadership of the revolutionary Trotskyists who set the pace 
for events in Minneapolis in 1934 tells us that just the opposite was true 80 
years ago.  There are those who are in denial about this history.  They take 
the positions that they do because history matters to the politics they would 
like to see operative right now. For some, anything to the left of Barack 
Obama will do.  Others, if they look at struggles like those that unfolded in 
Minneapolis and elsewhere in 1934, will insist on thinking otherwise. 
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From resisting military service to the anti-militarist movement: 
Conscientious objection and resistance to compulsory military service 
in France, Italy and Spain. A comparative analysis, from the First 
World War until the 1980s. 
This article analyses the young people’s resistance to participate in the war 
throughout the twentieth century. This resistance was determined by the 
obligatory participation of citizens in the wars and continued in “peacetime” 
with the resistance to conscription. It began by the individual resistance for 
conscience’s reasons, and culminated in a large and heterogeneous social 
movement that influenced the Government’s decision to abolish the 
obligatory conscription. To analyze this issue, I selected three European 
countries: Spain, France and Italy. In all of them, the opposition to 
conscription had similar motivations among the young refractories; they 
suffered a strong state repression, which made them deepen even more in 
their anti-militarism and disobedience that lead to a social movement 
against the conscription. Finally, resulting from the magnitude of the 
conflict and their wear, the states opted to professionalize their armed 
forces. 
Keywords: military service, refractory, repression, conscientious objection, 
insubordination, social movement, anti-militarism, Spain, France, Italy. 
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Women and Wildcats: Unofficial Women’s Strikes in Sweden in the 
1970s and 1980s 
While the strike propensity in manufacturing declined in the 1980s and 
1990s, it remained high or even increased in services, health care, education 
and so on. Thegrowing portion of tertiary sector employment has further 
moved the searchlight from men to women, as the demographic 
transformation in work has promoted a feminization of strikes. However, 
what if we go back in history, to when strikes and industrial conflict was 
still mainly a men’s concern? Did women go on strike at all, and if so, how 
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did their strikes differ from the overall pattern? The 1970s was the decade of 
“resurgence of class conflict” in Western societies, including Sweden, with 
an outstanding upsurge of strikes in many countries. There is an affluence of 
studies of both the 1970s strike-waves and single strikes in this rebellious 
decade, but few of them deal with female-dominated strikes. This article 
explores women’s strikes in Sweden in the 1970s and 1980s with special 
attention to the treatment in the Labour Court, since the article finds a 
remarkable difference in legal outcome between “male” and “female” 
strikes. 
 
Fernando Mendiola 
Cogs in the military machine? War experience and antimilitarism 
during the Spanish Civil War 
This article focuses on how the Spanish Civil War was experienced and 
understood by those who in previous years had declared themselves pacifist 
or antimilitarist, mainly the pacifist movement around the War Resisters’ 
International (WRI) and the antimilitarist and anarchist trade union 
Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT). In the article, I deal with the 
different ways in which these men and women analysed the reality of war, 
starting with the use of violence and the attitude towards the creation of an 
army, followed by the questions of recruitment and finishing with the 
ideological repression behind Republican lines. These perspectives will help 
us understand the militarization process that occurred on the Republican 
side, the way that the culture of war was experienced and the strategies that 
were sometimes carried out to prevent some of its negative consequences.  
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The Workers of Northeast Chubut (Patagonia, Argentina): A Study of 
the Contextual Features that Shaped the Formation of a Working-Class 
Fraction  
We were interested in deepening the knowledge about the history of the 
working class in Patagonia, Argentina, and in Chubut’s North-East in 
particular. In this region, since the 1960s, industrialization was stimulated 
and subsidized by the national and provincial state, which gave origin to 
Trelew’s Industrial Textile Park and to the primary aluminium production 
plant ALUAR, in Puerto Madryn. Through these years a new working class 
was formed in the region, resulting from the massive arrival of different 
kinds of migrants from other provinces of the country, from the rural zones 
of the province of Chubut and from neighbouring Chile. This extremely 
heterogeneous working class, that in many cases had no previous experience 
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of industrial work, union activity or urban life, met a social context of full 
employment, frequent inauguration of new factories and the possibility to 
improve its living conditions and better work conditions. We’ve tried to 
understand how this working class was formed, how it developed its first 
actions and organization and in what conditions they faced the changes that 
began around the middle of the 1980s and fully impacted it during the 
1990s. 
Keywords: Working class formation, Patagonia, subsidized 
industrialization 
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Fear of Infectious Dissent: First World War Military Intelligence, 
Labor, and the Conscientious Objection of Erling Lunde 
When the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917, the 
military had to drastically expand to meet the requirements of a modern 
industrial war. Congress passed the Selective Service Act a month later with 
very few provisions for conscientious objectors. Erling H. Lunde was a 
pacifist who sought to avoid military service. With his stated objection to 
war and marriage to Laura Hughes, a well-known and outspoken pacifist, 
after the American declaration of war, Lunde came under investigation by 
the US Army’s Military Intelligence Division. Military personnel 
conducting surveillance of American civilians was a new concept in the 
United States. Intelligence officers were often citizen-soldiers themselves 
with inadequate training to conduct surveillance. Thus, they were guided by 
the prevalent political paranoia of the middle and upper classes that feared 
socialism, dissent, and the influence pacifism could have on the overall war 
effort. 
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